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Philosophical scepticism and its tradition in 







Montaigne has widely been regarded as one of the most significant sceptics of 
the XVI Century. Yet, if we consider his Essais as a whole, he turns out to be more a 
sceptical thinker like Socrates or Saint Augustine rather than a pyrrhonist like Sextus 
Empiricus. He is closer to the Academic scepticism rather than to the absolute 
scepticism of Pyrrhonism. This thesis contends that despite most of modern research, 
Montaigne’s biggest debt to ancient sources is with Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Saint Paul, 
Saint Augustine and Plutarch rather than with Sextus Empiricus. I argue that Montaigne 
was familiar with the distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism and his 
quest for truth meant that he had more affinity with Socrates and St. Augustine than 
with Sextus Empiricus or Pyrrho. He did not suspend his judgment more pirronico: on 
the contrary, he exerted it in every occasion. The Christian tradition left a more 
important mark than it was initially thought in Montaigne’s Essais. This reconsideration 
of Montaigne’s scepticism leads to a re-evaluation of different aspects of the sceptical 
tradition since the ancient times. 
In this thesis I show that Montaigne’s scepticism was partly shaped by the 
presence of scepticism in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Old Testament and in St. 
Paul, Lactantius and St. Augustine. Powerful currents of scepticism permeated different 
traditions during the Middle Ages and although their existence has been acknowledged, 
their potential debt to Greco-Roman antiquity and their influence in the recovery and 
transmission of scepticism in the early modern period still need further investigation.
I argue that in the sceptical crisis of the early modern period Sextus’ writings 
may have fuelled this crisis, but they did not initiate it. I claim that Sextus Empiricus 
revival was more a result rather than a cause of the sceptical crisis. Considering that 
scepticism is a fundamental part of the Essais as a whole we can say that Montaigne 
was an important part of the sceptical crisis but his scepticism was not shaped by 
Sextus.
I present in this thesis Montaigne’s originality and the complexity of his thought, 
and even though sometimes it is difficult to follow, his vision is utterly harmonious and 
consistent. Montaigne considered the ideas of many who had gone before him, 
sometimes following them, sometimes taking his own path. Montaigne believed in the 
possibility of real knowledge, even if, in the tradition of Socrates and Augustine, he 
despaired of achieving it in one person’s life. Montaigne was a sceptic who believed in 
the existence of truth and he sought that truth through the medium of the essay.
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Despite recent concerns about the viability of the concept of the “scientific 
revolution” and ongoing debates over the relative “continuity” and “discontinuity” 
between ancient, medieval and early modern science, most historians of science agree 
that the western scientific enterprise was fundamentally transformed in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. The story of this transformation is, in part, that of the 
methodological debates that lay at the heart of the development of the “new learning” of 
the seventeenth century. The story of these methodological debates centers on the 
reactions to a “sceptical crisis”, a “crisis of doubt” about the human capacity to achieve 
meaningful knowledge independently of divine revelation. A central figure in this latter 
tale is the sixteenth-century French essayist Michel de Montaigne, generally regarded as 
one the most influential of the sixteenth-century sceptics and a very important figure in 
the story of the development of early modern scepticism. This study tries to be a story 
about the scepticism of Montaigne, a story about the “scientific revolution” that 
emphasizes both continuity and discontinuity.
The standard account of Montaigne’s scepticism focuses on the supposed 
influence on Montaigne and his Essais of the writings of the ancient sceptic Sextus 
Empiricus. The principal responsible of this understanding of Montaigne’s scepticism 
was Pierre Villey with his book Les sources et l’evolution des Essais de Montaigne, 
(Paris, 1908). Important scholars like Richard Popkin, Donald Frame, Hugo Friedrich, 
and many others who are Montaigne’s most recent biographers, have followed Pierre 
Villey in this. This interpretation of Montaigne and this reading of the Essais, however, 
is problematic. It overlooks largely the use made by Montaigne of other classical 
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authors who are far more important to an understanding of the Essais than is Sextus 
Empiricus. My position is also that this interpretation dismisses, essentially, 
Montaigne’s complex relationship with the long-standing Christian commitment to the 
primacy of faith over reason and virtually ignores the important part played by the 
experience of self and other in the world of the later sixteenth century. The standard 
reading makes Montaigne a simple mouthpiece of ancient sceptical ideas, portrays his 
scepticism as a mere revival of ancient scepticism and diminishes the philosophical 
originality of the French. Finally, and perhaps more tellingly, it is based on a basic 
misreading of the Essais, for the scepticism of Montaigne is not the scepticism of 
Sextus Empiricus, and the evidence of the influence of Sextus Empiricus on the Essais
is scanty at best.
The scepticism of the Essais is in part the product of a voyage of self-discovery 
set within the context of the tumultuous events of the later sixteenth century, which 
included the expansion of Europe’s physical and intellectual horizons in the Age of 
Discovery and the chaos brought on by the Protestant and Catholic reformations and the 
wars of religion that spread all over the continent. In this journey, Michel de Montaigne 
sought guidance from a number of ancient and Christian authors and fought against the 
relative merits of reason, experience and faith in the search for veritable knowledge. His 
model in this quest, however, was not the Pyrrho of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, but his image of the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon, a Socrates who for 
him did not symbolize the impossibility of the attainment of knowledge, but rather the 
quest itself. For Montaigne as for the eidolon of Socrates, scepticism was not the result 
of the quest, but its sign, its emblem, encapsulated by him in the famous motto, “Que 
sçais je?” (What do I know?). As for Socrates, Montaigne’s scepticism was an 
affirmation rather than a negation. Ultimately, Montaigne did not embrace the Pyrrhonic 
epoché or “suspension of judgment”, but rather the Socratic search for knowledge, 
despite the inevitability of uncertainty.
The story of Montaigne’s scepticism is part of the story of early modern science. 
It does not offer nor suggest a meta-narrative of the science of the period as a whole, but 
it does shed light on some of the things going on at the time. It is part of the story of 
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developments in one area of inquiry, and it is one of continuity and discontinuity for 
Montaigne partakes of a deeply rooted tradition, even as he helps to transform it. In the 
hands of Montaigne and some of those who come after him, like Bacon, Descartes, 
Mersenne, Gassendi or Newton, scepticism was not merely a statement about human 
limitations or simply a problem to be surmounted, but an integral part of the quest for 
knowledge, and ultimately, a tool. In short, in the methodological debates of the period, 
scepticism is not just an obstacle to overcome, but an essential part of the search for a 
new epistemological foundation for rational discourse.
The sceptical crisis of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is widely believed 
to have been brought on by the Protestant Reformation and fueled primarily by the 
rediscovery of ancient sceptical teachings, particularly those writings attributed to 
Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the professors, second century), 
Cicero’s interpretation of academic scepticism (particularly his play Academica, first 
century) and Diogenes Laertius' widely disseminated book, Lives and opinions of 
eminent philosophers (probably written in the third century). In truth, however, and this 
is my reading in this study, the basic arguments of the ancient sceptics were known 
throughout the Middle Ages, and the flowering of scepticism in the early modern period 
was essentially the reaffirmation of a long-standing Christian commitment to the 
primacy of faith over reason that evolved in response to continuous and dramatic 
cultural upheaval rather than as a reaction to discreet, seminal events. This question is 
paradoxical since, from the XVIII century onwards the word “sceptic” will be 
synonymous with “unbeliever”.
One of the ideas I defend in the present study is that classical sources, some of 
which ultimately must be seen as more significant in this respect than the writings of 
Sextus Empiricus, played an important role, but so did Judeo-Christian materials that 
have received little attention in this context.
Montaigne’s scepticism, as I have pointed out, has been often portrayed as a 
mere phase in his thought, the temporary result of a personal sceptical crisis supposedly 
provoked by reading Sextus Empiricus’ books. According to this idea, there would be 
two more phases in his thought: a phase of Stoicism before and a phase of hedonism 
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later. Relatively little attention has been devoted to other possible influences on 
Montaigne’s scepticism. 
Recent Montaigne scholarship, however, has begun to address this problem and 
has demonstrated that scepticism is fundamental to Montaigne’s outlook and to the 
Essais as a whole, and pre-dates his alleged encounter with Sextus Empiricus writings.
Donald Frame, for example, has considered that Montaigne’s scepticism was not 
confined to the Apology. Dikka Berven and Marcel Tetel have argued that there are 
Stoic, Sceptical and Epicurean ideas together in the Essais as pieces of the whole. André 
Tournon, Geralde Nakam and Frédéric Brahami have considered the importance and the 
presence of scepticism in Montaigne’s Essais in different ways. Nonetheless, most 
scholars still regard Sextus Empiricus as one of the most important of Montaigne’s 
sources, and considerable disagreement remains as to the impact of theological 
considerations and contemporary events on Montaigne’s thought. In this study I am 
going to argue that Montaigne’s scepticism has more affinity with the doubt of Socrates 
and Saint Augustine than with the scepticism of Sextus Empiricus and that his reflection 
on the human condition led him to a probabilistic, rather than a truly sceptical or 
relativistic, conception of knowledge in matters both earthly and divine. And we must 
not forget that the probabilistic option had a platonic origin. In short, I maintain that 
ultimately Montaigne believed in the possibility of real knowledge, even if, together 
with Socrates and Augustine, he despaired of achieving it in one person’s life. 
*****
Before proceeding further, it seems appropriate to say a few words about the 
methodological underpinnings of this study. Montaigne can be read from a diverse 
variety of perspectives and historians, philosophers and literary scholars and others all 
approach him in slightly different ways. This is as it should be, for the pursuit of 
knowledge in the modern Academy is truly a group undertaking that benefits from a 
plurality of voices, even if they do not always speak as one. This study is offered as a 
contribution to an extended dialogue, and to paraphrase Timaeus, Cicero and 
Montaigne, if I were more than merely human I would offer certainties rather than 
conjectures. There are, however, different means of pursuing probabilities. There are 
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“idea-driven”, “text- or data-centered”, and “problem-focused” approaches among 
others. Arguments may be presented rationally, empirically, or consequentially. Mixed 
approaches and methodologies are perhaps the most common, and this study is an 
example of this fact. If it is fundamentally “problem-focused”, ideas and texts, 
nonetheless, play a part in it, for although it centers on Montaigne's relationship to the 
sceptical tradition, it necessarily has to deal with the ideas and texts that embody that 
tradition. They themselves are not the primary focus, however; the problem is. If it is 
primarily consequential, often offering its conclusions in advance of the evidence, it 
nevertheless frequently falls into a kind of rationalism, and even occasionally pretends 
to a sort of empiricism. The problem, however, always remains central, and the function 
of the evidence is to provide the possibility of a solution. At the heart of this 
investigation are a handful of questions about the nature of Montaigne's scepticism and 
the “influences” on its development. The answers are to be found in the complexities of 
texts, if they are to be found at all, but “influence” is a tricky thing to establish. Authors 
frequently cite other authors and more often borrow ways of framing ideas, but it seems 
to me that the true test is whether or not the ideas of one author echo, either in a positive 
or a negative way, the ideas of another. After that, if it can be clearly established that the 
later author knew the writings of the earlier author, it seems to me that we can start to 
talk about “influence”. “Affinity”, however, might be a better term. An author has an 
affinity, a connection, with another author whose works present similar ideas. In such 
cases the later author can reasonably be described as having engaged the ideas of the 
earlier author, even if ultimately some aspects of those ideas are rejected.
The case of Montaigne presents the scholar with a number of interesting 
challenges. Although he discusses philosophical, theological and anthropological 
problems, he rarely does so in a straightforward way. He read many different kind of 
texts, and had many literary approaches to choose from. He intentionally chose not to 
adopt a philosophical, a theological or an historical style. Instead, following Plutarch 
and other classical authors, he chose a model of discourse, the essay, that allowed him 
the freedom to explore a wide range of topics in an unsystematic way. Montaigne's 
choice not so systematize should not be mistaken as a failure to present a coherent 
vision, however. Montaigne is coherent, and the self-portrait of the Essais is one, for 
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even if there is diversity within it, there is also an overall unity. Montaigne relates 
anecdotes that seem to reveal to him essential features of the human condition and 
juxtaposes alternative perspectives on those anecdotes in an effort both to penetrate their 
meaning and to convince his reader of the plausibility of his judgments. Montaigne had 
a rare gift, the ability to see things from different perspectives, and he utilized that gift 
to its fullest in the Essais. The Essais speak with multiple voices, but it must never be 
forgotten that all of them are Montaigne's voice, and if we seem to encounter many 
different Montaignes in the Essais, it is only because the meta-Montaigne has chosen 
that we should. It might be argued that this is an expression of Montaigne's Pyrrhonism, 
of his relativism, a literary sceptical monument that embodies the impossibility of 
knowledge and the contingency of custom. It is not, however. It is a rhetorical strategy 
that he uses to persuade his reader of the tentative conclusions that he has at least 
temporarily embraced in his search of knowledge. It is and expression and a symbol of 
his ultimate conviction of the existence of truth.
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Chapter 1
Critical reconsideration of Michel de Montaigne’s scepticism
- The sceptical tradition.
Before a complete account of Montaigne’s scepticism can be given, a few words 
must be said, from my point of view, about the sceptical tradition out of which it 
emerged. A brief look also must be taken at the man himself and at his Essais. Finally, 
the standard account of Montaigne’s scepticism and the problems associated with it 
must be explored more thoroughly before an alternative and its implications for our 
understanding of Montaigne’s place in the history of early science can be laid out in 
full.
The sceptical tradition to which Montaigne was heir and from which his 
philosophy came had roots in Greek antiquity but spread, at least, some measure of 
continuity through the Middle Ages and into the early modern period. Within this rich 
and varied tradition, scepticism took many forms, ranging from the simple expression of 
doubt to the formal denial of the possibility of knowledge, from a sort of probabilism to 
debates about the relative roles of reason, experience and faith in the acquisition of 
knowledge. 
In this brief overview, only a quick glance at the history of scepticism in Greek 
and, in a lesser extent, Roman antiquity, the Middle Ages and the early modern period is 
possible. This cursory investigation, however, will help to contextualize the scepticism 
of Montaigne.
The history of ancient scepticism extends from classical Greece in the sixth 
century before Christ through the late Roman imperial period in the third century anno 
domine. Although Greek scepticism did not come to full fruition until some time after 
the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B. C. in the Hellenistic period, to varying 
extents the principal Greek sceptics all claimed presocratic predecessors to their 
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thought. Scepticism was also an important current in Hellenistic and Roman thought.1
The nature of this unsystematic tradition, nonetheless, is not easily characterized. The 
sources for ancient sceptical arguments include Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Plutarch, 
Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius and other ancient writers with Saint Augustine and 
other patristic authors. Among these, Ciceron, Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius 
are, perhaps, the richest and certainly the most important for our understanding of the 
chronological development of ancient scepticism.2
The story of ancient scepticism runs then from roughly the sixth century B.C., to 
the third century a.d.3 It begins with the Presocratics in the sixth and fifth centuries 
before Christ, but the most important early figures are Socrates, who died in 399 B.C. 
and his students Plato (427-347 B.C.) and Xenophon (434-355 B.C.), who are largely 
important in this context as sources of their master’s thought. The first of the great 
Hellenistic sceptics was Pyrrho of Elis (365-270 B.C. approximately) –after whom the 
later pyrrhonian sceptics were named- and his student Timon (325-235 B.C.).4 The 
election of Pyrrho as the beginner of this philosophical movement probably was kind of 
arbitrary. It was Sextus Empiricus who pointed out Pyrrho as the origin of the 
scepticism’s line of thought in the third century A.D. It would not have had any sense to 
make Pyrrho the creator of a philosophical school, because it was the origin of 
scepticism at stake, a line of thought that made its motto with the difficulties of grasping 
knowledge.
The history of ancient scepticism proper, however, begins in Plato’s Academy 
with the succession of Arcesilas (dead 242 B.C.) as head of the Academy around the 
                                                            
1 A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, v. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987, p. xiii.
2 At least these three authors are paid more attention than the others in works as important as Richard 
Popkin’s The history of scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, Oxford University Press, 2003. The origin 
of this book, Popkin’s The history of scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, written in 1960, was the 
portico of much of the contemporary research on scepticism.
3 Much of what follows in this brief chronological summary is taken from Myles Burnyeat’s introduction 
to The Skeptical Tradition, Burnyeat ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, pp. 4-5.
4 Timon was a poet and some of his poems in which the figure of Pyrrho appears have survived and they 
are one of the scarce sources we have about Pyrrho.
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year 273 B.C. Both Arcesilas’ second or middle Academy and the Third or New 
Academy established with the succession of Carneades (219-129 B.C.)5 some time 
before 155 B.C. were dominated by sceptical arguments.6 Academic scepticism 
flourished until 87 B.C. when the succession of Antiochus (dead 67 B.C.) signaled a 
return to a more dogmatic interpretation of Plato’s thought. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-
43 B.C.) was heir to this tradition of Academic scepticism. Around the time of 
Antiochus’s restoration of the Old Academy, Aenesidemus broke with the Academy and 
initiated a revival of pyrrhonic scepticism. The two most important descendants of this 
revived pyrrhonism were Agrippa in the first century A. D. and Sextus Empiricus, the 
last major and the culminating figure in the story of ancient scepticism, in the second 
century.
The leading proponents of Academic and Pyrrhonic7 scepticism all claimed 
Presocratic precursors for their ideas, but while these claims cannot be dismissed 
entirely, they need to be taken with some caution. Cicero included Democritus, 
Anaxagoras and Empedocles in his description of the pedigree of Academic scepticism.8
Sextus Empiricus, while ultimately arguing that none of the Presocratics were sceptics 
in the true sense, considered the historical importance of Heraclitus, Democritus, the 
Cyrenaics and Protagoras to the development of the sceptical tradition.9 In the 
biographical sketch of Pyrrho in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius 
indicated that some considered Homer, the Seven Wise Men of Greece, Archilochus, 
                                                            
5 On the successor line in the Academy see Diogenes Laertius, Life and Opinions of Eminents 
philosophers, IV, 59-60.
6 On the distinction between academies see Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 220.
7 Language matters: in Spanish, Italian and French it is possible to make a difference between two 
concepts: pyrrhonic and pyrrhonian. Pyrrhonic, whose origin would be “pyrrhonism”, would refer to 
everything regarding the sceptical movement, while pyrrhonian, coming from “Pyrrho”, would indicate, 
exclusively, the information regarding the figure of Pyrrho. Very interesting the nuance, see Ramon 
Roman, El escepticismo antiguo: posibilidad del conocimiento y búsqueda de la felicidad, Córdoba, 
1994, p. 28, n. 20.
8 Cicero, Academica, I, xii, line 44.
9 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, xxix-xxxii, lines 210-219.
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Euripides, Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea and Heraclitus as sceptics.10 This list perhaps 
could be expanded almost indefinitely. In general, however, as David Sedley and others 
have suggested, it is probable that the sceptical tendencies of various Presocratic 
thinkers are nothing more than simple expressions of doubt or statements about the 
prerequisites for the search for knowledge by philosophers who should otherwise be 
regarded as dogmatic, even though, as Sedley is careful to point out, later sceptics often 
made profitable use of such expressions.11 More work needs to be done on this subject, 
however, and the importance of similar tendencies in the thought of Socrates and the 
writings of Plato is a little more complicated, as Sedley shows elsewhere.12
The relationship of Socrates and Plato to the sceptical tradition that had its real 
beginning in the Academy is not a simple one. Arcesilas and Carneades both claimed to 
represent the true spirit of the Academy, a claim with which Cicero seems to have 
concurred.13 Sextus Empiricus considered both Socrates and Plato to be relevant to the 
history of scepticism, but thought of neither of them nor the Academic tradition that 
they founded as representative of the true nature of scepticism.14 Diogenes Laertius 
called Socrates a sceptic, but Plato a dogmatist.15 At times Cicero seemed to agree with 
this, at other times he seemed to have regarded Plato as essentially having been a 
sceptic.16 The solution to this puzzle lies in a closer examination of the relationship of 
the thought of Socrates and Plato to the tradition of Academic scepticism. While such an 
examination lies outside the confines of the current study, some additional light needs to 
be shed on this subject before  the nature of Montaigne’s can be explored fully, for both 
                                                            
10 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 71-74.
11 David Sedley, “The Motivation of Greek Skepticism”, in Burnyeat ed., Skeptical tradition, pp. 9-10.
12 David Sedley, “The Protagonists”, in Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat and Jonathan Barnes, eds., 
Doubt and Dogmatism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, pp. 9-10.
13 Cicero, Academica, I, iv, lines 13-14.
14 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, xxxiii, lines 220-235.
15 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, III, 51-53.
16 See the conflicting evidence in Cicero, Academica, I, iv, lines 15-18 where Varro argues for this 
interpretation and Cicero’s ultimate response in Academica, I, xii, lines 43-46.
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Socrates and Plato are crucial to the reading of Montaigne in this and many other 
aspects.
Although the answer to this question can only be sketched out here, its essence 
seems to me to lie in the fact that the Academic sceptics basically transformed the 
teachings of Socrates and Plato in a way that was neither wholly faithful nor completely 
unfaithful to their teachings. The Socrates portrayed in some of the early and late 
dialogues of Plato and in the writings of Xenophon, and to a certain extent Plato 
himself, considered scepticism or acknowledgment of the state of ignorance as a sign of 
the quest for a possibly unattainable knowledge. For Socrates, and possibly for Plato, 
scepticism was the symbol of the philosopher’s quest. Simply put then, among the 
Academic sceptics, the symbol of the quest became its essence, its end rather than its 
indication. For Montaigne, as for Socrates, however, it remained a symbol of a quest 
that for both in the final analysis was one for self-knowledge.
Socrates’ confession of his own ignorance was a powerful symbol for those who 
came after him. This was, perhaps, especially true in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Indeed from antiquity through the present this image of Socrates has endured 
as one of the most resonant symbols of scepticism. Socrates was one of the first to make 
the distinction later elaborated by Plato and Aristotle between “knowledge”, that which 
can be known with certainty, and “opinion”, that which is, at best, only probable.17
Socrates, however, unlike some later sceptics, did not assert that since man can know 
nothing with certainty, the search for certain knowledge should be abandoned, but rather 
that knowledge should be sought even if it can never be found. His was not a retreat 
from the quest for certain knowledge, as it often was for later sceptics, but rather, as 
Terry Penner has shown, the stance of one who was continuously striving for knowledge 
while realizing that it could never be gained fully.18 For Socrates, the goal of philosophy 
was knowledge, a knowledge that was ultimately knowledge of self. This image of the 
                                                            
17 This was the origin of the old dispute between dóxa and episteme.
18 Terry Penner, “Socrates and the Early Dialogues”, in Richard Kraut ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
Plato, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 137.
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historical Socrates comes principally from the early dialogues of Plato and such late 
works of Plato’s as the Theaetetus and the Parmenides and thus raises the question for 
Plato’s own views on the subject.
Plato has generally been regarded as a dogmatist, as asserting numerous positive 
claims about the self and the world, but the shadow of Socrates’ scepticism nonetheless 
permeates Plato’s writings, making Plato an important source for ancient sceptical ideas 
and making it impossible in the final analysis to view Plato as a thorough-going 
dogmatist. As Penner has shown, in the early Socratic dialogues, Plato was still in the 
shadow of his master, and his ideas were still very close to those of Socrates. Even in 
his later dialogues, however, and especially in such late examples as the Theaetetus and 
the Parmenides, where Plato returns to something of that earlier Socratic doubt, Plato 
continued to display the influence of Socrates. Furthermore, at the core of Plato’s 
thought, and crucial to his epistemology, is the idea presented in the “Allegory of  the 
Cave” in the Republic and in passages in other contemporary dialogues that in this life 
the soul cannot have direct knowledge of eternal ideas. It is thus at least possible to read 
Plato as being committed ultimately to the proposition that real knowledge can never be 
attained in this lifetime. Socrates professed his own ignorance and his dedication to the 
unrealizable quest for knowledge. Plato asserted a number of positive claims while 
retaining a healthy doubt about the certainty of his own ideas, as we see in the 
Parmenides where he virtually overthrows all of his own main propositions. Pyrrho, the 
Academic sceptics and the later Pyrrhonians made this doubt, in one form or another, 
the end of the philosophical quest, rather than the sign of it.
Relatively little is known about Pyrrho of Elis and his student Timon. There was 
even some debate in antiquity, and to some extent this debate continues today, as to 
whether or not Pyrrho properly belongs in the tradition that took his name. In his lives 
of Pyrrho and Timon, Diogenes Laertius makes Pyrrho one of the tradition’s founders. 
Sextus Empiricus considers him a forerunner of his school, but notes that his own brand 
of scepticism, though descended from that of Pyrrho is, ultimately, more complete than 
that of the tradition’s founder. Cicero did not regard Pyrrho as a true sceptic, but as a 
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philosopher dedicated to ethics.19 R. G. Bury, the Loeb editor and translator of Sextus 
Empiricus, concurred with Cicero’s interpretation, calling Pyrrho “not at all a full-blown 
sceptic, but rather a moralist of an austere and ascetic type”.20 Anthony Long pointed 
out that Cicero seems to have been ignorant to Timon’s writings and maintained that 
there were good reasons for the subsequent adoption of Pyrrho’s name by later 
sceptics.21 David Sedley suggested that Pyrrho’s student Timon may have used his 
teacher’s name as a sort of propaganda device to promote his own ideas, and that 
Aenesidemus, the reviver of Pyrrhonism, may have used Pyrrho’s name to establish a 
sound ancient precedent for his scepticism.22 In any event, Pyrrho apparently wrote 
nothing, and as the works of Timon did not survive, the ideas of both are known only 
through later sources such as Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus. Both Pyrrho and 
Timon seem to have maintained that certain knowledge is impossible, that the epoché or 
“suspension of judgment” is, therefore, the only feasible solution, and that this stance 
will lead to inner tranquility. At the beginning of the Pyrrhonic tradition there is thus 
something apparently new. This is not a mere expression of doubt, or a statement about 
the nature of the philosophical quest, but a formal epistemological claim about the 
impossibility of knowledge. The solution then, for Pyrrho, Timon and those who follow 
them, is not to strive to come ever closer to the truth, but to acknowledge that it can 
never be attained and to seek inner peace thorough the suspension of judgment rather 
than answers to questions that cannot even be formulated meaningfully.
The principal formulators of Academic scepticism were Arcesilas and 
Carneades. These also left no writings behind, and among the later descriptions of their 
thought, Cicero’s is the fullest, and as such is the primary source for our understanding 
of Academic scepticism. It is possible that Arcesilas’ sceptical stance was influenced by 
                                                            
19 Cicero, Academica, II, XLII, 130. Modern scholars are reconsidering this vision of Pyrrho as a sceptic, 
see, for example, Spinelli, E., Questione scettiche: Letture introduttive al pirronismo antico, Lithos, 
Roma, 2006, p. 4.
20 R. G. Bury, in the introduction to Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, p. xxx.
21 Anthony A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd edition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 
p. 77.
22 Sedley, “The Motivation of Greek Skepticism”, pp. 19-20.
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that of Pyrrho, but the Academic sceptics themselves derived the history of their ideas
from Plato and his predecessors, as was note above. At any rate, Academic scepticism 
was developed largely in opposition to Stoicism, and most of the arguments of the 
Academic sceptics were articulated in response to Stoic propositions. Arcesilas seems to
have maintained a position similar to that of Pyrrho, advocating an absolute scepticism 
that is incapable of knowing even that it knows nothing.23 Carneades, on the other hand, 
seems to have argued that while ultimately it is impossible to know anything with 
certainty, it is possible to entertain likely opinions, or to have a provisional or probable 
knowledge of things.24 This one seems to have been the position of Cicero himself.
Of the later Pyrrhonic sceptics, Sextus Empiricus is the most important, and it is 
in his writings that a fully developed sceptical system emerges. At the heart of Sextus 
Empiricus’ system is the Pyrrhonic idea of the suspension of judgment described above. 
In the writings of Sextus, however, this became more than a general principle. For in 
addition to giving the fullest account of the history of ancient scepticism, Sextus 
Empiricus’ writings offer a veritable manifesto of scepticism and provide an array of 
detailed sceptical arguments which are employed in a thorough and exhaustive critique 
of virtually all realms of ancient thought. It is thus with Sextus that the ancient sceptical 
tradition, which essentially began with Socrates even if ultimately it involved a 
transformation of Socrates’ ideas, reached its fullest flowering. It is, perhaps, because of 
this fact that Sextus Empiricus has often been viewed as the most important figure in the 
history of ancient scepticism and in the history of the later development of the sceptical 
tradition.25
Sextus Empiricus was not the only ancient sceptic, however, and his writings, 
although important, are not the only source for ancient sceptical ideas. Plato, Cicero and 
                                                            
23 Cicero, Academica, I, xi, line 45.
24 Cicero, Academica, II, xxxi, lines 98-101.
25 That’s why modern scholars tend to think about the recovery of Sextus’ books in the Renaissance as 
the very beginning of the recovery of scepticism after the Middle Ages, well above other sceptical 
sources. See Richar Popkin, The history of scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, pp. 64 and ff and 
Manuel Bermúdez, La recuperación del escepticismo en el Renacimiento, Fundación Universitaria 
Española, Madrid, 2006,  pp. 100-128.
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Diogenes Laertius are also important, and because of the relative obscurity of Sextus 
Empiricus and the low popularity of his works compared to theirs, they may in fact, in 
the long run, be more important for the subsequent historical development of the 
sceptical tradition than Sextus Empiricus.
Later Christian authors, like Saint Augustine, also a much more significant and 
influential figure than Sextus Empiricus, are also important in this regard, both as 
sources for ancient sceptical ideas and as part of the continuing evolution of the 
tradition of scepticism. 
For Socrates, Plato, Pyrrho and Timon, Arcesilas, Carneades, Cicero and Sextus 
Empiricus, the question was what can be known. For some, the answer was unclear, but 
the search was what mattered. For others, probable knowledge, or the acquisition of 
likely opinions, was a reasonable goal. For still others, inner peace could be found 
through acceptance of the fact that we cannot know even if we know nothing, and 
through the embracing of permanent suspensions of judgment. This debate lived on, in 
altered form and with new influences, in the context of the Christian tradition. For at 
least some of the early fathers of the Church, these epistemological questions were 
crucial. The same would be true later for some authors within the Islamic and Jewish 
traditions.26
In the preface of the most recent edition of his History of Skepticism,27 Richard 
Popkin, the principal author of the standard account of the “revival” of scepticism in the 
early modern period, acknowledges the contributions of the medieval Christian, Islamic 
and Jewish sceptical traditions, but sceptical tendencies within Christian, Islamic and 
Jewish theological debates generally have been treated as less important developments, 
                                                            
26 For the presence of the Jewish thought in the sceptical tradition see Manuel Bermúdez, “A glimpse of 
Jewish thought in Francisco Sanchez’s Quod nihil scitur”, in Contrastes, University of Malaga, vol. 
XIII, 2008, pp. 285-294.
27 Which is the one entitled The history of scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, and published in 2003. 
The first edition of this book was published in 1960 with the title The History of Skepticism from 
Erasmus to Descartes. This work has been the threshold for the study of scepticism and it has been 
extended some times until its latest edition which is the one cited above. Richard Popkin died in April 
2005 and he was working until his very last day. I spent with him a very productive period of study 
and research in the spring of the year 2004 in his house at Pacific Palisades in California.
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continuous with and significant for neither the story of ancient scepticism nor that of 
early modern scepticism. This fault cannot be redressed here, but certain features of 
early modern scepticism, and of Montaigne’s scepticism in particular, do not make 
sense without at least some consideration of their medieval Christian antecedents. The 
scepticism of Montaigne and his contemporaries had a profoundly Christian component 
that it inherited in part from the Middle Ages.
The early Christian fathers were deeply sceptical of the human capacity to 
understand either the Creator or his creation, and this current remained strong, although 
not all pervasive, in medieval theology. Examples of scepticism in Ecclesiastes, 
Proverbs and elsewhere in the Old Testament perhaps may be dismissed as evidence of 
simple “anti-intellectualism”, or, at least, of some measure of hostility to the Greek 
philosophical tradition, as may similar examples in the New Testament, specifically in 
the writings of Saint Paul. 
Saint Augustine and some of the other early Christian apologists who were 
trained within the classical tradition, however, are another story. St. Augustine and 
others routinely made use of sceptical arguments in their refutation of pagan philosophy 
and were, at least, sympathetic to the ancient sceptics, whom they viewed as being less 
guilty of vanity and folly than were their dogmatic counterparts. Of these early 
apologists, Saint Augustine is the most important in this as in many other respects. For 
Augustine, nothing can be known with certainty without divine illumination. Augustine 
rejected scepticism in its extreme form, but he essentially embraced the Socratic idea 
that knowledge can never be attained fully in this lifetime and inclined towards a 
pragmatic Ciceronian probabilism in most matters. In the Confessions, Augustine tells 
us that the scepticism of the Academics helped to lead him to the truth of Christian 
belief. In the Contra Academicos, he tells us that faith ultimately gives the lie to 
scepticism and maintains that through God man can strive for knowledge, even if, as for 
Socrates, it must remain elusive because of the nature of the human condition. For 
Augustine, as for the later Augustinian theologians who followed him, reason is weak 
and incapable of understanding the Creator or his creation. Man can formulate likely 
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opinions about matters earthly and divine, but can obtain certainty only through 
revelation.
As Popkin and others have argued, the principal ancient sources for sceptical 
ideas appear to have been largely unknown in the Middle Ages, but the basic position of 
the Academic sceptics was known, in part through Augustine, to at least a few, and that 
position was not viewed unfavorably.28 In the twelfth century John of Salisbury 
commended the caution of the Academic sceptics, which he contrasted with the folly of 
other ancient philosophers who thought they could plumb the mysteries of the world.29
Nicholar of Autrecourt in the fourteenth century clearly was aware of the basic 
arguments of the Academic sceptics, even if their influence on his own scepticism is 
uncertain.30 Leading late medieval theologians such as Saint Bonaventure and John 
Duns Scotus made reference to the arguments of the Academic sceptics in their defense 
of Augustinian epistemology, which emphasized the primacy of faith over reason, 
against the attacks of medieval Aristotelians.31 The basic ideas of the Academic sceptics 
were known in the Middle Ages and were regarded with sympathy by Christian thinkers 
committed to an Augustinian vision of human capacities. In the early modern period, 
against the backdrop of the Reformation, this would take on new significance as 
Protestant and Catholic Reformers battled for theological authority. The seeds of much 
of this, however, were sown in the Middle Ages, as were those of many other aspects of 
the history of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations.
                                                            
28 See Richard Popkin, History of Skepticism form Erasmus to Spinoza, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979, p. xvi and Charles B. Schmitt, “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in 
Modern Times”, in Burnyeat ed., The Skeptical Tradition, pp. 226-228.
29 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, Cary J. Nederman tr., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 
book VII, chapter 2.
30 What we know of Nicholas of Autrecourt’s epistemology comes largely from his second letter to 
Bernard and from the articles condemned at Paris in 1346. Texts of both, together with facing English 
translations, are to be found in L. M. de Rijk ed., Nicholas of Autrecourt; His Correspondence with 
Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo, New York: E. J. Brill, 1994, pp. 58-75 and 167-207 respectively.
31 For Bonaventure see Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi, Hamburg: Meiner, 1992, Quaestio 4. 
For Duns Scotus see Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, Allan Wolter tr., Edinburgh, Nelson, 1962, 
pp. 103-106.
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The broad features and, indeed, many of the details of the story of the revival of 
ancient scepticism in the early modern period have been described by Richard Popkin 
and others and only a few words are necessary here.32 According to Popkin, a “sceptical 
crisis”, a “crisis of doubt” about the human capacity to achieve meaningful knowledge 
independently of divine revelation, occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
in part as a result of the Protestant Reformation and in part because of the rediscovery of 
ancient sceptical writings, most notably those of Sextus Empiricus. As Popkin has 
shown, some early Protestant and Catholic Reformers made use of sceptical arguments 
in their theological debates, and later thinkers created a substantial early modern 
sceptical tradition. For Popkin, the major early figures in this story were Erasmus and 
Montaigne, in the latter of whose writings Popkin saw the first example of a mature, 
fully developed scepticism. For Popkin, perhaps the most significant events in the story 
of the development of early modern scepticism were the publication of a Latin 
translation of portions of Sextus Empiricus’ writings by Henri Estienne in 1562 and  that 
of a complete Latin edition of Sextus Empiricus by Gentian Hervet in 1569.33
According to Popkin, these events marked a turning point in the history of early modern 
scepticism and made the mature scepticism of Montaigne and those who came after him 
possible. The major weaknesses of Popkin’s account of the early phase of the sceptical 
crisis are, from my point of view, his tendency to dismiss the contributions of thinkers 
prior to Montaigne, his perhaps exaggerated emphasis on the importance of Sextus 
Empiricus and his failure to consider personal, psychological factors and other more 
general developments in the culture of the period.
Many factors shaped the evolution of the sceptical crisis. The new wider 
availability of ancient texts, the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, the Age of 
Discovery and other events on the broader level of European culture, as well as the 
local, personal experience of all of this contributed to shape the development of early 
modern scepticism. A number of things were going on and the causes of the sceptical 
                                                            
32 The most important work in this field remains Richard Popkin, The History of skepticism from 
Erasmus to Spinoza.
33 Popkin, History of scepticism, p. 19.
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crisis were complicated. It is important to keep this in mind when thinking about the 
general picture and individual thinkers. With regard to the role of ancient texts in this 
story, this word of caution is particularly important.
There has been a tendency to view the re-discovery of Sextus Empiricus as a 
primary cause of the unfolding of the sceptical crisis, and this, ultimately, is a mistake. 
The basic arguments of the ancient sceptics were known throughout the Middle Ages 
and within the medieval Christian tradition there was, at least, a current of scepticism, 
which consisted in the assertion of the certainty of revealed tradition in contrast with the 
highly speculative nature of fallible, human inquiries. In the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries a number of texts that added to the understanding of ancient scepticism 
became available. The writings of Sextus Empiricus were among these, but also 
included were the relevant writings of Plato, Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and others. 
Although Sextus Empiricus offers the most complete account of ancient scepticism and 
the only example of a “sceptical system”, it is important to note that his works never, at 
any time, enjoyed anything like the popularity of those of either Plato or Cicero, or of 
the Christian sources, such as the writings of St. Augustine, which also provided access 
to ancient scepticism. A better interpretation of the role of the writings of Sextus 
Empiricus is to suppose that within the context of an already emerging sceptical crisis, 
caused by a number of different factors, renewed interest in this relatively obscure 
ancient author was paid and that although they contributed to future developments, they 
may not have played as large a causal role as is often assigned to them. In the long run, 
it is more plausible to believe that the wider circulation of the writings of Sextus 
Empiricus was one of the results rather than one of the causes of the sceptical crisis.34
Although the writings of Sextus Empiricus may have fueled the sceptical crisis, they did 
not ignite it. Finally, we must keep in mind that the factors besides renewed interest in
ancient texts were, at least, equally important to the story of early modern scepticism.
                                                            
34 I’d like to point out this situation, since it is a new opinion in the research of the recovery of 
scepticism in the Renaissance.
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In general, then, although renewed interest in ancient sceptical ideas was part of 
the story of the development of scepticism in the early modern period, it was only one 
part of the story and as with Sextus Empiricus, interest in ancient sceptical writings was 
as much a product of the sceptical crisis as it was a cause of its further development. 
Ancient sceptical ideas inspired early modern sceptical discussions. Disagreements 
between philosophers also helped to weaken the confidence in any one particular 
philosophical system. Early modern thinkers made use of ancient ideas, but their 
scepticism was not in the final analysis simply the result of the encounter with those 
ideas. Like their ancient predecessors, a number of early modern thinkers wrestled with 
the questions of what it is possible to know and how much confidence can be had in the 
outcomes of speculative investigations of all kinds. The sceptical crisis had important 
ramifications for virtually all realms of knowledge and human inquiry. The status of 
“religious” claims, “scientific” claims, “moral” claims, indeed of any and all claims, 
came under renewed and intense scrutiny in this period. In their efforts to explore these 
questions, early modern thinkers looked actively at ancient sources for guidance. They 
were not the passive recipients of ancient wisdom, they developed their own originality.
Other factors contributed to the development of early modern scepticism. The 
religious debates of the period and the bloody encounters that often erupted over them 
were immensely important. Although Popkin does an excellent job of showing how 
such issues set the sceptical crisis in motion, he says little about their ongoing effect as 
events unfolded. Protestant and Catholic Reformers alike made use of sceptical 
arguments in their attacks on one another. Their efforts and, indeed, the very nature of 
their disputes over the content and forms of Christianity, fueled the crisis. Things like 
the Wars of Religion and the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, which set neighbor 
against neighbor and brother against brother gave immediacy to the problem. The 
turmoil that all of this produced in the social and political climates of France, Germany, 
England and elsewhere turned this into a true crisis. While all of this was going on, 
Europe’s physical and intellectual horizons were in the process of expanding. The 
discovery of the “New World” changed the very identity of Europe and the place of 
educated Europeans within the world as a whole. New lands, new plants, new animals, 
new peoples and new customs provided an overload of new information to be processed 
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and assimilated. The world and man’s place in it needed to be reconceived. Finally, all 
of this, and the sceptical crisis which was but one part of the overall picture, was not 
happening on some separate, abstract, universal level, but within the hearts and minds 
of real people situated in specific times and places.
The case of Montaigne provides both an excellent example of some of these 
issues and an entry point into future discussions of the varied causes of the sceptical 
crisis. As Popkin has shown, Montaigne was perhaps the most significant of the early 
“sceptics” and certainly one of the most influential. He wrestled with the problems of 
reason, experience, faith and doubt that lay at the heart of the sceptical crisis and he 
made use of numerous ancient authors in this endeavor. A member of the elite of 
European society, he participated directly in some of the most important events of the 
day and he offered insightful reflections on many of the cultural factors that shaped the 
development of the sceptical tradition. He also left us a rare look behind the scenes at 
the private mental life of an early modern sceptic.
- Michel de Montaigne and his Essais.
Montaigne is one of the most fascinating figures in the history of sixteenth-
century France. In many ways his private life was that of a quiet country nobleman with 
a contemplative, scholarly inclination. His public life, however, was set within the 
circles of power. Ultimately of course, the distinction is somewhat artificial, and 
nowhere is this truer than in the case of Montaigne. Montaigne seemed to shift back and 
forth between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa, so that making a hard division 
between the two is impossible in his case.35 This mingling of the public and private, the 
universal and the personal, is part of what has made the Essais both his greatest legacy 
and one of the world's great treasures.
                                                            
35 For a discussion of this subject see George Hoffmann, Montaigne’s Career, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1998.
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Much of Montaigne’s private life took place within the environs of Chateau 
Montaigne, the ancestral family home east of Bordeaux in the gentle hills of Guyenne in 
southern France. Montaigne’s great-grandfather, Raymon Eyquem, a wealthy merchant, 
had purchased the title and estate of Montaigne in 1477.36 Montaigne’s grand-father, 
Grimom Eyquem, also a merchant, further enriched the family with the cultivation of 
numerous contacts among the local magistrates and Church officials. After his return 
from the Italian wars, Montaigne’s father, Pierre Eyquem, married Montaigne’s mother, 
Antoinette de Louppes in 1528.
Michel Eyquem de Montaigne was born in Chateau Montaigne on 28 February 
1533. According to Montaigne, for the first six years of his life he heard and spoke 
nothing but Latin. He apparently was sent to school at the Collège de Guyenne in 
Bordeaux at the tender age of 6 in 1539. His studies there continued until he left the 
Collège in 1546 at the age of 13. Montaigne was thus prepared from an early age for 
intellectual greatness.
In 1557, the 24 year old Montaigne, now a member of the Parlement of 
Bordeaux, struck up a friendship with another of the Parlement's members, Étienne de 
La Boétie. This friendship was to be one of the most important of Montaigne’s life, and 
La Boétie's death six years later, in 1563, was a great blow to Montaigne. He deeply 
mourned the loss of his friend and wrestled with the pain of it for the remainder of his 
life. 
In 1565, at the age of 32, Montaigne married Françoise de la Chassaigne. In 
1568 his father died. Three years later, in 1571, Montaigne, now 38, officially retired 
from public life. He inscribed these words on the wall of this study to commemorate the 
occasion:
                                                            
36 This and the other details of this brief biographical sketch of Montaigne are taken from the chronology 
of Montaigne’s life in Michel de Montaigne, Essais, Villey-Saulnier ed., v. 1, Paris: Quadrige, 1999, 
pp. xxxiii-xxxix. There is a delicious biography of Montaigne, written by Stephan Zweig, which is 
also an interesting source: Stephan Zweig, Montaigne, Barcelona, Acantilado, 2008.
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“In the year of Christ 1571, at age of thirty-eight, on the day before the Calends 
of March, the day of his birth, Michel de Montaigne long weary of the servitude of the 
court and of public employments, while still entire, retired to the bosom of the learned 
virgins, where in calm and freedom from all cares he will spend what little remains of 
his life, now more than half run out. If the fates permit, he will complete this abode, this 
sweet ancestral retreat; and he has consecrated it to his freedom, tranquility, and 
leisure”.37
It was after his ultimately short-lived withdrawal from the world that Montaigne 
began work on the Essais. The longest of them, and the most important to an 
understanding of Montaigne’s scepticism, the “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, was 
probably completed some time in 1576. In that same year Montaigne commissioned his 
famous medallion bearing the motto, “Que sçais je?”, “What do I know?” Montaigne 
continued to work on the Essais for the rest of his life. He died in 1592, at the age of 59, 
having suffered severely for many years from kidney stones.
As noted above, however, Montaigne’s withdrawal from public life was short 
lived, or rather never fully complete. Indeed, although in the twenty-one years between 
1571 and 1592 he spent long intervals at home, working on the Essais, he nonetheless 
continued to be an active participant in the events shaping the future of France and was 
frequently away from Chateau Montaigne. In the eighteen years between the end of his 
school-days in 1546 and his “retirement” in 1571, Montaigne had made a place for 
himself in the circles of power. In the last twenty-one years of his life his involvement 
there continued.
In 1554, Montaigne, then 21, became a member of the Cour des Aides de 
Périgeux. He became a judge in the Parlement of Bordeaux in 1557. In 1559, at the age 
of 26, he apparently made his first appearance in the French royal court. Between 1561 
                                                            
37 Montaigne, Essais, p. xxxiv. N.B.: here and throughout this study I have relied heavily on Donald 
Frame's translation of the Complete Essays of Montaigne, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958 
and in my own efforts to render Montaigne’s thought into English and into Spanish.
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and 1562 he participated in the siege of Rouen. In 1562 he became a member of the 
Parlement of Paris, the highest legal court in the land, at which time he was required to 
make a public declaration of his allegiance to the Catholic religion. He gave this 
position up in 1570 (the position in the Parlement, not the position about his religious 
beliefs). In 1571, the year of his “retirement”, he was made a Knight of the Order of St. 
Michael. In 1574, only three years after his retirement, Montaigne was with the French 
royal army in Poitou, where he apparently participated in important diplomatic 
missions. Montaigne had made a place for himself among the favorites of the liberal 
Catholic supporters of the French crown.
He also developed important and powerful connections among the liberal 
Protestant enemies of the crown, however. In 1577, Montaigne was named a Gentleman 
of the Chamber of the Protestant King Henri of Navarre,38 who eventually ruled France 
as Henri IV from 1589 to 1610. Henri of Navarre later spent two days as a guest in 
Chateau Montaigne in 1584 and dined with Montaigne there in 1587. 
However, Montaigne retained the favor of the Catholic King Henri III as well. In 
1580 Montaigne took a trip to Italy from which he was recalled in 1581 by a letter from 
Henri. Montaigne had been elected to a two-year term as Mayor of Bordeaux, and the 
king was eager that he should take up his duties. Montaigne was elected to a second 
term in 1583. During his tenure as Mayor of Bordeaux, Montaigne, who had highly 
placed connections among liberal Catholics and Protestants, served as a go-between for 
the two camps. This, of course, did not make him popular among conservative 
Catholics, however, and during a journey to Paris in 1588 he apparently was thrown into 
the Bastille by supporters of the extremist Catholic League. He was released on the 
orders of the Queen Mother.
Montaigne lived a rich and varied life. He was a judge, a statesman, and a 
confidant of princes. He participated at the highest level in some of the most important 
events of his day. Nonetheless, he was also a scholar -not a university-trained 
                                                            
38 This was the king who supposedly pronounced the famous and well known sentence: “Paris vaut bien 
une messe”, “Paris is well worth a mass”, carrying out an interesting exercise of real politik.
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philosopher or theologian, but rather an educated “man of letters”, perhaps one of the 
first, and certainly one of the most popular among later generations. This popularity, and 
the fame of Montaigne, rests on his Essais.
The Essais of Montaigne are divided into three Books, which all together occupy 
some one thousand pages in modern editions. Book I contains 57 essays, about a third 
of the total. Most of the essays in Book I are no more than a few pages in length. Book 
II contains 37 essays, which account for something like another third of the whole work. 
The essays in Book II vary considerably in length. The longest of them, indeed the 
longest of all of the essays, the “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, the twelfth in Book II, 
runs to well over a hundred pages. Book III contains 13 essays, most of fairly 
substantial length. Modern editions of the Essais employ a simple system to note the 
different layers of the text, which was revised and revised again by Montaigne between 
the first edition of 1580 and the posthumous edition of 1592.
As indicated above, Montaigne began work on the Essais after his “retirement” 
in 1571. Between 1572 and 1573 he completed much of Book I and portions of Book II. 
The longest of the essays, the “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, was probably written in 
1576 as were other portions of Book II. Between 1578 and 1580, he completed the first 
drafts of the essays in Books I and II, and the first edition of the Essais, consisting of 
Books I and II only, was published in 1580. Subsequent editions of the Essais, with 
modifications, appeared in 1582 and 1587. A fourth edition, which included substantial 
changes to some of the material in Books I and II and the thirteen new essays of Book 
III, appeared in 1588. A final revised edition was published posthumously in 1592.
Montaigne's Essais are both the sign and the product of his quest for self-
knowledge. He viewed them as a sort of self-portrait. In the “Note to the Reader” that 
appeared at the beginning of the first edition of 1580, Montaigne tells us something of 
the purpose of the Essais:
“This is a book of good faith, reader. It warns you from the outset that in it I 
have set myself no other goal than a domestic and private one. I have given no 
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consideration either to your service or to my glory. My powers are not capable of such a 
design. I have dedicated it to the private convenience of my relatives and friends, so that 
when they have lost me (as soon they must), they may recover here some features of my 
habits and temperament, and by this means keep the knowledge they have had of me 
more complete and alive. If  I had written to seek the world's favor, I should have 
bedecked myself better, and should present myself in a studied posture. I want to be seen 
here in my simple, natural, ordinary fashion, without straining or artifice; for it is
myself that I portray. My defects will here be read to the life, and also my natural form, 
as far as respect for the public has allowed. Had I been placed among those nations 
which are said to live still in the sweet liberty of nature's first laws, I assure you I should 
very gladly have portrayed myself here entire and wholly naked. Thus, reader, I am 
myself the matter of my book; you would be unreasonable to spend your leisure on a 
subject so frivolous and so vain. So farewell. Montaigne, this first day of March, fifteen 
hundred and eighty”.39
Montaigne tells us that he himself is the “matter of his book”. The Essais of 
Montaigne are not, however, autobiographical in any straightforward or traditional 
sense. Rather the Essais are the record of Montaigne's reflections on a wide variety of 
subjects. They are the record of this quest for self-knowledge. They are also, since the 
private and public cannot truly be separated, the work of this exploration of the world. 
The self is the substance of his book, but the self's relationship with the other is the 
concern of this book as well. The place of the self in the world is the matter of 
Montaigne's book. The world is the matter of Montaigne's book.
The Essais are both the most important and the most substantial of Montaigne's 
literary undertakings. In addition to them, however, he left several other writings. In 
1569 he made a translation of the Natural Theology of Raymond Sebond, a work that is 
important for an understanding of Montaigne's scepticism. In 1571 he published an 
                                                            
39 Montaigne, Essais, p. 3. The French critical edition chosen is: Montaigne, Oeuvres complètes, Albert 
Thibaudet and Maurice Rat ed., Paris, Gallimard, 1962, Bibliothèque de la Plèaide.
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edition of the works of this friend, the poet La Boétie.  The brief Journal de Voyage
written on Montaigne's trip to Italy in 1580 was published for the first t ime in 1774, 
long after his death. In addition, he also left behind a number of letters and an important 
set of inscriptions of lines taken from various sources, which he inscribed on the beams 
of the ceiling of his library in Chateau Montaigne. The Essais, however, are the heart of 
Montaigne's legacy. Although these other materials are not without their relevance, it is 
in the Essais that we truly encounter the scepticism of Montaigne. 
- Montaigne’s scepticism reconsidered.
Montaigne's scepticism has often been considered the product of a personal 
sceptical crisis brought on by the reading of Sextus Empiricus works. This idea, and this 
is one of the most original contributions of this study, is not supported by the evidence 
of the Essais, however. Instead, a sceptical outlook seems to have been fundamental to 
their author, and the scepticism of Montaigne has more affinity with the scepticism of 
the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon than it does with that of Sextus Empiricus. This 
account of Montaigne's scepticism does little justice to his deep engagement with the 
numerous other sources for the sceptical ideas contained within the sceptical tradition, 
most especially the writings of Plato, Cicero and St. Augustine. It also pushes 
Montaigne's participation in the tradition of the Christian commitment to the primacy of 
faith over reason well into the background. Furthermore, it all but ignores the role of 
personal and cultural factors in the shaping of Montaigne's thought. Finally, it makes 
Montaigne a passive receptacle for ancient ideas, rather than an active reader searching 
for guidance.
The “evolutionary thesis” first articulated by Pierre Villey and since subscribed 
to by many scholars makes scepticism a phase in Montaigne's thought. According to this 
interpretation of the Essais, Montaigne's scepticism was inspired by a study of the 
works of Sextus Empiricus sometime around 1575, just before the composition of the 
longest and most-straightforwardly sceptical of the Essais, the “Apology for Raymond 
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Sebond”, by Villey's dating.40 But as Donald Frame and others have noted, Montaigne's 
scepticism is not confined to this essay, and expressions of it come both before and after 
the Apology in the chronological layering of Montaigne's text.41 Indeed, and this is one 
of the main theses of this study, scepticism is a fundamental part of the basic worldview 
of the Essais. Moreover, there is little if any actual evidence to suggest that Montaigne 
was as deeply influenced by Sextus Empiricus as is sometimes supposed. Finally, as a 
number of recent readers of the Essais have pointed out, Montaigne's thought is not 
easily reducible to a straightforward evolutionary scheme.
According to the evolutionary thesis there were three phases to Montaigne's 
thought, the Stoic, the sceptical and the Epicurean. Recent trends in Montaigne studies, 
however, have moved away from the evolutionary thesis in favor of an interpretation of 
the Essais which makes all three elements an integral part of the work as a whole. The 
evolutionary thesis was first articulated by Pierre Villey. In Les sources et l'évolution 
des Essais de Montaigne and elsewhere, Villey argued that the three books of the Essais
corresponded to three successive phases in Montaigne's thought. For Villey the essays 
of Book I were primarily representative of Montaigne's “Stoicism”, those of Book II of 
his scepticism, and those of Book III of his “Epicureanism”. Villey considered 
Montaigne's scepticism as an ultimate rejection of his “Stoicism” and a stage in the 
development of his “Epicureanism”. His “Epicureanism” for Villey subsequently came 
about as Montaigne seemingly realized that scepticism could be defeated only by a 
reliance on experience, as the Epicureans argued.
Villey's influence on subsequent generations of scholars of Montaigne has been 
enormous, and the debt to him is significant. Villey's dating of the composition of the 
individual essays and the various recensions of them and interpolations within them, 
although not without potential problems, remains an important tool for anyone engaged 
                                                            
40 Montaigne, Essais, p. xxxiv.
41 See Donald Frame, Montaigne's Discovery of Man, New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 
chapters III and IV.
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in the serious study of Montaigne. The same is also true of Villey's attempt to trace the 
“influences” on Montaigne's thought.
All of this notwithstanding, there are serious problems with the traditional 
formulation of the evolutionary thesis, and with its treatment of Stoic, sceptical, and 
Epicurean elements within the Essais. In general, such an argument presupposes a 
model of the development of thought and of the idea of influence that is ultimately too 
linear and simplistic. In the case of Montaigne in particular, it does serious injustice to 
one who was anything but systematic by attempting to make of him and adherent 
successively of different and distinct schools of thought. Finally, it misrepresents the 
very nature of the ancient traditions that Montaigne was drawing on and the way he 
made use of them by dealing with them as if they were completely separate in 
themselves, which ultimately they were not.
In a recent collection of essays on Montaigne, Dikka Berven noted that 
“something unclassifiable lies at the heart of Montaigne's self-portrait in the Essais, a 
desire to question everything, to affect no wish to resolve and conclude, and this 
extraordinary fluidity resists the rigidity of Villey's formal categories”.42 Berven's 
sentiment more closely resembles the traditional conception of the Essais common to 
literary readers like Emerson and Gide than it does that of Villey and those critics who 
follow him. Berven further agrees with Marcel Tetel and many others that the idea of 
Montaigne being first a Stoic, later a sceptic, and then an Epicurean is somehow 
inimical to Montaigne and the Essais. In Tetel's words, “the growing consensus 
maintains that Montaigne was not successively a Stoic, a sceptic and finally an 
Epicurean; instead he was all three at the same time and refused to mold himself into a 
school of thought”.43
                                                            
42 See Berven's introduction to Montaigne: A Collection of Essays, Dikka Berven ed., v. 1, New York: 
Garland, 1995, p. viii.
43 Marcel Tetel, “Montaigne: Evolution or Convolution”, in Berven ed., Montaigne: A Collection
of Essays, v. 1, New York: Garland, 1995, p. 213.
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This notion of the blending of Stoic, Sceptical and Epicurean elements in 
Montaigne's thought and within the Essais is ultimately much more organic and 
satisfying. Montaigne and the Essais are complicated, confused, and often even 
potentially contradictory. In the Essais, Montaigne revels in this complexity, making of 
it a badge of honor, proclaiming it as his right, and perhaps even as his duty in the 
attempt at faithful self-portrayal. This reading of the Essais is further supported by the 
fact that in the chronological layering of Montaigne's text, Stoic, sceptical, and 
Epicurean ideas stubbornly refuse to remain completely separated. These themes or 
currents flow throughout the Essais. For Montaigne these tendencies that have been 
described as “Stoic”, “Sceptical” and “Epicurean” interpenetrate one another and are not 
easily separable. They are pieces of the whole. The influence of the older reading of 
Montaigne by Villey, however, has lingered on, especially among those not directly 
engaged in Montaigne studies.
An example of this can be seen in Richard Popkin's treatment of Montaigne. 
Popkin's discussion of Montaigne's scepticism in the History of Skepticism from 
Erasmus to Spinoza identifies all the broad features of Montaigne's scepticism and its
importance to later developments. Nevertheless there are some potential problems with 
the details of Popkin's interpretation of Montaigne. Following Villey, Popkin placed too 
much emphasis on the importance of Sextus Empiricus.44 Furthermore, although Popkin 
touched briefly on the problem of Montaigne's belief in Christianity and its relationship 
to the religious debates of the period, he offered no extended discussion of the subject. 
Then too, while Popkin considered some of the other events that helped to shape life in 
the later part of the sixteenth century, the relevance of Montaigne's experience of life 
amidst them to the evolution of his scepticism lay largely outside the scope of his study. 
                                                            
44 It is not only Popkin who follow this trend, scholars like Luciano Floridi, in his Sextus Empiricus. The 
Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism, Oxford University Press, 2002, go the same way. For 
example, Floridi devotes a good part of his book to studying the influence of Sextus Empiricus in 
Michel de Montaigne's thought, and the importance of the Greek phisician in the inscriptions  
inscribed on the beams of the ceiling of his library. See Manuel Bermúdez, “The recovery and 
trasmission of Sextus Empiricus works”, Elenchos, anno XXIV, 2, 2003, pp. 517-518.
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Finally, Popkin's claim that Montaigne's response to doubt was the advocacy of the 
Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment is mistaken.45
In the beginning of his account of Montaigne's scepticism, Popkin maintained 
the importance of Sextus Empiricus to an understanding of Montaigne.46 Interestingly 
enough, in the same place Popkin acknowledged that Montaigne's scepticism pre-dated 
his supposed reading of the works of the ancient sceptic (Sextus Empiricus).47 Popkin 
mentioned Sextus Empiricus only twice more in his treatment of Montaigne, moreover. 
The first was when he noted that Montaigne made use of “practically all the gambits 
and analysis of Sextus Empiricus”.48 Unfortunately Popkin, from our point of view, 
failed to address the question of whether or not Montaigne took these ideas from Sextus 
Empiricus or from some other source. The second mention of Sextus Empiricus came at 
the end of Popkin's discussion of Montaigne, where he asserted without any real 
investigation of the potential debt to the ancient sceptic that Montaigne had 
“revitalized” the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus.49 Popkin also argued that Montaigne 
endorsed the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment but offered little in support of this 
claim.50 He offered no investigation of the use made by Montaigne of other ancient 
sources.
Popkin's treatment of Montaigne's relationship to the tradition of Christian 
scepticism is problematic as well. His judgment of St. Paul's “anti-rationalism” is 
insufficiently elaborated.51 His declaration of Erasmus's “anti-intellectualism” is ill-
                                                            
45 I talked with Richard Popkin in the year 2004 about this problem during a stay of work in his house in 
Pacific Palisades.  Successive editions of this important work, the History of skepticism, repeated the 
same position about Montaigne's scepticism. Unfortunatedly, he died in April 2005 at the age of 82, 
and he did not change his opinion about it. 
46 See Popkin, R., History of skepticism, pp. 41 and 43.
47 To check this acknowledgement of Popkin see his History of Skepticism, p. 43.
48 Popkin, History of Skepticism, p. 52.
49 Popkin, History of Skepticism, p. 54.
50 See Popkin, History of Skepticism, p. 52.
51 We can see this clearly in Popkin, History of Skepticism, p. 45.
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considered.52 Indeed, in general, his consideration of the Christian sources, both ancient 
and contemporary, that Montaigne drew on is somewhat sparse. Finally, although he 
properly called attention to the fact that the question of faith in an age of religious strife 
is central to Montaigne's scepticism, he offered no extended consideration of the nature 
of Montaigne's relationship to faith. In one place he calls Montaigne's “Apology” a 
“defense of the Catholic rule of faith”.53 In another he complicated this claim by 
referring to the fact that Montaigne sometimes has been read as making a veiled attack 
on religious belief, as asserting that belief in impossible.54 Ultimately, Popkin judged 
that either interpretation can be supported, but that Montaigne was probably “mildly 
religious” and that his defense was genuine.55 Montaigne's position vis-à-vis the 
religious debates of the day is far from transparent, and while in the final analysis it 
seems likely that Montaigne was a liberal Catholic both spiritually and politically, as 
Popkin here maintained, the nature of faith in Montaigne is far from simple. The 
problem of Montaigne's understanding of faith is, from our point of view, crucial.
Finally, although Popkin considered the religious debates of the period and 
touched briefly on the impact of the discovery of the “New World”, the focus of his 
account of early modern scepticism is on the interplay of the ideas under discussion.56
The exploration of the events that helped to shape sixteenth-century society, the 
sceptical crisis in general, and the scepticism of Montaigne in particular lay outside the 
confines of this study. This aspect of the story was left untold by Popkin. It is crucial to 
an understanding of both sixteenth-century scepticism in general and scepticism of 
Montaigne in particular.
                                                            
52 For Popkin's interpretation of the relevance of Erasmus's thought to Montaigne see Popkin, History of 
Skepticism, pp. 46 and 54.
53 Popkin, History of Skepticism, pp. 52-53.
54 Popkin, History of Skepticism, p. 54.
55 Popkin, History of Skepticism, p. 55.
56 For the theological debates see especially chapter 1 of Popkin's History of Skepticism. For mentions of 
the significance of the encounter with the New World to Montaigne's scepticism see pp. 50 and 53 of 
the same work.
36
To summarize, Popkin's account of Montaigne's scepticism identifies all of the 
proper elements, but his overall judgment about the nature of Montaigne's scepticism is 
flawed. The texts of the sceptical tradition, contemporary theological debates, and the 
experience of life in Europe in the later sixteenth-century are all part of the story. But 
although Popkin's treatment of the importance of these elements to the understanding of 
Montaigne's scepticism is the best overview currently available, the story has not been 
told fully. Many of the details require further investigation and research. Most 
importantly, Popkin's reading of Montaigne's scepticism as an advocacy of the 
Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment is mistaken. Montaigne did not follow Pyrrho but 
Socrates. As for the latter, Montaigne's response to the inevitability of uncertainty was 
the continuous pursuit of understanding, even if certainty could never be attained. 
As indicated above, unlike Popkin, most Montaigne scholars have moved away 
from the “evolutionary thesis” of Villey. Not all have abandoned the idea that 
Montaigne's scepticism was shaped by an encounter with Sextus Empiricus, however. 
André Tournon argues that scepticism was a basic feature of Montaigne's thought, but 
he also claims, in a very interesting book, that Montaigne's juridical experience led him 
to embrace the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment that he presumably encountered in 
the writings of Sextus Empiricus.57 For Géralde Nakam, it was the study of history and 
culture that confirmed Montaigne's Pyrrhonian and relativistic sceptical outlook.58
Although Tournon sees French legal culture as the principal influence on Montaigne's 
scepticism, and Nakam the study of custom, both accept the idea that Montaigne's 
thought was influenced by the writings of Sextus Empiricus.
A more recent treatment of Montaigne's scepticism by Frédéric Brahami follows 
Villey and Popkin in arguing that Montaigne's scepticism was influenced by that of 
Sextus Empiricus, but unlike Popkin and others, Brahami maintains that Montaigne's 
scepticism ultimately departed from that of Sextus Empiricus. Brahami also considers 
                                                            
57 André Tournon, Montaigne; La glosse et l'essai, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1983. I am 
planning to consider Tournon's argument in greater detail in the following chapter.
58 Géralde Nakam, Montaigne et son temps, Paris, Gallimard, 1993. My idea is to discuss Nakam's 
argument in the penultimate chapter of this study.
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the problem of faith in Montaigne. He offers no discussion of other relevant features of 
late sixteenth-century society, however. The core of Brahami's argument is that 
Montaigne, unlike Sextus Empiricus, should be read as an anti-rationalist. According to 
Brahami, Montaigne rejected the suspension of judgment of Sextus Empiricus and 
maintained that man has no choice but to exercise judgment in the face of an absolute 
incertitude.59 With regard to religious issues, Brahami argues that Montaigne believed, 
departing for Augustine, that here could be no rational defense of belief, and that 
Montaigne's only defense of belief was faith.60
Brahami's argument is subtle, but not without its problems. The essential feature 
of the relationship between Montaigne's scepticism and that of the ancient sceptics is 
not Montaigne's departure from Sextus Empiricus, but rather his debt to the Socrates of 
Plato and to Cicero. Following Socrates, Montaigne maintained the necessity of the 
continuous striving for understanding, even if it cannot be achieved fully. Following 
Cicero, Montaigne believed in the possibility of entertaining likely opinions, of 
acquiring a kind of probable knowledge. Ultimately, Montaigne's conviction of the 
certitude of incertitude is not a retreat from rationalism, but a proscription of the limits 
of human understanding. Like Socrates, however, Montaigne was deeply committed to 
the search of understanding. In this Montaigne was perfectly in harmony with 
Augustine, and Montaigne's defense of Christian belief was a rational, if complicated, 
one, for Montaigne, finally, seems to have had no faith with which to defend belief.
Elaine Limbrick has also seen Montaigne's affinity with Socrates and 
Augustine.61 Her claim that Montaigne may not have fully understood the distinction 
between Pyrrhonian and Academic scepticism is problematic, however, as is her 
apparent failure to see Montaigne's significant departures from Augustine. In general, 
                                                            
59 Frédéric Brahami, Le scepticisme de Montaigne, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, pp. 
106-107.
60 Brahami, Le sceptisme de Montaigne, p. 78.
61 Limbrick's reading of Montaigne is presented in a series of articles listed in the bibiography from 
which the most important for this issue could be: Elaine Limbrick, “Montaigne et Saint Augustin” in 
Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXXIV (1972), pp. 49-64 and Limbrick, “Was Montaigne 
Really a  Pyrrhonian”, in Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXXIX (1977), pp. 67-80.
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moreover, Limbrick fails to see much that is original in Montaigne, and all too often 
seems to read him as simply following in the footsteps of others rather than actively 
engaging the ideas of his predecessors. She also has little to say about the relevance of 
contemporary culture and Montaigne's study of it and of history. 
There are three major pieces then to the story of Montaigne's scepticism. His use 
of ancient sources must be investigated. His understanding of the problems of reason, 
experience and faith must be explored. Finally, his reaction to his own life experience 
must be considered. Ultimately, a proper understanding of Montaigne'es scepticism is 
crucial to our overall understanding of the origins, development and consequences of 
the sceptical crisis of the early modern period. 
Our main position is that Montaigne's scepticism was fundamental to his 
outlook. In the self-portrait of the Essais, he grapples and wrestles with the problem of 
reason, faith and experience. His motto, “Que sçais je?” is not a negation of the 
possibility of knowledge, but the battle cry of its quest. For Montaigne, as for Socrates, 
knowledge is something to be sought after, even if it can never be fully attained. For 
Montaigne, as for Socrates, this quest is ultimately an existential one, the search for 
self-knowledge, the search for an understanding of one's place in the overall scheme of 
things. In the end, for Montaigne reason is weak, faith is uncertain, and experience 
reaches only our own fallibility. They are pitiful guides through the pitfalls of life, but 
they are all that we have. Montaigne's response to the turmoil of the sixteenth century 
was an admission of the misery of man's condition but not a turning away from it. In the 
end, Montaigne embraced the imperfect experience of an imperfect world. 
Montaigne's scepticism was also part of his search for faith. Montaigne sought 
grace, but in the long run he did not claim to possess it. He seems to have believed with 
Augustine that man can be illuminated only through God, but unlike Augustine, he did 
not claim to have experienced that illumination, nor even in part. He submitted himself 
and man to the judgment of a God he knew that he did not and could not know in this 
life. He was not a sectarian, but he aspired to be a Christian. His “Apology for Raymond 
Sebond” is perhaps the ultimate defense of Christian belief, for it is offered by one who 
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only aspires to faith. Montaigne's scepticism is an affirmation of the Christian 
commitment to the primacy of faith over reason. Montaigne sought, he did not find.
In his quest, he made use of a wide variety of ancient sources. He sought 
guidance in ancient writings. Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus and 
Diogenes Laertius and others gave him food for thought. He drew from many, and all 
are important to an understanding of his scepticism. Of all of them, Plato and Cicero 
may be the most important, however. For it was in Plato that Montaigne found Socrates 
and in Cicero he found a fully developed Socratic scepticism. The scepticism of 
Montaigne, like that of Socrates and Cicero, was an expression of the commitment to 
the search for knowledge rather than a negation of its possibility.
Montaigne's search for knowledge was not confined to the exploration of a set of 
abstract philosophical and theological problems, however, and the real subject of the 
Essais is Montaigne's study of man and society. As he tells us in a number of places, it 
is a knowledge of man that Montaigne seeks. In pursuit of this knowledge, he makes use 
of his own experience and of a wide variety of sources that provide him with human 
stories and the bulk of the Essais is devoted to the presentation and consideration of 
anecdotes drawn from historical and contemporary, western and non-western, cultures. 
Montaigne explores the nature of man and culture through an examination of primarily 
anecdotal material. This is what occupies him. Man is the greater puzzle of which 
philosophical and theological problems are only pieces. Man is Montaigne's obsession, 
and it is his study of man that reveals the true nature of Montaigne's scepticism. Like 
Socrates, Montaigne is concerned with ethics, and the question of public and private 
conduct is of central concern. He seeks the answer to this question in the study of 
human situations, and he almost invariably pronounces some sort of tentative, if often 
complicated, judgment on them. He does not withhold or suspend his judgment in a 
Pyrrhonian fashion, nor does he conclude the relativity of custom. He believes in the 
existence of a universal moral standard, even if he is uncertain of its susceptibility to 
human comprehension and fulfillment.
Montaigne and his contemporaries offered a critique of human capacities that 
drew on the labors of their predecessors. Their successors in the next century continued 
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that critique. Ultimately, their development of new theories of knowledge was as much 
a continuation of the quest of Montaigne and others as a response to it.
In the next chapter we will consider Montaigne's use of ancient sources. His 
relation to the Christian tradition will be discussed in a later chapter. The final chapter 
will deal with Montaigne's experience of self in the world of the late sixteenth century. 
The conclusion will deal with Montaigne and the “sceptical crisis”.
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Chapter 2
Montaigne and ancient scepticism
Like many who came before and after him, Michel de Montaigne 
questioned the human capacity to achieve true understanding of matters earthly and 
divine. Although not a philosopher in the formal sense, neither by training nor 
inclination, but rather a literatus, a man of letters in its translation in English, and a 
statesman, Montaigne was nonetheless deeply philosophical. In the Essais, which he 
tells us are both the way and the outcome of a journey of self-discovery, he returns 
again and again to the most crucial of philosophical problems, the question both of how 
we come to know and how much confidence we can have in that knowledge. Montaigne 
wrestles with this question throughout the Essais and in his struggle to understand the 
relative values of reason, faith and experience, traditionally the principal claimants to 
epistemological authority, he draws on numerous classical sources for guidance. As 
indicated above, it has long been argued that the most important of these sources were 
the writings of the ancient sceptic Sextus Empiricus, and Montaigne's scepticism has 
often been interpreted as the result of a personal sceptical crisis brought on by a reading 
of Sextus Empiricus and, therefore, as a mere phase in the linear development of his 
thought from Stoicism, through Scepticism, to Epicureanism.
As we have shown previously, however, most Montaigne scholars have come to 
acknowledge  that Montaigne's scepticism pre-dated his alleged encounter with Sextus 
Empiricus and that rather than being simply a phase in his intellectual development, the 
scepticism of Montaigne, together with his “Stoicism” and his “Epicureanism”,  was a 
permanent and basic feature of this thought. In short, from our point of view Montaigne 
was not first a Stoic, then a sceptic and finally an Epicurean, but all three and none of 
these at once. Indeed Montaigne, as is now widely acknowledged, like Cicero, Plutarch 
and many of his other favourite classical authors, drew piecemeal from a variety of 
traditions as his needs and inclinations dictated. Montaigne was not an adherent of an 
ancient “school” of thought, nor successively of different schools of thought. The facile 
42
notion of rigid “schools of thought” is even more absurd as regards Montaigne than it is 
with respect to the intellectual history of late antiquity. Moreover, Montaigne was not a 
mouthpiece for ancient sceptical ideas, but rather a man grappling with an 
epistemological crisis who drew on ancient sources, including the writings of Sextus 
Empiricus. And as I hope to demonstrate, Sextus Empiricus was not the most important 
of Montaigne's sources.
Indeed the scepticism of Montaigne is closer to the doubt of Socrates and the 
probabilism of Cicero than it is to the complete scepticism of Sextus Empiricus, and 
although Montaigne drew on a number of ancient sceptical sources in addition to Sextus 
Empiricus, including Xenophon, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, the Socratic dialogues 
of Plato and the Academica and other sceptical writings of Cicero are undeniably the 
most important of his ancient sources in this context. Sextus Empiricus, the culminating 
figure in the late-antique Pyrrhonian revival named for Pyrrho of Elis, maintained a 
position of absolute scepticism. In his early dialogues and in some of his late writings, 
Plato displayed the doubt of his master Socrates. Cicero embraced the probabilistic 
scepticism that developed in Plato's Academy under the stewardship of Arcesilas and 
Carneades.62 Ultimately, Montaigne inclined more towards Academic doubt than 
Pyrrhonian scepticism. In the potentially problematic terms of both Sextus Empiricus's 
and Montaigne's days, Montaigne was more of a “New Academician” than he was a 
“Pyrrhonian”. Unlike Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne did not reject the quest for 
knowledge in the face of absolute uncertainty. Instead, like Socrates and Cicero, he 
believed in the search for knowledge despite the inevitability of uncertainty. 
Montaigne's choice of the motto “Que sçais je?”, “what do I know?” over the 
Pyrrhonian formula “επεχο, I suspend judgment”, illustrates this.
Immediate, if not entirely convincing, evidence of this can also be gleaned from 
a brief glance at the frequency of references to classical authors in Montaigne's Essais. 
                                                            
62 There is a very important book about the scepticism in Plato's Academy which has turned into a 
classic book on the topic, Carlos Lèvy, Cicero scepticus, Rome, Ecole Française de Rome, 1992. 
There are also other interesting writings on academic scepticism, among which we would like to point 
out Ramón Román, El enigma de la Academia platónica, Córdoba, Berenice, 2007.
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The picture that is partially revealed thereby is suggestive at the very least. As 
mentioned above, modern editions of the Essais run to about 1000 pages. In these 1000 
pages, Montaigne makes in excess of 2500 references to more than 500 figures drawn 
from classical literature. These references include more than 1000 direct quotations. 
Montaigne mentions by name, and indeed discusses, all of the major figures of the 
ancient sceptical tradition with the sole exception of Sextus Empiricus. Montaigne 
considers Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Pyrrho and his student Timon, Arcesilas and 
Carneades, Cicero, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, but never Sextus Empiricus. In 
addition to making him the principal subject of at least two essays, Montaigne refers to 
Socrates more than 70 times and quotes him on more than 15 occasions. Montaigne 
mentions Plato more than 100 times, and quotes him more than 10 times. Xenophon is 
referred to more than 30 times but apparently quoted directly only once. Cicero is the 
subject of at least one essay and is mentioned some 50 times. He is quoted more than 
100 times. Plutarch is mentioned more than 50 times and quoted more than 10 times. 
Diogenes Laertius is mentioned by name only once, and quoted directly only once, but 
both references make it clear that Montaigne was extremely fond of him. Sextus 
Empiricus is not mentioned once in the Essais, and the single, unacknowledged 
potential borrowing from him is problematic, as will be shown below. Montaigne did 
not follow Sextus Empiricus. Socrates, Cicero and others were the principal ancient 
guides of his quest for self-knowledge.
None of this can be regarded as conclusive, however, and a complete account of 
Montaigne's debt to ancient sceptical sources cannot be given without a thorough 
examination both of the most relevant of these sources and of the use to which 
Montaigne put them. The first part of what follows deals primarily with the scepticism 
of Sextus Empiricus, the doubt of Socrates as portrayed in Plato and Xenophon and the 
probabilism of Cicero. The second part deals with Montaigne's understanding of these 
sources and of additional material which he found in the writings of Plutarch and 
Diogenes Laertius. The third and final part considers more fully the relationship of the 
scepticism of Montaigne to that of the ancients.
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- Academic doubt and Pyrrhonic scepticism.
The sceptical tradition of antiquity was considerably diverse. The respective 
positions of Cicero, Socrates and Sextus Empiricus effectively define a spectrum of 
opinion ranging from probabilism through doubt to absolute scepticism. That of Sextus 
Empiricus, although chronologically the last, as the sceptical extreme, will serve as a 
benchmark. It is also the position at the furthest remove from Montaigne's own. 
Sextus Empiricus flourished around the beginning of the third century anno 
domine. He was a Greek physician who, although called “Empiricus”, was apparently a 
follower of the “methodic” rather than the “empiricist” tradition in Hellenistic 
medicine.63 Little else is known about him.
It seems that the practice of medicine and the sceptical stance have had a special 
relationship throughout the history of thought.64 As John Christian Laursen has 
described: “At first glance, it might not seem particularly likely that physicians would 
be attracted to philosophical skepticism. After all, if you have to doubt and suspend 
judgment about everything, how are you going to treat patients?”65 Following Laursen, 
there were three different schools of medicine in the Ancient period. 
The dogmatists or rationalists believed that the main element of knowledge was 
logic and assigned little importance to experience. Anatomy and logic were their 
instruments and the used to rely in Aristotle, the Stoics and other dogmatic philosophies. 
For the dogmatist school studying medicine meant reading a lot of philosophical texts. 
The empiricist school was the school of the Academic scepticism. They opposed 
the dogmatists and thought that philosophy was of little help in medicine and that the 
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main tool to be used in order to cure somebody should be “the empirical observation, 
histories provided by others, and a sort of analogy (metabasis)”.66
The third school was the methodist, and this one was in opposition of the 
previous two and claimed to solve their problems. One of its main spokesman was 
Galen and he said the methodist school rejected dogmatists and empiricists claims about 
medicine. This school maintained that it was “unnecessary to know what part of the 
body was ill, nor what may have caused the illness. The patient's age, constitution, and 
habits and the climate and location were insignificant. The disease alone would be the 
teacher, and the physician just observes certain general conditions: the body's 
restriction/constriction/costiveness and its dilation/relaxation/flux with respect to bodily 
fluids, and the mixture of the two”.67
Among the little information we have about Sextus Empiricus we do know that 
he was a physician, but we do not know to which school he belonged. On the one hand, 
Diogenes Laertius in the chapter IX of his Life and opinions of eminent philosophers
and the Pseudo-Galen in his Isagogé call him an “Empirical Physician”; his name also 
would indicate that. But, on the other hand, Sextus Empiricus himself wrote that a true 
sceptic could only be a methodical physician, not an empiricist.68 We can only muse or 
lucubrate about the real position of Sextus Empiricus. Some scholars, among them John 
C. Laursen, try to solve this problem proposing that perhaps “Sextus was highly critical 
of the empirical school while remaining inside of it and pushing it back toward its roots 
in a more Pyrrhonian skepticism”.69
The three works of Sextus Empiricus that have survived are the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, Against the Dogmatists and Against the Professors. Two additional works, 
On the soul and Notes on Medicine, are sometimes ascribed to him. The first of the three 
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books of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism presents a summary of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The 
latter two books of this work and all of Against the Dogmatists and Against the 
Professors are devoted to the employment of sceptical arguments against a variety of 
specific propositions. Of the extant writings of Sextus Empiricus, the first book of the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism is the most important in the present context, for this is where 
Sextus Empiricus defines the Pyrrhonian position.
Sextus Empiricus maintained that man cannot know even that he knows nothing. 
Because of this absolute and unmitigated scepticism, he rejected philosophical 
speculation and advocated the cultivation of the suspension of judgment, which he 
believed would lead to inner balance and tranquillity, the also know as ataraxia or 
freedom of worry. To Sextus Empiricus, all propositions were equally tenable and 
equally untenable, and neither truth nor its approximation could ever be attained. For 
Sextus Empiricus, the wise man refrained from judging between equally uncertain 
propositions, refrained in essence from speculation into the nature of things, and 
cultivated acceptance of the inevitability of man's ignorance of the nature of the world 
and his place in it. This position of Sextus Empiricus can be illustrated by a brief 
analysis of a few key passages from the Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
Sextus Empiricus defines scepticism as “an ability, or mental attitude, which 
opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to 
the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a 
state of mental suspense and next to a state of 'unperturbedness' or quietude”.70 In the 
elaboration of this definition, he tells us that the sceptic is able to oppose appearances 
and judgments and is thereby able to show the equal probability and improbability of all 
propositions.71 He further says that “'suspense' is a state of mental rest owing to which 
we neither deny nor affirm anything” and that “'quietude' is an untroubled and tranquil 
condition of the soul”.72 For Sextus Empiricus, all propositions are equally likely and 
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equally unlikely. “Suspense of judgment” and mental “quietude” are the only 
appropriate goals of the sceptic. 
Sextus Empiricus admits that “the originating cause of scepticism is (…) the 
hope of attaining quietude”.73 He contrasts the sceptic with “men of talent” who, 
“perturbed by the contradictions in things and in doubt as to which of the alternatives 
they ought to accept “ are “led on to inquire what is true in things and what false”.74 By 
contrast, the “basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every 
proposition en equal proposition”, which leads to and end to dogmatizing.75 According 
to Sextus Empiricus, philosophical speculation leads only to confusion because of the 
inevitability of uncertainty. It produces anxiety rather than peace of mind. Accepting 
this, the sceptic seeks tranquillity through the suspension of judgment and refrains from 
philosophical speculation into the nature of things. 
But what about appearances? If Sextus Empiricus rejects judgments about the 
nature of things, what about the data of sense impressions? His position here is fairly 
clear as well. He argues that those “who say that 'the skeptics abolish appearances', or 
phenomena” are misled, saying that “when we question whether the underlying object is 
such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the 
appearance itself but the account given of that appearance”.76
Sextus Empiricus thus accepts that we perceive phenomena, but rejects all 
attempts to interpret their meaning. It is crucial to note here that he is not an empiricist.
He is as mistrustful of the senses as he is of reason. He makes this clear when he says in 
a very important fragment of his writings that “no one, I suppose, disputes that the 
underlying object has this or that appearance; the point in dispute is whether the object 
is in reality such as it appears to be”.77 He maintains that the senses do not reveal the 
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natures of things in themselves and asserts that reason cannot discover them. He 
acknowledges the existence of appearances, but argues that real accounts of them 
cannot be given. He rejects the investigation of appearances. His scepticism is 
unmitigated and he denies either a rational or an empirical foundation for philosophical 
inquiry. He rejects the existence of all criteria in the search for truth. Sextus Empiricus 
disavows the ability of either reason or sense to obtain truth. 
For Sextus Empiricus, the wise man avoids fruitless speculation into the nature 
of things. “Suspension of judgment” and mental “quietude” are his goals and we can see 
it in this representative passage:
“We assert still that the Skeptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion 
and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the Skeptic, having set out to 
philosophize with the object of passing judgment on the sense-impressions and 
ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, 
found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide 
between them suspended judgment; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it 
happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For the man who opines 
that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is without 
the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally 
bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good; which when he has 
obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and 
immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavor to 
avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who 
determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues 
anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed”.78
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Like Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, who lived some 200 years before him, also 
sought peace of mind. Indeed this was one of the main goals of virtually all Hellenistic 
and late ancient philosophers; and Academicians both new an old, Peripatetics, Stoics, 
Epicureans and Pyrrhonians all sought it in different ways. Neoplatonists, Aristotelians, 
Stoics and Epicureans defined dogmatic positions. The sceptics, both Academic and 
Pyrrhonian, convinced by the inevitability of uncertainty, did not. Cicero was an 
Academic sceptic.
Like Sextus Empiricus, Cicero believed that certainty could never be achieved, 
but unlike the former, he believed in the possibility of a provisional or probabilistic 
knowledge. Although illustrations of Cicero's epistemology can be found in a number of 
his writings, its clearest expression, from our point of view, is to be found in the 
Academica, which Cicero offered in defence of the sceptical Second (or Middle) 
Academy of Arcesilas and the Third (or New) Academy of Carneades against the 
dogmatic claims of the restored Old Academy of Antiochus. Although as noted above, 
Arcesilas's position is closer to that of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus, Cicero treats the 
probabilistic scepticism of Carneades as its natural outgrowth, and it is this latter 
version of scepticism that Cicero defends in the Academica. Cicero's position is easily 
illustrated by an examination of two passages from this work. In the first, he speaks 
through Catulus with whom he ultimately agrees.79 Asked where he stands, Catulus says 
that he is “coming round to the view” of his father, the view of Carneades, “that nothing 
can be perceived”, but “that the wise man will assent to something not perceived, that 
is, will hold an opinion, but with the qualification that he will understand that it is an 
opinion and will know that there is nothing that can be comprehended and perceived”. 
For Cicero, the wise man knows that although he cannot comprehend or perceive 
anything as it really is, he can, nonetheless, entertain opinions about things, and can 
give his assent to them, at least provisionally. In this way, he can acquire a probabilistic 
knowledge.80
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This notion is made clearer in the second passage, where Cicero, speaking for 
himself, defines what he considers the true Academic position:
“But for our part, since it is our habit to put forward our views in conflict with 
all schools, we cannot refuse to allow others to differ from us; although we at all events 
have an easy brief to argue, who desire to discover the truth without any contention, 
and who pursue it with the fullest diligence and devotion. For even though many 
difficulties hinder every branch of knowledge, and both the subjects  themselves and our 
faculties of judgment involve such a lack of certainty that the most ancient and learned 
thinkers had good reason for distrusting their ability to discover what they desired, 
nevertheless they did not  give up, nor yet will we abandon in exhaustion our zeal for 
research; and the sole object of our discussions is by arguing on both sides to draw out
and give shape to some result that may be either true or the nearest possible 
approximation to the truth. Nor is there any difference between ourselves and those who 
think that they have positive knowledge except that they have no doubt that their tenets 
are true, whereas we hold many doctrines as probable, which we can easily act upon 
but can scarcely advance as certain”.81
Cicero's response to scepticism is to accept the conclusion that true knowledge 
or understanding, certainty, can never be achieved and that all we can have are opinions; 
but he maintained that we can judge the relative merit of those opinions and decide, in a 
provisional way, which seem more or less likely. Cicero's differentiation between 
knowledge or understanding in the one hand, that would be certain, and opinion on the 
other hand, that would not be certain, is fundamentally Socratic and is derived 
principally from Plato's and Aristotle's elaboration of a Socratic formulation. Cicero 
maintained that though we cannot achieve true understanding, we must continue to aim 
for it. Along the way, we entertain various approximations of the truth, opinions, which 
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partake of greater and lesser probability. Probability is Cicero's response to scepticism. 
Moreover, Cicero maintained that this stance is in harmony with that of Socrates and 
Plato. Indeed, the core of Cicero's argument in the Academica is the idea that the 
scepticism that developed in the Academy under the stewardship of Arcesilas and 
Carneades  was consistent with the teachings of Socrates and Plato.82 He, Cicero, states 
this quite explicitly when he adopts the opinion of Philo that there were not two 
Academies, but one,83 and again when he defends Arcesilas's claim that the sceptical 
position could be traced back to Plato, Socrates and various of the Presocratics.84
Additionally, he says, of the scepticism of the “New” Academy and its relationship to 
Plato and the teachings of the “Old”, that “they can call this school the New Academy to 
me it seems old, at all events if we count Plato as a member of the Old Academy, in 
whose books nothing is stated positively and  there is much arguing both pro and 
contra, all things are inquired into and no certain statement is made”.85
Cicero thus asserted that his opinion was that of Socrates and Plato. At the risk 
of sounding facetious, however, we must be a little sceptical of this claim. Socrates' 
position, although close to that of Cicero, is not identical. Plato's is perhaps more 
complicated still.
Our knowledge of Socrates comes primarily from the writings of his students 
Plato and Xenophon. The latter, however, was not a philosopher, but rather essentially 
an historian and, perhaps a moralist. His evidence on the philosophical opinions of 
Socrates is less substantial than the one found in Plato. Nonetheless, Xenophon provides
corroboration of some of the features of Socrates' thought, and Xenophon was a 
favourite of Montaigne. Xenophon's extant writings are numerous, but his Socratic 
writings, the Oeconomicus, the Symposium, the Apology and particularly the 
Memorabilia, are the most relevant in this context.
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In the Memorabilia, Xenophon gives us three glimpses of a Socrates whom we 
know well from Plato. In the first, Xenophon tells us that Socrates linked justice, virtue 
and wisdom.86 In the second, Xenophon portrays an imaginary conversation between 
Euthydemus and Socrates in which the latter two agree that wisdom and knowledge are 
equivalent and that no man can know all things.87 In the third, Xenophon gives his 
vision of the wisdom of Socrates and his defence of Socrates against the latter's 
Athenian accusers: 
“Moreover, Socrates lived ever in the open; for early in the morning he went to 
the public promenades and training grounds; in the forenoon he was seen in the market; 
and the rest of the day he passed just where most people were to be met: he was 
generally talking, and anyone might listen. Yet none ever knew him to offend against 
piety and religion in deed or word. He did not even discuss that topic so favored by 
other talkers, “the Nature of the Universe”; and avoided speculation on the so-called 
“Cosmos” of the Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena 
of the heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one's mind with such problems is 
sheer folly. In the first place, he would inquire did these thinkers suppose that their 
knowledge of human affairs was so complete that the must seek these new fields for the 
exercise of their brains; or that it was their duty to neglect human affairs and consider 
only things divine? Moreover, he marvelled at their blindness in not seeing that man 
cannot solve these riddles; since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did 
not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen”.88
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Xenophon does not provide an in-depth analysis of Socrates' thought, but he 
does give us a look at some of its essential features. Socrates saw a connection between 
knowledge and virtue or justice. Socrates was more concerned with human affairs and 
transcendental ideas than with the nature of the cosmos. Socrates was sceptical about 
the human ability to achieve true understanding. To explore the ideas of Socrates in 
more depth, we must turn to Plato. 
Several recent studies have emphasized the importance of Socrates and Plato to 
the development of ancient scepticism in general and to that of Academic scepticism in 
particular. The possibility of a sceptical reading of Plato himself, however, remains as 
problematic today as it was in antiquity when there was considerable debate as to 
whether Plato should be regarded as a “dogmatist” or a “sceptic”.89 Cicero, as we have 
seen, maintained that the position of the Academic sceptics was consistent with the 
teachings of Plato. As was indicated in the preceding chapter, Arcesilas, Carneades and 
other early Academic sceptics claimed both Socrates and Plato among their 
forerunners.90 Anthony Long and David Sedley have indicated that Arcesilas's 
scepticism was modelled on the “critical dialectic of Plato's early work”, arguing that 
Arcesilas could legitimately maintain that Plato, at least in the early dialogues, merely 
hypothesized and rarely sought to defend positive conclusions.91 Long and Sedley claim 
that there was a lack of consensus on the teachings of Plato in the years following his 
death, and maintain that in part Arcesilas was reacting against the efforts of some of his 
contemporaries to create a dogmatic system out of the ideas expressed in the 
dialogues.92 Long and Sedley further maintain that ultimately a purely sceptical reading 
of Plato is neither more nor less of a distortion of his thought than a thoroughly 
dogmatic one.93 Part of the reason, of course, why Plato can easily be read as either a 
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“sceptic” or a “dogmatist” is the fact that these concepts themselves grew out of the 
efforts of subsequent readers of Plato to interpret the teachings of their master. 
Hellenistic “dogmatists” and “sceptics” defended different readings of Plato, but 
although support for both interpretations can be found in Plato's writings, the terms of 
the debate are not in themselves Platonic. In short, although Plato himself can with 
some legitimacy be read either as being dogmatic or sceptical, ultimately, as the 
historical initiator of the debate, he must be regarded as either both or neither. His 
thought occupies a space prior to the debate which it sparked and cannot, therefore, be 
situated at either extreme within in. Paul Woodruff perhaps put it best when he said: 
“Which came first, the skeptic or the epistemologist? The answer is, 'Neither: Plato 
came first'”.94
Woodruff argues that although scepticism only truly emerged with Arcesilas, 
both Socrates and Plato are part of the story, and maintains that Plato himself is a 
dogmatist, a sceptic and neither of these, but that he laid the foundations for both 
positions.95 Plato thus is not a sceptic, at least not in the formal sense that such a 
designation, arising after the debates between Hellenistic “sceptics” and “dogmatists” 
implies. Nonetheless, there are sufficient sceptical tendencies in his writings to make a 
sceptical reading of Plato possible, and more that enough material to inspire subsequent 
advocates of sceptical positions. 
If Plato's relationship to the sceptical tradition is complicated, that of Socrates is 
no less so. As with Plato, Socrates pre-dated the debates that defined “scepticism” and 
“dogmatism” and Socrates' relationship to the issues raised in those debates is perforce 
as complicated as Plato's. Moreover, in the case of Socrates, we are confronted by 
another set of problems entirely. As has been noted many times, Socrates himself wrote 
nothing, and we are dependent on other sources for his thought. We know Socrates only 
through the eyes and pens of others. Nevertheless, while Xenophon, Plato and other 
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contemporaries of Socrates all employ him for slightly different rhetorical purposes, 
there is considerable consistency in their portraits of him. Historically, that of Plato, 
which is the most elaborate, has been the most influential, and although the Platonic 
Socrates cannot be identified with the historic Socrates with any degree of certainty, the 
ideas of the Platonic Socrates, whether they ultimately belong to Socrates himself or 
only to Plato's conception of him, have nonetheless acquired a life of their own and the 
Platonic Socrates has effectively become the Socrates of history. It is this Socrates with 
whom we must deal and his semi-mythical nature complicates matters.
Like the student on whose portrait of him we must rely, Socrates pre-figured the 
debates between the “sceptics” and the “dogmatists”, but whereas Plato seems 
sometimes sceptical and sometimes dogmatic, Socrates is more consistently sceptical, if 
never a sceptic in the sense in which that term eventually came to have. He is sceptical 
of man's ability to acquire certain knowledge in this life, and unlike Cicero, he seems to 
reject the possibility of a probabilistic knowledge; but he does not maintain that real 
knowledge is unobtainable, as Sextus Empiricus does. Traditionally, Socrates has not 
been regarded as an epistemologist, but Hugh Benson has argued that “much of what we 
take to be distinctively Socratic appears steeped in epistemological content” and that the 
Socratic equation of virtue with knowledge makes Socrates' focus on moral philosophy 
ultimately epistemological in nature.96 Benson also reads Socrates as a qualified 
sceptic.97 He says: “Socrates (…) is sincere when he professes his ignorance, and to this 
extent he is a genuinely sceptical philosopher”.98 Unlike other sceptics, however, 
Socrates does not believe that knowledge is necessarily unobtainable. Socrates does not 
reject the possibility of knowledge and is devoted to its pursuit, even if he is sometimes 
uncertain that it can be obtained.99 In Plato's Meno, Socrates says, “I shouldn't like to 
take my oath on the whole story [the theory of recollection], but one thing I am ready to 
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fight for as long as I can, in word and act that is, that we shall be better, braver and more 
active men if we believe it right to look for what we don't know than if we believe there 
is no point in looking because what we don't know we can never discover”.100
Socrates' scepticism consists in the acknowledgment of his own ignorance, but 
recognizing his lack of knowledge, he endeavours to acquire it.101 Although not a 
sceptic in the formal sense, Socrates was sceptical enough to become the seminal figure 
in the history of the sceptical tradition. 
Socrates' ideas are expressed most clearly in the Socratic dialogues of Plato, the 
Hippias Minor, the Charmides, the Laches, the Protagoras, the Euthyphro, the Apology, 
the Crito, the Ion, the Gorgias, the Meno, the Lysis, the Euthydemus, the Menexenus, the 
Hippias Major and in Book I of the Republic. These works all stem from a period in 
Plato's career when he was still in the shadow of his master's thought and had not yet 
completely defined his doctrine of ideas.102 Later Platonic writings, specifically the 
Theaetetus, the Parmenides and portions of the Timaeus, however, are also relevant and 
reveal that Plato never entirely abandoned the doubt of Socrates.103
Although they deal with various subjects, all of the Socratic dialogues portray 
the doubt of Socrates, and all end, in one form or another, with an admission of 
ignorance. The nature of virtue is considered in the Hippias Minor, the Protagoras, the 
Crito, the Gorgias, the Hippias Major and Book I of the Republic. Piety is the principal 
subject of the Euthyphro and the Euthydemus. Courage is the main subject of the 
Laches, friendship of the Lysis, and the nature of authority of the Menexenus. 
Knowledge is the primary topic of the Ion. The most crucial of the Socratic dialogues 
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here are the Apology, which presents Socrates' defence of himself against the charges 
levelled against him at his trial, and the Charmides  and the Meno, each of which deal 
with the nature of knowledge. The Theaetetus is crucial to an understanding of both the 
epistemology of Socrates and that of the mature Plato. The Parmenides deals with an 
argument against the Platonic ideas which ends inconclusively and is relevant largely 
because it shows Plato's own lack of “dogmatism”. Finally, several passages in the 
Timaeus provide partial support for Cicero's, and indeed Montaigne's, understanding of 
both Socrates and Plato.
Socrates' basic philosophical concern, and indeed perhaps Plato's, is the nature 
of virtue which is equated with knowledge, ultimately of good and evil, and with the 
question of whether or not true knowledge, or understanding, can ever be achieved. 
Socrates' fundamental interest is thus epistemological in its fullest sense. His concern is 
with what we can and cannot know. Socrates seems to believe that we cannot achieve 
true understanding in life, but that we must nevertheless strive for such understanding. 
At times Plato seems to maintain this as well. Both reject the ultimate value of 
approximate truth, or provisional knowledge, but both are willing to entertain likely 
opinions in the continuing search for knowledge, and both accept that, at least in some 
cases, probability may be the best we can ever achieve. 
The basic nature of Socratic doubt is revealed in the Apology, the Charmides
and the Meno. In the Apology, Socrates repeats the famous pronouncement of the Oracle 
at Delphi, that there is no one wiser than himself.104 He further relates that the only way 
that he can make sense of this is because he is the only man who knows that he knows 
nothing.105 In the Charmides, Socrates confesses his ignorance of the nature of 
knowledge itself.106 In the Meno, Socrates and Meno differentiate between knowledge 
and true opinion. There, Socrates says that true opinion only becomes knowledge when 
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the reason of its truth is understood. In Socrates' words: “true opinions are a fine thing 
and do all sorts of good so long as they stay in their place, but they will not stay for 
long. They run away from a man's mind; so they are not worth much until you tether 
them by working out the reason”.107 For Socrates, thus, man can have opinions, and he 
can have true opinions, but unless he has understanding, which he can apparently never 
achieve, he cannot know whether or not he has true opinions. This is a very provisional 
sort of knowledge indeed. Interestingly, it is in the Meno that we first encounter Plato's 
doctrine of recollection, the idea that all knowledge may ultimately depend on the soul's 
memory of the eternal ideas which it understood prior to its physical incarnation. It 
seems likely that this familiar Platonic formulation was articulated in response to the 
scepticism of Socrates, as a possible solution to one aspect of the problem of knowledge 
contemplated by both Socrates and Plato.108
The fullest explication of Socrates' epistemology, but one of the most perplexing 
with regard to Plato's, however, comes in the Theaetetus. There Socrates and Theaetetus 
consider more fully the nature of knowledge. They start, in fairly typical Platonic 
fashion, by rejecting the notion that knowledge is the knowledge of some particular 
craft or discipline.109 Later on comes the famous passage where Socrates compares 
himself to a midwife (like his mother was), saying that he, who knows nothing and has 
no ideas of his own, merely assists in the births of the ideas of others.110 Shortly after 
this comes an extended discussion of the possibility that knowledge is equivalent to 
perception, a proposition that is eventually rejected on the grounds that there is no way 
to tell whether or not the senses reveal the true nature of reality.111 Further on, the idea 
is proposed that knowledge consists of true belief together with an account of why such 
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belief is true.112 Ultimately, however, Socrates and Theaetetus come to the conclusion, 
familiar from the Meno, that it is possible to have true belief without understanding its 
truth.113 The dialogue ends with Socrates and Theaetetus acknowledging that their 
midwifery has produced “mere wind eggs” which are “not worth the rearing”:
“SOCRATES: Are we in labor, then, with any further child, my friend, or have 
we brought to birth all we have to say about knowledge?
THEAETETUS: Indeed we have, and for my part I have already, thanks to you, 
given utterance to more that I had in me.
SOCRATES: All of which our midwife's skill pronounces to be mere wind eggs 
and not worth the rearing?
THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.
SOCRATES: Then supposing you should ever henceforth try to conceive afresh, 
Theaetetus, if you succeed, your embryo thoughts will be the better as a consequence of 
today's scrutiny, and if you remain barren, you will be gentler and more agreeable to 
your companions, having the good sense not to fancy you know what you do not know. 
For that, and no more, is all my art can effect; nor have I any of that knowledge 
possessed by all the great and admirable men of our own day or of the past. But this 
midwife's art is a gift from heaven; my mother had it for women, and I for young men of 
a generous spirit and for all in whom beauty dwells”.114
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Here we see the essential Socrates, wise in his ignorance, a midwife at the 
mental labors of others, in the storyline of this particular dialogue, Theaetetus. Socrates 
and Theaetetus have been attempting to define knowledge. They have tried all of the 
possibilities they can think of but in the end have conluded that they have failed. The 
exercise, however, has not been fruiless. It has provided a foundation for future inquires, 
should they ever succeed in conceiving afresh. It has also shown them the limits of their 
understanding. This is what Socrates claims for himself: the ability to inquire, and the 
knowledge of his own ignorance.
The conception of all of this, however, is Plato's. This is the mature Plato, 
returning again to a problem that continues to vex him, the nature of knowledge. Like 
the earlier Meno, the Theaetetus ends with the distinction between true opinion and 
knowledge or genuine understanding. Understanding itself is stillborn, however, for the 
exploration of the problem here ultimately produces only “mere wind eggs”. His 
master's midwifery has not led Plato to knowledge; it cannot yield the ideas that are at 
the core of Plato's teaching. In the Theaetetus, Plato presents a powerful vision of 
philosophy as a process, a quest for knowledge that is at the furthest possible remove 
from dogmatism.115
This brings us to the Parmenides, where Plato, in true Socratic/Platonic fashion 
becomes the first to challenge the Platonic Ideas, a fact that lends considerable support 
to a sceptical reading of Plato.116 The Parmenides presents a conversation between the 
young Socrates and Parmenides. It begins with Socrates presenting a challenge to the 
Eleatic idea of the unity, or oneness, of all things.117  It ends with Parmenides' offering 
of an inconclusive argument in favour of his doctrine.118 In between comes Parmenides' 
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indictment of the Ideas, or Forms. He argues that the Forms are known by the Form of 
knowledge and that we do not possess the Form of knowledge. In the words of 
Parmenides, “then, none of the forms is known by us, since we have no part in 
knowledge itself”.119 Unfortunately for Parmenides, virtually the same argument can be 
turned against his doctrine of unity. Plato here ends with uncertainty. He cannot choose 
between the Eleatic idea of unity and his own doctrine of Forms. He cannot achieve 
understanding, only “wind eggs”. Again, as in the Meno and the Theaetetus, he shows 
philosophy at work, portraying it as an inconclusive search for a perhaps unobtainable 
truth. It is not at all difficult to imagine that later readers of Plato would see this as his 
and Socrates' view of philosophy.
Finally, we come to the Timaeus, wherein certain passages suggest that Socrates, 
and by association Plato, accepts that at least sometimes the best we can ever achieve is 
a provisional, probabilistic knowledge. In the Timaeus, Plato offers an account of the 
creation and nature of the cosmos, and this dialogue gives the fullest statement of Plato's 
cosmogony and cosmology. The principal speaker is Timaeus, who at regular intervals 
insists that his account is a likely story only. The first is when he says, it will be 
“enough if we adduced probabilities as likely as any others, for we must remember that 
I who am the speaker and you who are the judges are only mortal men, and we ought to 
accept the tale which is probable and inquire no further”.120 Further on, he advises that 
we accept the opinion of the ancients with respect to the genealogy of the Gods, for 
“although they give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they declare that they are 
speaking of what  took place in their own family, we must conform to custom and 
believe them”.121 Later still, discussing the generation of the body and the nature of the 
soul, he says, “and holding fast to the probability we must pursue our way”.122 Still 
later, Timaeus calls on God and begs him “to be our saviour out of strange and 
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unwonted inquiry, and to bring us to the haven of probability”.123 Shortly after this, 
Timaeus repeats the familiar distinction between knowledge and true opinion.124 Finally, 
regarding the question of whether the number of worlds is indefinite or definite, he says, 
“arguing from probabilities, I am of the opinion that they are one; another, regarding the 
question from another point of view, will be of another mind”.125 Plato understands that 
the cosmogony and cosmology that he gives in the Timaeus is at least partly provisional, 
a likely story only.
The Timaeus presents a number of interpretative challenges, however. Among 
modern scholars, A. E. Taylor emphasized the provisional nature of the work and argued 
that Plato was not presenting his own ideas but rather summarizing earlier, Pythagorean 
teachings.126 Francis Cornford rejected Taylor's reading of the Timaeus and treats the 
work essentially as original and dogmatic.127 Cornford's reading of Plato in general, 
moreover, is largely dogmatic, as is further illustrated by his interpretation of the 
Theaetetus which he regards as a defence of the doctrine of recollection.128 For 
Cornford in general, Plato's expressions of doubt are usually to be taken rhetorically. W. 
G. Runciman, who reads the Theaetetus as an inconclusive inquiry into the problem of 
knowledge, considers Cornford's attitude towards the Theaetetus as an example of the 
questionable practice which perhaps began with Aristotle of treating “all parts of Plato's 
teachings as part of a unified and consistent system”.129 More recently, Luc Brisson and 
F. Walter Meyerstein, like Taylor, have also argued for a speculative reading of the 
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Timaeus.130 Ultimately, as indicated above, Plato can with some legitimacy be read both 
as dogmatic and as sceptical, and here, as elsewhere in his writings, there is evidence to 
support a sceptical reading. Cicero read the Timaeus as speculative. For later Christian 
thinkers it presented a perhaps divinely inspired approximation of revealed teachings. 
Montaigne, as will be shown below, seems to have regarded it in the light of both the 
Ciceronian Academic and the Christian traditions.
Unlike Socrates, Cicero and Sextus Empiricus, Plato cannot be regarded as a 
“genuine sceptic”; he also, however, cannot be read as a “thorough-going” dogmatist. 
Plato did after all advance numerous positive propositions, and the doctrine of ideas is 
the centrepiece of his philosophy. His full epistemology, which is connected to the 
doctrine of ideas and to his cosmogony and cosmology and which ultimately involves 
the soul's recollection of its prior existence, is more complicated than has been set 
forward here. Nonetheless, if not a sceptic, Plato was sceptical, and, partially because of 
his debt to Socrates, he was aware of the limitations of his own speculations. In this 
vein, it seems reasonable to argue that both the “dogmatic” and the “sceptical” traditions 
of the later Academy were legitimate offspring of Socrates the midwife and his 
apprentice Plato. This, however, must remain the subject of future inquiries. 
For now, it is enough to state that the epistemological positions of Socrates, 
Plato and Cicero had some similarities and, further, that these positions differed 
significantly from that of Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonians. For Sextus Empiricus 
the inevitability of uncertainty dictated the necessity of the suspension of judgment and, 
essentially, the fruitlessness of speculative inquiry. For Cicero, it called for relentless 
inquiry and the acceptance of the fact that our understanding of things could never be 
more than provisional. For Socrates, uncertainty was inevitable, provisional knowledge 
was inadequate, indeed almost a contradiction in terms, but likely opinions were a 
useful tool in the pursuit of a never-attainable. For Plato, certainty was at least 
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sometimes unobtainable, and likely opinions were all that we could hope for in such 
cases. 
Having explored the ideas of the principal ancient sceptics, we must turn to 
Montaigne. Together Socrates, Cicero and Sextus Empiricus define the basic positions 
of ancient scepticism, which ranges from the Academic doubt of the former two to the 
full-blown Pyrrhonic scepticism of the latter. What did Montaigne know of their ideas? 
How did he know it? Whom did he follow?
- Montaigne’s knowledge of Ancient scepticism.
Montaigne's struggle with the problem of knowledge is one of the basic themes 
of the Essais, and to reconstruct this theme it is necessary to pull bits and pieces from 
several different, individual essays. Such a piecemeal approach to any author is not 
without its potential dangers, however, and nowhere perhaps is the danger greater than 
with Montaigne, who wears chameleon colours like a badge of honour. Still, 
paradoxically, Montaigne's text, and the author's self-professed attitude towards it, lends 
itself to this approach and, indeed, makes it a necessity. Montaigne's text, like 
Montaigne its subject, is fluid and complex and must be approached with subtlety. 
Montaigne warns us of this himself:
“Others form man; I tell of him and represent a particular one, most ill-formed, 
whom if I had to make over I should really make very different from what he is. Now it is 
done. Now the lines of my painting do not stray, though they change and vary. The 
world is in eternal motion. All things move without cessation, the earth, the rocks of the 
Caucasus, the pyramids of Egypt, both with the common motions and with their own.  
Stability itself is nothing other than a more languid motion. I cannot fix my object. It 
goes along troubled and unsteady, with a natural drunkenness. I take it like this, as it is 
in the instant that I give my attention to it. I do not portray being. I portray passing, not 
the passing from one age to another, or, as people say, from seven years to seven years, 
65
but from day to day, from minute to minute. It is necessary to accommodate my history 
to the hour for I may change this afternoon, not only by chance, but also by intention. It 
is a record of various and changeable events, and of irresolute and occasionally 
contradictory ideas, either because I myself change, or because I consider the subjects 
in different circumstances and aspects. So, I may indeed, possibly contradict myself, but 
the Truth, as Demades said, I do not contradict at all. If my spirit could fix itself, I 
would not make essays, I would make resolutions, but it is always in apprenticeship and 
on trial”.131
Montaigne tries to portray passing rather than being, and we try to portray 
Montaigne who has already passed by looking at the fragments that he left behind. The 
Essais are the exploration of a man and the world in which he finds himself. They are 
essays, as the word indicates, attempts, because he can find no firm footing in a moving 
self from which to view a moving world. He cannot conclude, he can only conjecture. 
His ideas are an apprenticeship, tentative and changeable. He may contradict himself, 
but in his quest he does not contradict the truth that he is continuously striving after, a 
truth that he cannot find but that he nonetheless seeks. This surely sounds more like the 
doubt of Socrates, the Socratic Plato, and Cicero than it does the scepticism of Pyrrho 
and the Pyrrhonic Sextus Empiricus, but we must delve deeper into Montaigne and look 
at his seeming contradictions before we can agree with him that ultimately his self-
portrait is one.
Montaigne's decision to write essays, and the rhetorical strategies that he 
employs within the Essais, reveal much about his thought. He maintains that he is not a 
philosopher, yet he clearly addresses philosophical issues, which he chooses to explore, 
like Plutarch, through the medium of the essay.132 He does so because the essay has a 
mobility that fits his need. It gives him the freedom to wander, to digress, in his search 
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for the truth. It allows him to make use of drama, irony, sublety, and nuance in a way 
that other vehicles would not. Perhaps most importantly, it gives him the chance to 
create and to juxtapose alternative perspectives on the subjects he considers. The essay 
fits his need perfectly. Searching for truth, he writes a search for the truth, playing ideas 
against one another, comparing and contrasting them. He presents a living philosophy 
for a living philosopher, an undogmatic and unsystematic philosophy.133 It appears to 
me that he writes sceptically. It has been suggested that he provides no resolutions, that 
his discourse is inconclusive and open-ended, a testament to the Pyrrhonian suspension 
of judgment.134 But if Montaigne presents no philosophical system in the Essais and 
offers no defence of formal theses, he nonetheless makes clear and precise 
distinctions.135 Furthermore, it seems that he pursues the truth relentlessly, like a hunter 
at the chase, and if in the end the conclusions he reaches are tentative only, they are, 
nevertheless, conclusions.136 Montaigne, as we hope to be able to show, exercises his 
judgment throughout the Essais, for although he entertains multiple perspectives in his 
search for the truth, he himself always remain apart, attempting to resolve the tension 
between those perspectives.
In his quest for the truth, Montaigne draws on a number of sources for guidance, 
including the ancient sceptics. But as Michael Screech has said, “Montaigne was born 
with a mind made for doubt”, and although the “Greek skeptics strengthened that cast of 
mind” they did not create it.137 Montaigne is inspired by the ancients, but he is not 
dominated by them and we totally agree with this statement.138 He considers their lives 
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and their thoughts, and frequently he draws their words into his own text. He chooses 
from among them to suit his needs, and the choices he makes reveal the lines of his 
thought. The text of the Essais can be read as an encounter between texts, and it is that, 
but it is also an encounter between minds through the medium of the text. The essay for 
Montaigne is the act of the chase, ideas are the quarry. The truth is the quarry. 
Montaigne considers the thoughts of the ancients in his search for the truth.
Montaigne's knowledge of ancient scepticism was drawn from a big number of 
different sources, so it is only fitting that we begin with them. Evidence from the Essais
makes it clear that Montaigne knew the Dialogues and Laws of Plato, although in what 
edition or editions we do not know.139 The same is true of various writings of Cicero, 
including the Academica.140 The question of Montaigne's knowledge of the writings of 
Sextus Empiricus is more complicated as we said before, but if Montaigne knew them, 
at present it is not known in what form and whatever statement supporting this 
affirmation would be simple speculation.141 Montaigne's understanding of ancient 
scepticism was supplemented by the writings of Xenophon, Plutarch and Diogenes 
Laertius, but again what edition of the last of these writings he might have worked with 
is uncertain,142 nor is it clear which edition of Plutarch's Moralia he knew.143 Montaigne 
owned a Latin translation of the works of Xenophon printed in Basle in 1551 and a 
Greek edition of Plutarch's Lives printed in the same place in 1550.144 The latter raises 
the thorny question of Montaigne's knowledge of Greek, which will be of some concern 
further below. In the Essais, he tells us that he does not know Greek and praises 
Amyot's French translation of Plutarch.145 Nonetheless this and other evidence on this 
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subject must be regarded as unclear and inconclusive. Montaigne owned books in 
Greek, used Greek words in the Essais, and had numerous lines inscribed in Greek on 
the rafters of his library at Chateau Montaigne, but he tells us in the Essais that he had 
“almost no knowledge” of the language despite his father's efforts to ensure  that he 
learned it.146 In another place he tells us that he does not take to books in Greek, 
because his “judgment cannot do its work with a childish and apprentice 
understanding”.147 In yet another place, however, he says that he finds French 
“sufficiently abundant, but not sufficiently pliable and vigorous” and feels that “it 
ordinarily succumbs to a powerful conception”.148 When it fails, he tells us, Latin, and 
sometimes Greek, come to his aid.149 The picture that emerges here is complicated. 
Montaigne seems to have had some, rather than no knowledge of Greek, but it was not a 
language with which he was comfortable. This issue will come up again when 
Montaigne's potential debt to Sextus Empiricus is considered.
Montaigne speaks of his favourite books and authors in a number of places in 
the Essais. In the essay “Of books”, he praises Cicero's philosophical works.150 In the 
same place he speaks of his admiration for Plato, while indicating that he dislikes the 
dramatic elements in the dialogues.151 However, his highest praise is reserved for others:
“The historians are my obverse. They are pleasant and easy; and at the same 
time, man in general, the knowledge of whom I seek, appears in them more alive and 
entire than in any other place -the diversity and truth of his inner conditions in mass 
and in detail, the variety of the means of his assembly, and the accidents that menace 
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him. Now those who write biographies, all the more so because they occupy themselves 
more with intentions than with events, more with what comes from within than from 
without, are most proper to me. That is why in all ways Plutarch is my man. I am very 
sorry that we do not have a dozen Laertiuses, or that he is neither more receptive nor 
more perceptive, because I consider no less curiosly the fortune and the life of these 
great teachers of the world than the diversity of their opinions and fantastic notions”.152
The historians, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius especially, are his favourites, and 
their role in shaping his understanding of ancient scepticism is critical, as we hope to 
show. Both are of immense importance to an understanding of Montaigne, but although 
he draws heavily on each of them, he is more effusive and direct in his praise of 
Plutarch, saying that it is hard for him “to do without Plutarch” because he finds him 
“so universal and so full that on all occasions, and on whatever extravagant subject you 
have taken up, he meets your need and offers you a liberal hand, inexhaustible in riches 
and embellishments”.153 Comparing him to Seneca, another of his favorites, he says, 
“Plutarch's manner, inasmuch as it is more disdainful and less tense” is to him “all the 
more virile and persuasive”, adding that he could “easily believe that the movements of 
his soul were more assured and more regulated”.154 Plutarch “forms, settles, and 
fortifies us constantly” and “touches our understanding more”.155
Montaigne praises Plutarch, saying that he wins our judgment,156 and while the 
expression could be taken as hyperbolic, it should be noted that at least here Montaigne 
does not sound like one who embraces the Pyrrhonic suspension of judgment. Instead, 
he sounds like one who seeks knowledge, understanding, and finds it, at least in 
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Plutarch, and perhaps in Diogenes Laertius, Plato, and Cicero as well. Cicero's 
philosophical works, the ideas considered in Plato's dialogues, and the lives treated by
Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius provide Montaigne matter in his search for knowledge 
of “man in general”. The historians show him man “more alive and entire than in any 
other place the diversity and truth of his inner conditions in the mass and in detail, the 
variety of the means of his assembly, and the accidents that menace him”. Montaigne 
seems to be saying here that he finds understanding in the historians who witness the 
experience of man and portray the truth of his nature. This is not in keeping with
Pyrrhonism which accepts the evidence of the senses and the report of witnesses, but 
rejects interpretations and conclusions derived from this material, rejects ιστορια, 
inquiry, historical or otherwise, in general, claiming that man and his world cannot be 
understood. The Pyrrhonian can no more assent to the historian who judges man's deeds 
than to the philosopher who judges his nature and his world. Montaigne is not always so 
full of praise, however, and at times in the Essais his tone with regard to a number of 
ancient authors is more critical than it is here, and on occasion he is openly scornful; but 
even his ridicule is affectionate and reflects long study and a deeply-rooted respect. 
Nevertheless, Montaigne does not merely study the ancients, he engages them, 
exercising his judgment on the matter that he finds in them, appropriating what seems 
useful and plausible, rejecting what does not. On balance, Montaigne's judgment of the 
classical tradition is positive, and he finds in it much to which he can at least give his 
provisional assent.
For Montaigne, the writings of Plato, Cicero, Plutarch and others are sources of 
wisdom, of guidance. They are, however, the works of men, who like himself can have 
only an imperfect grasp of truth at best.157 Nonetheless, he regards them as masters to be 
learned from, and his debt to them is as deep as his affection. He speaks to us directly of 
this at the very beginning of the essay “Of books”, where he says that he has no doubt 
that he often speaks of things that are better and more truthfully treated by the “masters 
of the craft”.158 He tells us in the same place that the Essais are only the attempt of his 
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natural faculties. Anyone who points out his ignorance will not offend him because he 
himself is unsure of and dissatisfied with the ideas he entertains. He bids the seeker of 
knowledge look for it where it lives, saying that there is nothing he professes less.159 He 
calls the Essais “his fantasies”, in which he tries “to give knowledge not of things” but 
of himself. He says that the things “will perhaps be known to me one day, or have been 
before, according as fortune may have brought me to the places where they were made 
clear”, but that he no longer remembers them.160
Montaigne further tells us that he seeks “knowledge not of things”, but of 
himself. Following Socrates and the prescription of the Delphic oracle, Montaigne seeks 
self-knowledge. In the Essais he tries his judgment on Montaigne, but also, despite his 
occasional claims to the contrary, on “man in general”, on God, and on nature, for the 
knowledge of self ultimately cannot be divorced from an understanding of the world, 
nor from an understanding of understanding itself. Perhaps Montaigne must understand 
the world to understand himself. The meaning of Pythian Apollo's admonition, however, 
and the message of Socrates, and of Montaigne, is that to understand the world, we must 
understand ourselves, and seeking self-knowledge we seek also knowledge of the world. 
Moreover, like Socrates in Plato's Parmenides, Montaigne knows that in order to truly 
understand anything, we must achieve an understanding of what it is to understand. To 
know, we must know what it is to know. As with Plato, this is not the only problem that 
Montaigne considers, and, like Plato but unlike Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonians, 
its exploration does not bring his inquiries to a halt. It is, however, a problem to which 
Montaigne, like Plato, returns again and again. Montaigne seeks understanding, and the 
ancients whom he commends to us are his guides as well.
Montaigne is sceptical, frequently saying, as at the beginning of the essay “Of 
books”, that “there is nothing that he professes less” than knowledge. The most 
powerful statement of his scepticism, and his most complete account of ancient 
scepticism, occurs in a few brief sketches in the longest of the Essais, the “Apology for 
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Raymond Sebond”, a work primarily concerned with faith and which, as such, is 
considered more fully in the next chapter. Discussions of Montaigne's scepticism that 
focus too heavily on the “Apology” present a skewed vision of the subject, however, for 
Montaigne's scepticism is not confined either to the physical or the chronological limits 
of the “Apology”, and there is much in it that cannot fully be understood without 
reference to other parts of the Essais and to the Essais as a whole. A complicated work, 
the “Apology” must be approached with caution.
Montaigne refers to a number of ancient thinkers in the Essais, but although he 
mentions Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonians on a few occasions, he never names Sextus 
Empiricus, as we already said, and others are his principal guides in the exploration of 
the limits of human reason. Pyrrho is mentioned 4 times in the “Apology” and 3 times 
elsewhere in the Essais, and Pyrrhonians are spoken of 7 times. References to and 
borrowings from Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius appear in 
considerable number throughout the Essais. In the “Apology” Socrates alone is 
mentioned 14 times and quoted once. Plato is mentioned 24 times and quoted 4 times. 
Cicero is quoted 22 times and mentioned and additional 14 times in the “Apology” 
alone. Nine of these quotations occur in the brief discussion of ancient scepticism that 
appears in the middle of the “Apology”, offering Montaigne's most extended treatment 
of the subject.161
Montaigne's choice of references here potentially reveals a great deal about the 
nature of his scepticism. It seems that his reliance on Plato and Cicero, and his decision 
to mingle their words with his own, indicate not only that he was wrestling with their 
ideas, but that he was willing to submit himself, at least in part, to their guidance. He 
learned from them, and his thought, his scepticism, whether or not it ultimately 
resembles theirs, was shaped by his encounter with them. It is possible that Sextus 
Empiricus also shaped his thought, but whereas there is abundant evidence that 
Montaigne actively engaged the writings of Plato and Cicero, there is little to suggest 
that Sextus Empiricus made much of an impact on him. Absence of evidence may not 
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be conclusive evidence of complete absence, but it is at least highly suggestive, and 
extremely problematic for anyone who would argue for presence. Still, it is possible that 
Sextus Empiricus had a subtle influence on Montaigne. Plato and Cicero, however, had 
an obvious one, and the voices of the Academic sceptics speak frequently in the Essais. 
Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Cicero and Plutarch, all members of the Academic family, 
appear throughout the Essais. The Pyrrhonians are represented exclusively by the figure 
of Pyrrho and the expressions attributed to the later Pyrrhonians. Montaigne may choose 
to walk with Pyrrho occasionally, but he returns again and again to the paths of the 
Academy and the company of Socrates, the first and archetypal master of philosophical 
discourse.
The figures of Socrates and Pyrrho offer Montaigne two alternative visions of 
scepticism, but while his pattern of citation suggests a preference for the former, this 
cannot yet be regarded as conclusive. Academic sources predominate, but this does not 
necessarily mean that Montaigne has more affinity with the Academic position. Modern 
scholars remain divided on this subject. André Tournon has argued that Montaigne was 
a Pyrrhonist whose juridical training contributed to the development of an open-ended 
discursive style that allowed him the freedom to consider various alternatives without 
forcing him to make a final choice between them.162 Tournon maintains that the Essais
are an exercise in the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment. Tournon's argument is 
plausible and elegant, but it is also fatally flawed, for Montaigne, as we shall see, self-
consciously and almost defiantly exercises his judgment throughout the Essais. More 
recently, Frédéric Brahami has also argued that Montaigne's scepticism was influenced 
by that of Sextus Empiricus, but unlike Tournon, Brahami maintained that Montaigne 
ultimately departed from Sextus Empiricus. The core of Brahami's argument is that 
Montaigne, unlike Sextus Empiricus, should be read as an anti-rationalist. According to 
him, Montaigne rejected the suspension of judgment of Sextus Empiricus and 
maintained that man has no choice but to exercise judgment in the face of an absolute 
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incertitude.163 Brahami's argument is subtle, but not without its problems. His claim that 
Montaigne is anti-rationalist is tied to his assertion of Montaigne's supposed fideism, an 
understanding of Montaigne which we argue against in the next chapter. We concur, 
however, with Brahami's claim that Montaigne exercises his judgment in the Essais, but 
we question the conclusion that he does so despite a belief in an inescapable and 
absolute incertitude. Most importantly, we feel troubled by Brahami's argument for a 
negative influence on Montaigne by Sextus Empiricus and we are convinced that if 
Montaigne does in fact prefer some other model of scepticism over the Pyrrhonian one, 
there is a much more straightforward and simpler explanation. In short, we suspect that 
if Montaigne follows Socrates rather than Pyrrho, articulating and Academic rather than 
a Pyrrhonian position, he does so consciously and relies primarily on Academic sources 
in doing so. Unlike Tournon and Brahami, Elaine Limbrick has argued for a strong 
Socratic and Ciceronian influence on Montaigne, but like them she has also maintained 
the importance of the supposed influence of Sextus Empiricus.164 Curiously enough, she 
seems to regard Montaigne as having embraced an Academic rather than a Pyrrhonian 
scepticism, but seems to believe that this was unconscious on Montaigne's part, arguing 
that he may not have made a clear distinction between the two165. The only way to 
resolve these questions is to take another look at Montaigne's scepticism, starting with 
what he has to say explicitly about the Academics and the Pyrrhonians in the “Apology 
for Raymond Sebond”. There, as indicated above, Montaigne looks both to Socrates and 
to Pyrrho for aid in his philosophical quest.
Socrates, however, is his principal guide, the Virgil to his Dante. Socrates is his 
role model, and it is to Socrates that he returns again and again throughout the Essais. 
The prelude to the extended discussion of ancient scepticism in the “Apology” fittingly 
begins with a reference to Socrates. Speaking of the vanity of the human claim to true 
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and “Was Montaigne Really a Pyrrhonist?”, Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXXIX, 
1977, pp. 67-80.
165 E. Limbrick, “Was Montaigne Really a Pyrrhonist?”, p. 67.
75
understanding, Montaigne says that pride hinders us.166 He relates Socrates' 
astonishment that the “God of Wisdom had given him the name of Sage” and tells how, 
“examining through and through, he found no basis for this divine sentence”.167
Montaigne relates that Socrates “knew men as just, as temperate, as valiant, as learned 
as himself, and more eloquent, handsomer, and more useful to their country”.168
Socrates “concluded that he was distinguished from the others, and wise because he did 
not think himself so, and that his God considered the opinion that man possesses 
wisdom and knowledge singularly savage, and that man's best doctrine was the 
admission of ignorance, and simplicity his best wisdom”.169
The image of Socrates, together with Plato's and Cicero's elaboration of the 
Socratic postion, is central to Montaigne's scepticism. The wisdom of Socrates consisted 
in his acknowledgment of his own ignorance. For Montaigne, “the wisest man that ever 
was, when they asked him what he knew, answered that he knew this much, that he 
knew nothing”.170 Montaigne continues, maintaining that “we know things in a dream” 
as Plato says, and “are ignorant of them in reality”.171 Finally, Montaigne says that  even 
“Cicero himself, who owed all his worth to learning (…) began to lose his esteem for 
letters” in his old age, and that “while he practiced them, it was without obligation to 
any party, following what seemed probable to him now in one sect, now in another, 
keeping himself always in Academic doubt”.172 Socrates professes his own ignorance, 
Plato says we know things in a dream, and Cicero, following the founders of the 
Academic tradition, keep himself “always in Academic doubt”. Here again, Montaigne 
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sounds like an Academic rather than a Pyrrhonian. A little further on, however, when he 
begins to explore the distinction between the two, everything becomes less clear:
“Whoever seeks anything comes to this point: he says either that he has found it, 
or that it cannot be found, or that he is still in quest of it. All philosophy is divided into 
these three types. Its purpose is to seek out truth, knowledge, and certainty. The 
Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics and others thought they had found it. They established 
the sciences that we have, and treated them as certain knowledge. Clitomachus, 
Carneades, and the Academics despaired of their quest, and judged that the truth could 
not be conceived by our means. Their conclusion is that man is feeble and ignorant. 
This party had the greatest following and the noblest adherents. Pyrrho and other 
Sceptics or Epechists -whose doctrines, many of the ancients maintained were derived 
from Homer, the Seven Sages, Archilochus, and Euripides, and were held by Zeno, 
Democritus, Xenophanes- say that they are still in search of the truth. They judge that 
those who think they have found it are infinitely mistaken; and that there is also an 
overbold vanity in that second class that assures us that human powers are not capable 
of attaining it, for this matter of establishing the measure of our power, of knowing and 
judging the difficulty of things, is a great and supreme knowledge, of which they doubt 
that man is capable”.173
This is a dense and important passage, and each of its main points must be 
examined in turn. As a beginning, here is a brief summary of its contents. First, 
Montaigne describes three possible epistemological positions, that of the Dogmatists, 
who claims to possess certainty, that of the absolute sceptic, who claims that it cannot 
be found, and that of one who quests for certainty but has not attained it. After 
identifying the Peripatetics (Aristotelians), Epicureans, and Stoics as the Dogmatists, 
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Montaigne considers first the Academics and then the Pyrrhonians. In describing these 
groups, Montaigne is presenting his own summary of their respective positions, one that 
is not drawn from any particular, single source, although, as we shall see presently, it is 
clear that he is relying on Diogenes Laertius here for his account of the Pyrrhonians.
Montaigne articulates the three basic epistemological stances: the claim of 
certainty, the claim of absolute scepticism and the claim of probable knowledge. It is 
clear enough that the first two of these are what he is talking about when he writes, 
“whoever seeks anything comes to this point: he says either that he has found it, or that 
it cannot be found”, but that he is talking about probabilism when he says “he is still in 
quest of it [i.e., certainty]” is less clear. Such a reading of this particular passage is at 
best ambiguous, and it is necessary to look elsewhere to find support for it. 
Montaigne speaks next of the Academic sceptics, of whom he writes, “this party 
had the greatest following and the noblest adherents”. He says that the conclusion of the 
Academics was that man was “feeble and ignorant” and they “judged that truth could 
not be conceived by our means”. This sounds like an endorsement of Academic doubt, 
but the rest of the passage, and much that follows it calls this endorsement into question.
Finally, Montaigne turns to Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonians, who seem here and in 
much of what follows to receive his highest praise. He begins with a description of the 
pedigree of Pyrrhonism that is worth noting. The derivation of the sceptical position 
from Homer, the Seven Sages, Archilochus, Euripides, Zeno, Democritus, and 
Xenophanes is reported by Diogenes Laertius in his sketch of Pyrrho.174 It is rejected by 
Sextus Empiricus, however.175 In Cicero and in Plutarch, we read that the claim more 
properly belongs to Arcesilas and the Academics than to Pyrrho.176 Whether he knew 
the claims of the others or not, Montaigne is clearly following Diogenes Laertius here.
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Of the Pyrrhonians, Montaigne says here that “they judge that those who think 
they have found it [certainty] are infinitely mistaken; and that there is also an overbold 
vanity in that second class that assures us that human powers are not capable of 
attaining it”. Immediately afterwards, in a new passage, Montaigne has this to offer: 
“Ignorance that knows itself, that judges itself and condemns itself, is not complete 
ignorance: to be that, it must be ignorant of itself. So that the profession of the 
Pyrrhonians is to waiver, doubt, and inquire, to be sure of nothing, to answer for 
nothing”.177
All of this sounds as if Montaigne sees the Academics as the absolute sceptics, 
and his tone implies a preference for the Pyrrhonians, whom he perhaps understands 
only imperfectly as a result of a reliance on inferior sources. Does he misunderstand the 
respective positions of the Academics and the Pyrrhonians? A little further in the text he 
gives the “Pyrrhonic expressions”. Here too he seems full of praise for the Pyrrhonian 
position:
“Their expressions are: 'I establish nothing; it is no more thus than thus, or than 
either way; I do not understand it; the appearances are equal on all sides; it is equally 
legitimate to speak for and against. Nothing seems true, which may not seem false'. 
Their sacramental word is επεχο that is to say, 'I hold back, I do not budge'. These are 
their refrains, and others of similar substance. Their effect is a pure, complete, and very 
perfect postponement and suspension of judgment. They use their reason to inquire and 
debate, but not to conclude and choose. Whoever will imagine a perpetual confession of 
ignorance, a judgment without leaning or inclination on any occasion whatsoever, has a 
conception of Pyrrhonism”.178
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However, some doubt is cast on Montaigne's attitude towards the Pyrrhonians by 
what immediately follows. He says, “I express [their] opinion as well as I can, because 
many find it difficult to conceive; and its authors themselves represent it rather 
obscurely and diversely”.179 It may seem over-subtle at this point to read in this 
indication that Montaigne, despite his apparent admiration for the Pyrrhonians, does not 
share their position, but we think that this is precisely the case.
In all likelihood, even if he did not acknowledge it, Montaigne took the 
aforementioned “Pyrrhonic expressions” from Sextus Empiricus, but he nowhere shows 
any interest in Sextus Empiricus himself, only in the Pyrrho whom he seems to have 
known largely through Diogenes Laertius: indeed with the exception of these 
expressions, there is little material on Pyrrho or Pyrrhonism that Montaigne made use of 
that he could not have found in Diogenes Laertius. These expressions, some of which 
were inscribed on the rafters of Montaigne's library, are the extent of Montaigne's 
indebtedness to Sextus Empiricus. Our main point here, as we would like to state 
clearly, is that Montaigne simply does not make substantial use of Sextus Empiricus. 
The reasons for this are uncertain. As discussed in preceding pages it has long been 
assumed that Montaigne read Sextus Empiricus in translation, but perhaps he had access 
only to a Greek edition, which, as indicated above, he was not equipped to engage 
properly. Maybe he knew him only indirectly. Maybe he simply did not find him that 
interesting. Whatever the truth is, Montaigne seems to have made little use of material 
borrowed from Sextus Empiricus. Pyrrho and Pyrrhonism may have fascinated him, but 
Sextus Empiricus clearly did not. This in itself is suggestive of his ultimate judgment on 
Pyrrhonism as well. In the crafting of the Essais, he returned once and again to the 
writings of Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius for guidance, and 
direct borrowings from these authors take up a significant portion of the words in 
Montaigne's own text. Montaigne drew most heavily on the texts, and the ideas 
presented in them, that resonated most strongly for him.
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While he had no abiding interest in Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne did have an 
enduring fascination with Socrates, Plato and Cicero, and was interested in both kind of 
scepticism: Academic scepticism which he knew primarily through the writings of Plato 
and Cicero, and Pyrrhonism, which he knew partly through Sextus Empiricus and partly 
through Diogenes Laertius. His understanding of the nature of the two traditions, and 
the question of which he found more attractive, has not been made clear yet, however. 
As stated before in the beginning of this chapter, the Pyrrhonians maintained a position 
of absolute scepticism, while, with the exception of Arcesilas who shared this stance, 
the Academics, following Carneades, inclined towards probabilism.180 Socrates and 
Plato were sceptical, but not sceptics, at least in the Pyrrhonian sense. Does Montaigne 
understand it this way?
A little further on in the “Apology”, Montaigne probes more deeply into the 
tradition of Academic scepticism. Here he makes direct references to Socrates, Plato and 
Cicero, and touches on the debate over Plato's epistemological position as discussed by 
a number of ancient authors, including Cicero, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius on the 
one hand, and Sextus Empiricus on the other. Cicero reads Plato as putting forth nothing 
but probabilities.181 Diogenes Laertius see him as affirming some things positively, but 
suspending his judgment on others.182 Plutarch seems to waiver between these two 
alternatives.183 Sextus Empiricus, who rejects probabilism, says that Plato cannot be 
regarded as a true sceptic whether he speaks assertively or only of probabilities and 
seems to doubt even that Plato has genuine sceptical tendencies.184 If Montaigne is 
familiar with the arguments of Sextus Empiricus, he does not employ them. Instead he 
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draws on Cicero, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius. Montaigne's judgment concerning 
Plato's epistemology, however, is the same as Cicero's, and, as he often does in the 
“Apology for Raymond Sebond” and elsewhere in the Essais, he uses Cicero's words in 
formulating his own position. Montaigne refers to Timaeus's proposition to speak to 
Socrates “mano to man” since “it will suffice if his [Timaeus's] reasons are as probable 
as another's”.185 Montaigne says that Cicero imitated Plato in the Timaeus when he said 
that he, Cicero, would not “declare certain and fixed things like Pythian Apollo” but 
would “speak like a mere man with probabilities following conjectures”.186 Finally he 
quotes from Cicero's translation of Plato's Timaeus, to show that Cicero adopted the 
stance of Timaeus, and of Plato in parts of the Timaeus, as his own.187 Montaigne 
reveals here his familiarity with the probabilistic Plato of the Timaeus. He calls Cicero 
Socrates' follower, high praise coming from Montaigne, and says that he pursued 
probabilities rather than speaking certainties like Pythian Apollo. Finally, quoting 
Cicero quoting Plato, he says that we who are judging are only men, and that if 
probabilities are stated we can ask for nothing more.188 A little further on, Montaigne 
speaks again with Cicero's words when he says, “this method in philosophy of arguing 
against everything and making no open judgment in any matter, started by Socrates, 
repeated by Arcesilas, confirmed by Carneades, continues still in our own time”, and 
that “we are those who say that some falsehood is joined with every truth, with so much 
similarity that there is no juncture in them that we can mark to judge and to assent with 
certainty”.189
Montaigne understands Cicero's position, but what happen with Plato's? The 
tradition started by Socrates, repeated by Arcesilas, confirmed by Carneades, continued 
in Cicero: where does Plato fit in? Here is Montaigne's reading:
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“Moreover some have considered Plato a dogmatist, others a doubter; others, in 
certain things one, in certain things the other. The conductor of his dialogues, Socrates, 
is always questioning and exciting discussion, never concluding, never satisfying; and 
says he has no other knowledge than the knowledge of opposing. Homer, their author, 
laid the foundations equally for all sects of philosophy, to show how indifferent he was 
about which way we would go. From Plato arose ten different sects, it is said. In my 
opinion, never was teaching wavering and noncommital, if his is not”.190
Montaigne reads Plato through Cicero's eyes, seeing him as “wavering and 
noncommital”. Elsewhere he tells us that where Plato “writes on his own, he prescribes 
nothing certain”.191 Some of this must be regarded as hyperbole, for there is evidence in 
the Essais to suggest that Montaigne understands the complexity of Plato, as do Cicero, 
Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius. All four know that there is some merit in each of the 
rival traditions within the Academy. Nevertheless all four accept the pedigree of 
academic scepticism given by Arcesilas and rejected by Sextus Empiricus, and Cicero 
and Montaigne, heirs of the sceptical Academy, ultimately read Plato himself as an 
Academic sceptic.
In the passages examined earlier, Montaigne seems at least potentially unclear 
about the difference between Academic doubt and Pyrrhonic scepticism, but a later 
passage in the “Apology” makes it plain that this was not the case. He says that the 
“Academics allowed some inclination of the judgment, and found it too crude to say 
that it was no more likely that snow was white than black, and that we were no more 
assured of the movement of a stone that leaves our hand  than of that of the eighth 
sphere.192 To avoid such absurdities, “they admitted that some things were more 
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probable than others”, even though ultimately they maintained that man can know 
nothing with certainty because “truth is engulfed in deep abysses where the sight of 
humans cannot penetrate”.193 Montaigne, drawing here indirectly on Cicero's 
Academica, understands the Academic position and sounds sympathetic to it. 
Immediately afterwards, however, he says t hat the “advice of the Pyrrhonians is bolder 
and at the same time more plausible”.194 He maintains that by accepting the idea of 
probable knowledge the Academics are essentially claiming that they can distinguish the 
true from the false.195 He writes, “if our understanding is capable of the form, the 
lineaments, the carriage and the visage of the truth, it would see it all as well as half of 
it, nascent and imperfect”.196 He argues that if “that appearance of verisimilitude which 
makes them lean rather to the left than to the right” is increased “it will come about 
finally that the balance will be tipped all to one side and come to rest on one choice and 
one entire truth”.197
Here the scales of his own balance seem to be tipping back towards the 
Pyrrhonians, and the seem to rest in their favour in what  follows immediately after 
when he says of the Academics, “how can they be persuaded to yield to the likeness of 
truth, if they know not the truth? How do they know the semblance of that whose 
essence they do not know? Either we can judge absolutely, or we absolutely cannot”.198
Note, however, that Montaigne's argument here against probability is essentially the one 
that Socrates gives in the Meno, the Theaetetus, and elsewhere, without subsequently 
coming to the same conclusion as the Pyrrhonians, namely that suspension of judgment 
is the correct response to this state of affairs. Note also, Montaigne's use of the idea of 
plausibility. Finally, there is the fact that Montaigne himself seems to be making a 
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judgment, or at least building up to one. Montaigne uses irony here to undermine his 
praise of the Pyrrhonians.
What is Montaigne's true opinion? Is his position closer to that of the Academic 
sceptics or to that of the Pyrrhonians? To resolve this question we must look at other 
portions of the “Apology” and elsewhere in the Essais. The answer, in part, is to be 
found in the nature of the Essais as a whole. In his exploration of this subject, 
Montaigne relied partially, here an elsewhere, on Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Plutarch, 
Diogenes Laertius and others. In the final analysis, however, the judgment was his own.
- Montaigne: facing academic doubt and Pyrrhonic scepticism.
Montaigne's fascination with Pyrrhonism is ultimately a fascination with the 
tradition's founder, Pyrrho, who at times he almost seems to see as exemplifying a 
deeply satisfying ideal of simplicity. The essentially pastoral motif of the idealized 
peasant, the simple man who is free from the cares and concerns of the gentle and 
scholarly, virtually a trope in western letters since Homer, strikes a powerful note in the 
Essais. If Montaigne is drawn to the simple life, however, he is keenly aware that it is a 
chimera. Nonetheless there is an abiding tension in Montaigne between involvement in 
the affairs of the world and engagement in intellectual inquiry, on the one hand, and 
withdrawal, both social and intellectual, on the other. Montaigne the courtier flees the 
vita activa for the vita contemplativa, but the world of the court and the law draws him 
back again and again. Montaigne the “retired” scholar dreams of the vita rustica, but 
knows that his conception of it is fantastical, for Montaigne the jurist and the student of 
Man knows that the so-called “simple life” is as full of ignorance and violence as the 
life of the town and the court. There remain, however, these tensions in Montaigne 
between the active and the contemplative and between the sophisticated and the simple. 
That Montaigne's interest in Pyrrho relates to this is perhaps not immediately apparent. 
Montaigne does not entirely seem to see Pyrrho as a “holy fool”, but there is certainly 
something of saintly anti-intellectualism in his image of Pyrrho. In the “Apology” he 
maintains that he cannot accept the portrait of Pyrrho as “stupid and immobile, 
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following a wild and unsociable way of life, waiting for carts to hit him, risking himself
on precipices, refusing to conform to the laws”.199 Although he does not acknowledge it 
here, Montaigne has taken this image from Diogenes Laertius,200 and this is perhaps one 
of the reasons why Montaigne laments that the latter is not “more receptive” and “more 
perceptive” in the essay “Of books”.201 Montaigne believes that this image of Pyrrho “is 
outside his doctrine” and that “he had no desire to make himself a stone or a stump; he 
wanted to make himself a living, thinking, reasoning man, enjoying all natural pleasures 
and comforts, putting to work and being served by all his bodily and spiritual faculties 
in regular and upright fashion”.202 Montaigne's “reasoning man” does not sound like 
holy fool whom Diogenes Laertius seems to portray or like a devotee of the “simple 
life”, but listen to what Montaigne says a little further on:
“How many arts are there that profess to consist of conjecture more than of 
knowledge, that do not decide on the true and the false and follow only what seems to 
be? There are, they say, both a true and a false, and there is in us the means to seek it, 
but not to test it by a touchstone. We are much better if we let ourselves be led without 
inquisitiveness in the way of the world. A soul guaranteed against prejudice is 
marvelously advanced towards tranquillity. People who judge and check their judges 
never submit to them as they should. How much more docile and easily led, both by the 
laws of religion and by political laws, are the simple and incurious spirits, than those 
spirits that survey divine and human causes like pedagogues!”.203
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Montaigne may or may not see Pyrrho as a holy fool, but for Montaigne, 
Pyrrhonism approaches the ideal of simplicity, an ideal to which Montaigne is drawn 
but that ultimately he considers illusory. When he speaks of arts that “follow only what 
seems to be” and do not involve conjecture, he has the crafts of the artisan in mind, as 
will become clearer momentarily. They, the simple, here artisans, do not seek to test the 
true and the false, but are “led without inquisitiveness”. They are “guaranteed against 
prejudice” and “marvelously advanced towards tranquillity”. These “simple and 
incurious spirits” are “more docile and easily led, both by the laws of religion and by 
political laws”, than those who “survey divine and human causes like pedagogues”, and 
“people who judge and check their judges never submit to them as they should”. These 
are weighted words coming from Montaigne the judge and the author of an essay on 
education. There is an irony here that Montaigne at the moment of writing may or may 
not be aware of, a withdrawal from what he is extolling. He was extolling the ideal of 
simplicity, but he does it in a way that portrays those who have not achieve it as 
gregarious individuals easy to control and dominate. That was not what he was trying to 
get, or was it?
Montaigne equates the balance that the Pyrrhonian seeks by suspension of 
judgment with the tranquillity known naturally by the “simple and incurious”, but 
although he occasionally seems to long for the simple life, Montaigne the judge who 
also aspires to the life of a retired scholar has a judicial and balanced understanding of 
the tension between the imaginary ideal of simplicity and his own commitment to 
ιστορια, inquiry, and to judgment. Montaigne's decision in the case of the simple vs. the 
learned is crucial to an understanding of his scepticism. Montaigne's judgment on 
judgment is, in our point of view, his decision in the Academy vs. Pyrrhonism.
To understand this fully, we must look closely at Montaigne on simplicity and 
learning and finally turn our attention to Montaigne on judgment itself. Earlier in the 
“Apology for Raymond Sebond”, he says that he has seen a “hundred artisans, a 
hundred labourers, wiser and happier than university rectors” and that he would rather 
be like the former than the latter. He suggests there that learning may have some 
importance in life, but not as much as many think. He argues that we really have no 
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more need of “offices, rules and laws of living” than do cranes and ants, who do well 
enough without erudition.204 He maintains that “if man were wise, he would set the true 
price of each thing” according to its utility and appropriateness”, and that “a greater 
number of excellent men will be found among the ignorant than among the learned”. 
Finally, he says that the “old Rome” produced men of greater worth.205
Montaigne says again here, in different words, that the “simple and incurious” 
are happier and better than the inquisitive. Artisans and labourers, and cranes and ants 
who live without laws and judges, are happier than university rectors. Erudition is not 
necessary to orderly conduct. Montaigne the historian longs with Livy the historian for 
an idealized Rome that never existed and could have produced neither of them. Like 
Livy (Titus Livius), Montaigne lives in what he perceives to be a decadent and 
contentious age. He equates “worth and innocence” with simplicity. He longs for a 
simple past that was dominated by good husbandmen who let themselves be “led 
without inquisitiveness”. In his histories, Livy propagandizes the virtue of the old 
Roman Republic. In the “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, Montaigne resorts to similar 
tactics in his search for an antidote to the troubles of his own day. Whether the irony of 
this was self-conscious in either of them is ultimately irrelevant, although it is hard to 
imagine that it was not, at least in Montaigne.
Although occasionally he longs for it, Montaigne knows that the ideal of the 
simple life is an imaginary one, and in any event it is not the one that he chooses, for 
among other things Montaigne is both a student and a teacher. He is committed to the 
quest for knowledge, and although he is contemptuous of the state of learning in his day, 
he believes that education is essential to the formation of judgment.206 All of this, and 
Montaigne's commitment to the life of the scholar, is stated clearly in many places in the 
Essais, but nowhere perhaps as strongly as in the essays “Of pedantry” and “Of the 
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education of children”. In the latter, Montaigne tells the reader that he is writing on 
education at the behest of a female friend who has requested that he consider  the 
subject and whom he addresses in the essay as “Madame”. At one point he writes, 
“Madame, learning is a great ornament and a tool of marvellous service, notably for 
people raised to such a degree of fortune as you are”.207 Montaigne says that learning 
belongs to the elite of society and that “in truth, it does not find its true use in base and 
vile hands”.208 This is Montaigne the nobleman speaking. Although it may be pleasant 
to dream of simple shepherds, ploughmen, and artisans, they are neither nice nor gentle, 
but rather crude, low-born, and apparently deservedly ignorant. Montaigne is not 
egalitarian, and although he likes at least some of his servants and sometimes likes to 
pretend that they live simpler lives, he does not wish to exchange places with them. 
Ultimately, Montaigne aspires more to the ideal of the philosopher than to that of the 
shepherd.
Although severely critical of the state of learning in his own day, Montaigne, a 
gentleman, a scholar, and a confidant of princes, identifies more with gentlemen and 
with scholars than with peasants and artisans. In the beginning of the essay “Of 
pedantry”, he tells us that as a child he disliked the fact that teachers were the butt of 
jokes in Italian comedies.209 He reports that this disdain for the learned is ancient and 
notes that Plutarch claimed that “Greek and student were terms of reproach and 
contempt among the Romans”.210 He tells us that as he grew older he came to realize 
that the most learned were not always the most wise, but he wondered how this was 
possible and how “vulgar” souls could entertain the “discourse and the judgments of the 
greatest minds that the world has produced” without becoming more wise.211 He is 
confused by the fact that ignorant peasants can sometimes have a natural understanding 
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of the wise that is not always shared by the learned.212  Montaigne draws a distinction 
here between the simple, the learned and the wise. Although he does note express it 
thus, it is hard to imagine that it did not come to his mind as it does to ours that the 
simple are like the boy in Plato's Meno from whom Socrates coaxes knowledge. The 
wise are like Socrates. Both the simple and the learned can be unwise, however, and 
both ultimately are guilty of condemning Socrates. All of this sounds very Platonic. To 
be wise is clearly best. To be simple is maybe the next best thing. To be learned but now 
wise is to be worthy of the scorn of all. As Montaigne says, thinking doubtless of the 
examples in Aristophanes and Lucian, the philosophers have “in truth sometimes been 
mocked by the comic liberty of their times, their opinions and ways making them 
ridiculous”.213 Montaigne, who sometimes joins in the fun, as did Socrates, nonetheless 
has a deep respect for philosophy and philosophers, at least for the true lovers of 
wisdom. For Montaigne, the real aim of education is to produce such love, a love that 
for him is embodied in the person of Socrates.214
Montaigne is not one of the “vulgar” who in antiquity disdained philosophers as 
“ignorant of the elementary and common things, as presumptuous and insolent”.215 He 
is amused by men who are “still trying to find out whether there is life, whether there is 
movement, whether man is something other than an ox”.216 A nobleman himself, he sees 
the arrogance of men who regard princes and sons of noble houses as no better than 
other men.217 He sees all of this, but he also sees its justification on the part of the wise. 
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He says that as the philosophers “were great in knowledge, so they were greater in every 
kind of action”.218
Montaigne says of the wise among the philosophers that it “clearly appeared that 
their heart and soul had been marvellously enlarged and enriched by the understanding 
of things”.219 He speaks of Archimedes, whom he knew through Plutarch and Diogenes 
Laertius, who knows the craft of the artisan better than the artisan himself but disdains it 
as merely the “apprentice work and plaything” of his art.220 The wise philosopher has 
achieved the true understanding that the artisan and the foolish among the learned 
lack.221 The former do not inquire into the nature of things, and the latter labour to fill 
the memory, “and leave the understanding and the conscience empty”.222 Montaigne 
argues that “just as birds sometimes go in quest of grain, and carry it in their beak 
without tasting it to give a beakful to their little ones, so our pedants go pillaging 
knowledge in books and lodge it only on the end of their lips only to disgorge it and  
                                                            
218 Montaigne, Essais, I, 25, “Of pedantry”, p. 135.
219 Montaigne, Essais, I, 25, “Of pedantry”, p. 135.
220 Montaigne, Essais, I, 25, “Of pedantry”, p. 135.
221 We have found some similarities between this conception and the way that Joseph Conrad depictes 
the relationship of the black men with technology in The heart of Darkness. We cannot avoid to see 
some analogies between this consideration of a lack of understanding in the artisans and the foolish 
and the way in which white culture of Conrad's The heart of Darkness was confident of its superiority. 
Perhaps it is worthy to stop a bit in this extraordinary passage of Conrad: “And between whiles I had 
to look after the savage who was fireman. He was an improved specimen; he could fire up a vertical 
boiler. He was there below me, and, upon my word, to look at him was as edifying as seeing a dog in a 
parody of breeches and a feather hat, walking on his hind-legs. A few months of training had done for 
that really fine chap. He squinted at the steam-gauge and at the water-gauge with an evident effort of 
intrepidity--and he had filed teeth, too, the poor devil, and the wool of his pate shaved into queer 
patterns, and three ornamental scars on each of his cheeks. He ought to have been clapping his hands 
and stamping his feet on the bank, instead of which he was hard at work, a thrall to strange 
witchcraft, full of improving knowledge. He was useful because he had been instructed; and what he 
knew was this--that should the water in that transparent thing disappear, the evil spirit inside the 
boiler would get angry through the greatness of his thirst, and take a terrible vengeance. So he 
sweated and fired up and watched the glass fearfully (with an impromptu charm, made of rags, tied to 
his arm, and a piece of polished bone, as big as a watch, stuck flatways through his lower lip)”, 
Joseph Conrad, The heart of Darkness, Norton Critical Edition, London, 2006, chapter 2. An 
interesting analysis could be made on understanding, technology, education and superstition reading 
this passage, but this is probably not the right place to do it.
222 Montaigne, Essais, I, 25, “Of pedantry”, p. 136.
91
scatter it to the winds”.223 Montaigne asks “what is the making of knowledge, if not 
understanding?”224 For Montaigne, learning is neither for giving “light to the soul that 
has none, nor for making the blind man see”.225 He maintains that its purpose “is not to 
furnish him with sight but to direct the sight that he has, provided it has straight and 
capable feet of its own”.226 He says that knowledge is a good drug, “but no drug is 
strong enough to preserve itself without alteration and corruption, according to the taint 
of the vessel that contains it”.227
Montaigne praises true learning and true knowledge, despising only pedantry, 
and makes it clear that the former is not the province of the simple. Following Plato he 
argues that different men are made for different things.228 He writes, “cripples are ill-
suited to exercise of the body, and crippled souls to exercises of the spirit; the bastard 
and the vulgar are unworthy of philosophy”.229 Montaigne prefers the wise to the 
learned and to the simple. These sentiments are voiced early on in the Essais, but they 
remain with him at their end. In the essay “Of experience”, one of the most important of 
the essays and one that is considered more fully in the penultimate chapter of this work, 
he writes this:
“It is more of a task to interpret the interpretations than to interpret the things, 
and there are more books about books than about any other subject: we only write 
glosses about each other. The world is swarming with commentaries; of authors there is 
a great scarcity. Is it not the principal and most reputed learning of our times to learn to 
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understand the learned? Is that not the common and ultimate end of all studies? Our 
opinions are grafted on one another. The first serves as a stock for the second, the 
second for the third. Thus we climb, step by step. And it happens that he who has 
mounted highest has often more honour than merit; for he has only mounted one bit 
higher on the shoulders of the last”.230
Montaigne laments the state of learning in his day, but borrowing an image from 
St. Bernard argues that although the efforts of his contemporaries are puny in 
comparison to those of the ancients, progress in the work of understanding, in the 
exercise of the judgment, is nonetheless being made. Scaling the ladder step by step, we 
climb higher that we were before. We come closer to knowledge.
Although Montaigne's stance on the value of philosophy seems clear, he is 
nonetheless a sceptic, professing his own ignorance again and again like Socrates, but 
whether his scepticism is closer to that of the sceptical Academy of that of the 
Pyrrhonians has yet to be established. The answer depends on Montaigne's judgment. 
Both the Academics and the Pyrrhonians argue that it is impossible to achieve certainty 
in this lifetime. With the exception of Arcesilas, the Academics believe that it is possible  
to differentiate between more and less likely opinions, however. The Pyrrhonians reject 
this notion and recommend the perfect and complete suspension of judgment, arguing 
that this will lead to a state of balance in which the mind is freed from the anxiety that is 
produced by fruitless inquiry into the nature of things.
Judgment and Montaigne's attitude towards it are the keys. To get at this, we 
must look again at Montaigne's thoughts on Pyrrho and on Pyrrhonism. Finally, we must 
look at what he has to say of judgment, and of Socrates, the true founder of the 
Academic tradition.
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Montaigne admires the Pyrrhonians, and perhaps at times aspires to their ideal, 
but in the end he considers them as extreme as the dogmatists. In the “Apology for 
Raymond Sebond”, he says that the Pyrrhonians “have reserved a wonderful advantage 
in combat, having discharged themselves of the need to cover up”.231 He maintains that 
it does not matter to them “that they are struck, provided that they strike; and the do 
their work with everything”.232 He writes, “if they win, your position is lame; if you 
win, theirs is”; either way, proving that nothing is known, or not proving it, they win. 
He says, “they make their way in finding much more easily why a thing is false than 
why it is true, and what is not than what is, and what they do not believe than what they 
believe”.233 The Pyrrhonians here sound little ridiculous. In the essay “Of cripples”, he 
is even more critical of the ancient sceptics, however. He quotes Clitomachus as saying 
with scorn that the labours of Carneades who refused to give his assent to anything were 
even greater than those of Hercules.234 He argues that the doctrine of Carneades arose 
only as a backlash against the arrogance of other philosophers. He compares the 
position of the sceptics to that of Aesop who when he found himself being sold with two 
other slaves who each claimed great things for himself, said that he could do nothing for 
the others had already claimed everything. He declares that the sceptics adopted threir 
position “through spite and emulation” of the arrogance of the dogmatists. He said that 
the first “hold the same extreme in ignorance that the others do in knowledge”.235
Ultimately, he sees this as an example of man's vanity.
Here the ancient sceptics, both Academics and Pyrrhonians, are castigated for 
the immoderacy of their opinions, the extremity of their scepticism. Carneades the 
Academic alone is named, but if Carneades, whom Montaigne knew to embrace the 
possibility of likely opinions, is criticized, how much greater is the implied criticism of 
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the Pyrrhonians who reject even this? However one reads this, Montaigne the sceptic 
rejects absolute scepticism. 
Elsewhere, in the essay “Of virtue”, where he touches again on some of the 
anecdotes concerning Pyrrho recorded by Diogenes Laertius, Montaigne seems to 
consider Pyrrho himself a little extreme.236 Among other things, Montaigne relates that 
if Pyrrho “was going somewhere, he would not change his path for any obstacle that 
presented itself, and was saved from precipices, from being hit by carts, and from other 
accidents, by his friends” because “to fear or avoid anything would have been to clash 
with his own propositions, which deprived even the senses of any choice of 
certainty”.237 As seen above, Montaigne defends this in the “Apology for Raymond 
Sebond”, as he does here, but he also says that “it is something to bring the soul to these  
ideas”.238 He maintains that it is even harder, but not always impossible, to practice 
them, but he also says, to practice them “with such perseverance and constancy as to 
establish them as our ordinary course, certainly, in these undertakings so remote from 
common usage, it is almost incredible that it can be done”.239 Montaigne finds the 
Pyrrhonic position extreme and almost incredible.
In the “Apology”, Montaigne directly considers ataraxy, freedom from worry, 
the ultimate goal of the Pyrrhonians, the balance which they claim results from the 
suspension of judgment and produces freedom for “fear, avarice, envy, immoderate 
desires, ambition, pride, superstition, love of novelty, rebellion, disobedience, obstinacy, 
and most bodily ills”,240 and again his feelings seem mixed. Montaigne admires the 
balance of the Pyrrhonians as an ideal, but ultimately he considers it unattainable:
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“Is it not an advantage to find oneself disengaged from the necessity that curbs 
others? Is it not better to remain in suspense than to entangle yourself in the many 
errors that the human fancy has produced? Is it not better to suspend your conviction 
than to get mixed up in these seditious and quarrelsome divisions? What am I to 
choose? Whatever you please, provided you choose! A stupid answer, to which 
nevertheless all dogmatism seems to come, by which we are not allowed not to know 
that which we do not know”.241
The Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment follows for Montaigne from the 
dogmatism that is its reverse, but the former is no less extreme and no more acceptable 
than the latter in his eyes, and ataraxy is a chimera. Undoubtedly it would be better “to 
find oneself disengaged from the necessity that curbs others”, but it is an impossibility. 
For Montaigne, the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment is ultimately as foolish and 
dogmatic an answer as the dogmatism to which it is in opposition.242
Montaigne rejects the Pyrrhonian affirmation of doubt and chooses instead the 
words “Que sçais je?” What do I know?, which together with a pair of scales form his 
device or strategy.243 He understands the Pyrrhonian ideal and admires it, but he reject it 
as extreme. He chooses a balance, not to represent ataraxy, but to symbolize judgment. 
In the end his judgment of the Pyrrhonians is negative, for they have gone too far and 
“use their arguments and their reason only to ruin the apparent facts of experience; and 
it is marvellous how far the supplenesss of our reason has followed them in this plan of 
combating the evidence of the facts”.244 Montaigne accepts the existence of  facts and, 
unlike the Pyrrhonians, is willing to try to interpret them. He says, “they prove that we 
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do not move, that we do not speak, that there is no weight or heat, with the same force 
of arguments with which we prove more likely things”.245 Montaigne places himself 
among those who “prove more likely things”, saying, “having essayed by experience 
that where one man has failed, another has succeeded, and that what was unknown to 
one century the following century has made clear, and that the sciences and arts are not 
cast in a mould, but are formed and shaped little by little, by repeated handling and 
polishing, as the bears lick their cubs into shape at leisure, I do not leave off sounding 
and testing what my powers cannot discover; and by handling again and kneading this 
new material, stirring it and heating it, I open up to whoever follows me some facility to 
enjoy it more at his ease, and make it more supple and manageable for him”.246
Montaigne, at least potentially believes in progress in the quest for knowledge and 
makes attempts at judgment. Ultimately, of course, they remain attempts only, and the 
idea of progress itself may be chimerical.247 He knows that human judgment is weak, 
but he also knows that its exercise cannot be escaped and this is what Montaigne does
tirelessly all over his Essais.
Montaigne says that judgment holds an “insecure seat in man”, but that it holds 
it nonetheless.248 He maintains that our notions, our opinions change constantly.249 He 
argues that no matter how many times we discover that we have been mistaken, no 
matter how well we know that ultimately true understanding is impossible in this 
lifetime, we still cannot avoid exercising our judgment and attempting to distinguish the 
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true from the false, or at least the more likely from the less likely.250 He tells us in no 
uncertain terms that this is part of the human condition.
Montaigne may lament the weakness of human judgment, but he does not regret 
that to judge is part of what it means to be human. If fact he revels in it; we should keep 
in mind that he is after all a judge by profession. A sceptic, he does not claim to possess 
the truth that (like Socrates and Plato) he might once have known but has since 
forgotten, but like them he hopes to discover it again one day. For Montaigne, as for 
Socrates, ultimately the quest for knowledge, as uncertain as its end must be, is 
nonetheless a necessity. Its pursuit is a sign of strength, withdrawal from it a sign of 
weakness. He tells us this clearly in the last of the Essais, the essay “Of experience”:
“It is nothing but a particular weakness that makes us content with what others 
or we ourselves have found out in this hunt for knowledge. An abler man is not content 
with it. There is always a place for a successor, yes, and for ourselves, and another 
road. There is no end to our inquiries; our end is in the other world. It is a sign of  
contraction of the spirit when it is content, or of weariness. No generous spirit ever rests 
in itself; it always tends towards more and goes beyond its strength; it has impulses 
beyond its means. If it is not advancing and pressing forward and standing at bay and 
clashing, it is only half alive. Its pursuits are without limit and without form; its food is 
wonder, the chase, ambiguity. Apollo revealed this clearly enough, always speaking to 
us equivocally, obscurely, and obliquely, not satisfying us, but amusing and occupying 
us. It is an irregular, perpetual motion, without model and without aim. Its inventions 
excite, pursue, and produce one another”.251
For Montaigne, engagement in the quest for knowledge is a sign of strength. He 
calls it a weakness to shirk form the quest and maintains that an “abler man is not 
                                                            
250 Montaigne, Essais, II, 12, “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, p. 563.
251 Montaigne, Essais, III, 13, “Of experience”, p. 1068.
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content with it”. He says, “there is no end to our inquiries”, no rest, no ataraxy, in this 
world. He argues that no generous spirit ever rests in itself unless it is only “half-alive”. 
Montaigne declares that “its pursuits are without limit and without form; its food is 
wonder, the chase, ambiguity”, that the quest for knowledge will always end, in this life 
at least, in uncertainty. The gods speak to us obliquely only because we are incapable of 
apprehending the truth directly. He writes:
“Judgment holds in me a magisterial seat, at least it carefully tries to. It lets my 
sentiments go their way, both hatred and friendship, even the friendship I bear myself, 
without being altered and corrupted. If it cannot reform the other parts according to 
itself, at least it does not let itself be deformed to match them; it plays its game apart. 
The advice to everyone to know himself must have an important effect, since the god of 
knowledge and light had it planted on the front of his temple, as comprising all the 
counsel he had to give us. Plato also says that wisdom is nothing other than the 
execution of this ordinance, and Socrates verifies it in detail in Xenophon”.252
Following the advice of Pythian Apollo with Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, 
Montaigne turns his judgment on himself, but like them he also turns it on the world. 
Elsewhere, he says that he “proposes formless and unresolved notions, as do those who 
publish doubtful questions to debate in the schools, not to establish the truth but to seek 
it”.253 He writes, “I speak pompously and opulently of ignorance, and speak of 
knowledge meagrely and piteously, the latter as an accessory and accidentally, the 
former expressly and principally. And I treat nothing by name except nothing, and no 
knowledge except that of the lack of knowledge”.254 Here, however, Montaigne is not 
                                                            
252 Montaigne, Essais, III, 13, “Of experience”, p. 1074-1075.
253 Montaigne, Essais, I, 56, “Of prayers”, p. 317.
254 Montaigne, Essais, III, 12, “Of physiognomy”, p. 1057.
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being entirely honest, for he treats virtually every topic under the sun in his Essais, 
essaying his judgment on each of them.
Judgment holds a magisterial seat in Montaigne and in his Essais, and the Essais
as a whole are evidence that Montaigne is no Pyrrhonian. Look at the table of contents 
of the Essais. Montaigne tries his judgment on a staggering diversity of subjects, 
searching in his own roundabout and oblique way for the truth in each of them as he 
plums the depths of his soul. Montaigne exercises his judgment on everything. In the 
essay “Of Democritus and Heraclitus”, he says this explicitly:
“Judgment is a tool for all subjects, and comes in everywhere. Therefore in the 
tests that I make of it here, I employ it on all occasions. If it is a subject that I do not 
understand at all, even on that I make an attempt, sounding the ford from a good 
distance; and then, finding it too deep for my height, I hold to the bank. And this 
acknowledgment of not having the power to cross over is a token of its action, indeed 
one of those it is most proud of. Sometimes in a vain and nonexistent subject I try to see 
if it will find the wherewithal to give it body, prop it up, and support it. Sometimes I lead 
it to a noble and well-worn subject in which it has nothing to discover, the road being so 
beaten that it can walk only in the footsteps of others. There it makes its play by 
choosing the way that seems best to it, and of a thousand paths it says that this one or 
that was the most wisely chosen”.255
Montaigne tells us that in his search for knowledge he sometimes follows in the 
footsteps of others who are wiser than he, exercising his judgment by choosing whom to 
follow. He says that judgment is a “tool for all subjects”. He tells us that in the Essais he 
makes “tests” of it. He writes, “if it is a subject that I do not understand at all, even on 
that I make an attempt, sounding the ford from a good distance; and then, finding it too 
deep for my height, I hold to the bank”. With the metaphore of the ford Montaigne 
                                                            
255 Montaigne, Essais, I, 50, “Of Democritus and Heraclitus”, pp. 301-302.
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acknowledges scepticism, saying that he cannot cross over. And with the universal 
exercise of judgment we can see now why the book is entitled Essais. This term refers 
to the method that the author is using to get his goal, a method which consists in 
proving and trying, keeping himself faithful to the provisional and the unstable, 
resigning explicitly to try to become in a solid theory, in a system, but without 
sacrificing the educational eagerness.256
*****
Montaigne's scepticism has more affinity with Academic doubt than with 
Pyrrhonism, and although his guides are Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Plutarch and 
Diogenes Laertius, it is Socrates whom he, like they, follows after. In the very last of the 
Essais, he says that he “affirms human ignorance” as the “most certain fact in the school 
of the world”, and that “those who will not conclude their own [ignorance] from so vain 
an example as mine, or theirs, let them recognize it through Socrates, the master of 
masters”.257 Elsewhere he calls the “soul of Socrates (…) the most perfect that has come 
to my knowledge”.258 In the essay “Of physiognomy”, he tells us that we know Socrates 
only through the writings of his friends, not by our own knowledge.259 He tells us that 
no monument left by the men of his own benighted day could win such approval. He 
says, “it happened most fortunately that the man most worthy to be known and to be 
presented to the world as an example should be the one of whom we have most certain 
knowledge”.260 For Montaigne, Socrates is the “man most worthy to be known and to be 
                                                            
256 See María Dolores Picazo, “Los Ensayos, un discurso más allá del sistema y la autobiografía”, in 
Revista de Filología Francesa, num. 3, 1993, cit. in Michel de Montaigne: Ensayos, edición de María 
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257 Montaigne, Essais, III, 13, “Of experience”, pp. 1075-1076.
258 Montaigne, Essais, II, 11, “Of cruelty”, p. 423.
259 Montaigne, Essais, III, 12, “Of physiognomy”, p. 1037.
260 Montaigne, Essais, III, 12, “Of physiognomy”, p. 1038.
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presented to the world as an example”, and “we have light on him from the most clear-
sighted men who ever lived”.261 Montaigne follows Socrates and his students, not 
Pyrrho.
Montaigne performs on himself the ministrations of Socrates the midwife, and 
the Essais, in Socrates' words in Plato, no “mere wind eggs”, are the fruit of his labours. 
He is a sceptic throughout, but he exercises his judgment everywhere. The Essais are a 
patchwork and full of apparent inconsistencies, but the pattern is whole, and the self-
portrait is one. Montaigne is true to himself, and to the prescription of Apollo's oracle, 
from beginning to end. Sometimes, he may seem to contradict himself, but the Truth he 
never contradicts:
“My book is always one. Except that at each new edition, so that the buyer may 
not come off completely empty-handed, I allow myself to add, since it is only an ill-fitted 
patchwork, some extra ornaments. These are only overweights, which do not condemn 
the original form, but give some particular value to each of the subsequent ones, by a 
bit of ambitious subtlety. Always from this if will easily happen that some transposition 
of chronology may slip in, for my stories take their place according to their timeliness, 
not always according to their age”.262
                                                            
261 Montaigne, Essais, III, 12, “Of physiognomy”, p. 1038.




The preceding chapter dealt with the relationship of Montaigne's scepticism to 
classical sceptical models. This chapter considers the relevance of ideas that emerged in 
the Judeo-Christian context. There is, however, considerable affinity between the two 
traditions since Christianity was shaped in part by Greco-Roman thought, and much that 
is to be found in Augustine and other Christian authors ultimately perhaps derives from 
Athens and Rome rather than from Jerusalem. Montaigne knew all about Socrates, but 
so did Augustine. Montaigne shared the Christian commitment to the primacy of faith 
over reason, along with the scepticism with respect to the limits of human 
understanding that is a basic feature of the Christian sceptical tradition. For the 
Christian sceptic, doubt may be mitigated by faith, but uncertainty, for some at least, 
remains an inescapable part of the human condition. Like Augustine and others, 
Montaigne believed that the Creator and his Works are beyond human comprehension, 
at least in this life.
Several terms that deserve a brief initial consideration figure prominently in this 
discussion. The central ideas that this chapter tries to revolve around are reason, faith 
and grace. “Reason” is used here both as a noun and as a verb. As a verb, it signifies the 
act of rational thought or discourse. As a noun, it refers to the ability to reason. It is an 
internal, human capacity. In contrast, “grace”, within the context of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, is a virtue enjoyed by human beings through the independent action of God, 
an external agency. The word “faith” is more complicated. Its most common usage 
below is as an alternative means to the attainment of belief.263 The complications arise 
when faith is considered in conjunction with reason and grace. As I employ it, faith is 
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separate and distinct from reason and grace, although it may interact with either or both, 
an independent, internal quantity. It may function in cooperation with them, but it is 
human rather than divine, and fundamentally non-rational. The conclusions of faith, 
whether a specific belief or set of beliefs, may or may not be susceptible to rational 
explication, but faith itself exists apart from reason. Reason and grace may support 
faith, but ultimately faith comes from within and involves the acceptance of ideas for 
which there can be no purely rational justification. For many authors within the Judeo-
Christian tradition, however, faith is the only road to true knowledge; reason has a part 
to play in the acceptance of the teachings of faith, but it cannot discover them on its 
own. As I hope to show, Montaigne has an essentially Augustinian understanding of 
these concepts. He believes that truth, particularly the truth of divine revelation, cannot 
be fully apprehended by rational means, but that rational assent to the truth of faith or 
revelation that comes solely through the free gift of God's grace is a pre-requisite to 
salvation and to the limited understanding attainable by the viator.264 In this respect, the 
state of doubt, the acknowledgment of ignorance or the realization of the absence of 
knowledge, whether derived through reason or faith, becomes a sign of the quest for 
illumination. This was as true for Montaigne as it was for Socrates and Augustine.
Montaigne's scepticism was in part a response to the problem of faith in an age 
of religious upheaval. For Montaigne and his contemporaries, faith was central to 
epistemological discussions. This should come as no surprise, for although the 
proponents of faith are frequently dismissed by many in the modern world as irrational 
or even anti-intellectual, and not always without good reason, faith has had, and 
continues to have, a powerful claim to epistemological authority.
Indeed, the problem of knowledge itself is inextricably intertwined with that of 
faith. This is as true for us as it was for Montaigne, for Socrates and for Job. Reason, 
experience, and faith or revelation, are all possible routes to knowledge. Traditionally, 
many have regarded the authority of faith, in contradistinction to that of reason and 
                                                            
264 This Latin term means “traveller”, in general, I will use this concept to refer to a common or regular 
individual.
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experience, as unimpeachable. But just as the limits of reason can be explored, and the 
verisimilitude of experience questioned, so too a reflection on the nature of faith can 
also lead to doubt. As with reason and experience, the problem of faith is the question of 
the security of the foundation on which it rests. In the Judeo-Christian and Islamic 
traditions, faith ultimately depends on divine revelation.
The problem of faith in this context is twofold, and consists both of the 
acceptance of the revealed status of the Word, and of its interpretation. There is little 
evidence to suggest that anyone in Montaigne's day seriously questioned the former, but 
Jews, Christians, and Muslims all revered different canons and were aware of other 
religions that claimed still other sources of revelation, and there were bitter and often 
bloody controversies over religious issues. In Montaigne's day, in the Christian context 
specifically, there was also bitter internecine rivalry. The early modern crisis of doubt 
was also a crisis of faith, and conflicts over the interpretation of the Word were crucial, 
and ultimately seen by many as posing a threat to the status of divine revelation itself. 
These were not just philosophical or theological conundrums; the order of human 
society and the promise of salvation were at stake, for the affairs of the City of Man and 
those of the City of God were seen as being interwoven.
In his consideration of the problems of knowledge and faith, Montaigne drew on 
traditional, Judeo-Christian sources for assistance. He found food for thought in 
Wisdom, Job, and Ecclesiastes, in the letters of St. Paul, and in the writings of some of 
the other early Fathers, but it was in the writings of Augustine and other early Christian 
Apologists who had dealt with fundamentally similar problems that he found the most 
guidance. Ultimately, Montaigne the sceptic had no confidence in reason, experience, or 
faith without grace, and remained a Christian, a Catholic, and defended his belief as 
Augustine in part did, historically. In the final analysis, Montaigne's judgment on faith 
was historical, and his ιστορια265 here led him to history.
                                                            
265 This Greek term includes several meanings, from “investigation” to “knowledge”, but also “story”, 
“account”, “tale” but even “history”. I include it here because it is multipurpose and allows the reader 
to choose the most appropriate meaning.
105
The problem of faith is central to Montaigne, and the problem of Montaigne's 
belief has been a subject of some controversy for centuries. Some have seen him as a 
devout, if potentially unorthodox, Catholic. Others have regarded him as a Christian by 
circumstance, with no strong conviction of belief. Some have viewed Montaigne's 
exploration of faith in the Essais as being ultimately unresolved. Still others have seen a 
thinly-veiled attack on religion in the Essais, and have at least suspected him of a secret 
agnosticism or even atheism. Most serious contemporary Montaigne scholars, however, 
reject the latter extreme. Nonetheless, the question of Montaigne's belief is a tricky one. 
Still, a close reading of the Essais makes the idea that Montaigne is an agnostic or an 
atheist seem almost ludicrous. He is a self-professed Catholic who aspires to be a good 
son of the Church and repeatedly and convincingly acknowledges his submission to the 
ecclesiastical authority of Rome. Nevertheless, he is still Montaigne, and in the Essais, 
he essays his judgment even on the question of faith. He could not do otherwise. The 
problem of faith is crucial to his day, and, moreover, faith and its shadow, doubt, are 
central not only to religious questions, but also to the very exploration of self, the task 
that he has set himself in the Essais. Indeed, the problem of faith is one of the 
underlying themes of the Essais, and Montaigne returns to it again and again. 
Ultimately, Montaigne's vision of faith is essentially Augustinian, and like Augustine, 
Montaigne believed that reason, faith and grace are all necessary for the attainment of 
the limited understanding of the divine that is possible in this life. Like Augustine, 
Montaigne believed that doubt and imperfect belief are the best that most of us can ever 
hope to achieve. Like Augustine, Montaigne conceived his own belief as imperfect. His 
defense of that belief, his apology, the “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, reflects this. 
Like Augustine, Montaigne sought to defend his belief against its detractors with the 
only tools at his disposal, his limited human reason, his narrow and fallible earthly 
experience, and his imperfect mundane faith. He spoke as a man, not as messenger for 
the divine. Montaigne's judgment on faith is that at best it can only be imperfect.
To demonstrate this more fully, and to give a complete account of the role of the 
problem of faith in Montaigne's scepticism, we must look more closely at the sceptical, 
Judeo-Christian sources with which Montaigne was familiar and consider the uses to 
which he put them. The first part of what follows deals with the most important of these, 
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specifically the Books of Wisdom, Job, Ecclesiastes, the letters of St. Paul, and the 
writings of St. Augustine and others. The next section treats the problem of Montaigne's 
belief. The last considers his defense of that belief and attempts do delineate more 
clearly the Christian nature of Montaigne's scepticism.
- Judeo-Christian sceptical sources.
Scepticism is an important if not all-pervasive theme within the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, and sceptical tendencies can be found in both the Old and the New Testaments
and in the writings of the early fathers of the Church.266 In this context its basic feature 
is the belief that human reason and experience are essentially incapable of 
understanding the divine. God and his works, both the Creator and his Creation, are 
seen as being beyond the understanding of man. For Jewish and Christian sceptics, 
man's capacity to know, to understand, is severely limited. Desire for knowledge is 
perhaps proper to man, but only God has true understanding. What understanding man 
can achieve comes, as do all things, either directly or indirectly from God. Examples of 
all of this are not hard to find in the sacred writings of the Judeo-Christian tradition; 
indeed, on the contrary, they are hard to miss. Some of the most powerful and seminal 
expressions of this sceptical motif appear in the Books of Wisdom, Job, and Ecclesiastes 
in the Old Testament.
The most sceptical voice in the New Testament is that of St. Paul, whose 
importance to the development of Christian thought cannot be overstated. Indeed, Paul's 
deeply rooted scepticism of human claims to knowledge derived solely through the 
operation of reason became almost central for many early Christians and has continued 
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to exercise a powerful influence throughout the history of the Christian tradition. Paul's 
scepticism has often been regarded as anti-intellectual, as has that of many of his 
successors.
Unfortunately, the Church Fathers who succeeded Paul have often been 
portrayed as anti-intellectual, and many have regarded them as unilaterally hostile 
towards the classical philosophical tradition. This, however, was not the case, and this 
claim has been badly over-stated. The reality is far more complex.
Although some early Christian thinkers were hostile towards the classical 
tradition and others were at least mistrustful of its utility, still others were sympathetic 
to it, some even deeply respectful of it.267 Moreover, most, if not all, of the early Fathers 
were educated in the Classical tradition. Although they transformed what they had 
inherited, the early Christians were as much the heirs of Greece and Rome as they were 
of Judea, and both Greek philosophy and Roman law exerted a powerful influence on 
the development of early Christianity. Many of the most important early Christian 
theologians viewed themselves as successors of Plato as well as of Paul, and from a 
philosophical standpoint it is at least possible to view Christianity itself as a 
Neoplatonic offshoot. Indeed, many early Christian thinkers saw no real conflict 
between Neoplatonic thought and Christianity, and many of the early Christian 
Apologists emphasized this notion in their attempts to defend and promote Christianity 
through philosophical argument. Occasionally, they also made use of sceptical 
arguments. In this they were undoubtedly influenced by the scepticism of Paul, but 
some of them at least were also influenced by Academic scepticism. St. Augustine, in 
this respect as in many others, is the most important of these, and the Christian 
scepticism of Augustine, which partakes of both the scepticism of Paul and the doubt of 
Socrates, has had a profound influence on Christian thought.
                                                            
267 For a discussion of the early Fathers attitude towards the Classical tradition see David C. Lindberg, 
“Science and the Early Church” in Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers de., God and Nature: Historical 
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Nonetheless, even though the Christian tradition was nurtured in the academy of 
Greek philosophy, its progenitors were the authors of the Old and New Testaments, and 
the Christian sceptical tradition, though midwifed by Socrates, was born of Paul, 
Ecclesiastes, Job and Wisdom. There are, however, a number of similarities between 
biblical scepticism and the Greek sceptical tradition.268 At the heart of each is the notion 
that human understanding is limited and ultimately incapable of apprehending the 
mysteries of the cosmos. One of the themes of the Book of Wisdom is that man's 
happiness consists in knowledge of God's law, a knowledge that comes only from God. 
The central message of Job is that man's happiness is unimportant and that the highest 
understanding that man can achieve is the knowledge of the necessity of submission to 
the divine will. Part of the teaching of Ecclesiastes is that happiness and understanding 
pertain in the end, as all things do, not to man, but only to God. In all three, knowledge 
or understanding is the province of God, not of man.
In the Book of Wisdom, or Proverbs, wisdom is portrayed as being essential to 
happiness, but available only through the Lord. It comes from God, not from man. 
Knowledge begins with fear of the Lord, and ends with obedience to the divine will.269
“Knowledge and discernment are by His decree”.270 Man is advised to trust in the Lord 
and not to rely on his own understanding.271 Man is told not to be wise in his own eyes, 
but to “fear de Lord” and to “shun evil”.272 The author of Wisdom tells us that the 
beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord, “and knowledge of the Holy One is 
understanding”.273 Man's happiness depends on knowledge of and obedience to God's 
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revealed will. Man's only true understanding consists in this realization and in nothing 
else.
In the Book of Job, God's prophet is shown that the only thing proper to him, the 
only understanding, indeed the only thing that he can claim as his own, is obedience and 
submission. Job asks “whence does wisdom come? / Where is the source of 
understanding? / It is hidden from the eyes of all living”.274 Speaking with the words of 
Abaddon and Death, he says that “we have only a report of it”.275 He says that “God 
understands the way to it; / He knows its source”. Speaking with the words of the Lord, 
and echoing Wisdom, he says, “See! Fear of the Lord is wisdom; / To shun evil is 
understanding”.276 Later on, the Lord asks Job if he knows the secrets of the universe, 
saying to him, “Where were you when I laid the earth's foundations? / Speak if you have 
understanding”.277 Job replies, “See, I am of small worth; what can I answer You? / I 
clap my hand to my mouth”.278 Confronted with the divine, Job acknowledges his own 
insignificance, his own ignorance. According to Job, man speaks “withouth 
understanding” of things that are beyond him, which he does not know. It does not 
belong to man to know, but to ask and to be informed. Knowledge does not pertain to 
man, only obedience:
“I know that you can do everything,
That nothing you propose is impossible for You.
Who is this who obscures counsel without knowledge?
Indeed, I spoke without understanding
Of things beyond me, which I did not know.
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Hear now, and I will speak;
I will ask, and You will inform me.
I had heard You with my ears,
But now I see You with my eyes;
Therefore, I recant and relent,
Being but dust and ashes”.279
The messages of Wisdom and Job are echoed in Ecclesiastes: experience of the 
divine and its works belongs to man, knowledge and understanding of them pertain only 
to God. Man's only true knowledge is that revealed to him by the Lord, and man's only 
true happiness is obedience to the Lord's will. Man cannot know the way of the 
world.280 The poet asks, “who can possibly know what is best for a man to do in life -the 
few days of his fleeting life?”281 The answer is the Lord. Man can devote himself to 
contemplation and reflection, “even to the extent of going without sleep day and night”, 
he can observe “all that God brings to pass”, but he “cannot guess the events that occur 
under the sun”, and “even if a sage should think to discover them he would not be able 
to guess them”.282 Just as he cannot “know how the lifebreath passes into the limbs 
within the womb of the pregnant woman”, so man “cannot foresee the actions of God, 
who causes all things to happen”.283 The quest for knowledge, for understanding, 
belongs to man, is perhaps part of the human condition, but the only true knowledge 
that man can obtain is that revealed to him by God. Comprehension of the nature of 
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things is beyond the capacity of man. He cannot understand the Lord or his ways. He 
cannot explain the mysteries of the cosmos. He cannot account for, predict, or control 
his own destiny. All of these things belong only to God. To man belongs only 
obedience:
“The sum of the matter, when all is said and done: Revere God and observe His 
commandments”.284
Many of these sceptical themes were later taken up and Christianized by St.
Paul. Paul's thought was deeply rooted in the traditions of the Old Testament and in the 
articulation of his Christian scepticism Paul frequently made use of older formulations. 
The main feature of Paul's epistemology is that genuine knowledge is bestowed only by 
the grace of God through the mediation of Christ. Man is incapable of arriving at this 
truth through the exercise of the intellect alone.285 The only true knowledge, and the 
only true happiness, is through faith in Christ and in the divinely revealed teachings of 
the Prophets and Apostles. Paul was as or more suspicious of the “wisdom of this 
world” than the authors of Wisdom, Job and Ecclesiastes and frequently contrasted this 
fallible human wisdom with the revealed and certain preachings of the Apostles. For 
Paul, man can know with certainty only what God has revealed to him, all else is 
subject to doubt, and all of man's other pretensions to knowledge, ultimately, are signs 
of his pride and his true ignorance. Philosophy, and the traditions of man, are nothing 
more than vain deceits. Man's proper study and knowledge is God, and what man knows 
of God he knows only through the grace of Christ, the Living God. The thorny question 
of man's debt to God, and of the precise nature or mechanism of salvation in Paul may 
be sidestepped here, for although there are clearly connections between Paul's 
conception of knowledge, faith and grace and his teachings regarding salvation, the 
nature of his scepticism can be gleaned from an examination of his more 
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straightforward epistemological pronouncements without reference to his statements on 
soteriology.286 Some of Paul's most sceptical remarks are to be found in the first letter to 
the Corinthians and in the letter to the Colossians.
Paul was sceptical of the wisdom of this world and of the vain deceits of 
philosophy. In his first letter to the Corinthians, Paul said that “it is written: 'I will 
destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent I will reject. Where is 
the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world?'”.287 He said that 
God has “made foolish the wisdom of this world”.288 He contrasted this earthly wisdom 
with the teachings of the Apostles, saying that “for seeing that in the wisdom of God the 
world, by wisdom, knew not God, it pleased God, by the foolishness of our preaching, 
to save them that believe”.289 The wisdom of this world cannot know God. God can 
only be known through special revelation. Paul tells us not to deceive ourselves into 
thinking that we are wise and urges those of us who think that we are to unlearn our 
supposed wisdom, “for the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God”.290 He tells us 
that it is written, “I will catch the wise in their own craftiness”, and “the Lord knoweth 
the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain”.291 He said, “if any man think that he 
knoweth any thing, he hath not yet known as he ought to know”.292 Man's only true 
knowledge is the knowledge bestowed by divine revelation. In the letter to the 
Colossians, he tells us that “all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” are hidden in 
the “knowledge of the mystery of God the Father and of Christ Jesus”.293 All that man 
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can know is to be found in and through God. Finally, he warns us to “beware lest any 
man cheat you by philosophy, and vain deceit; according to the tradition of men, 
according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ”.294 Philosophy is a 
cheat and a deceit, only faith is reliable.
If Paul was hostile toward philosophy, not all of his successors among the early 
Fathers were. Some were, but others were not. Some perceived no real conflict between 
pagan philosophy and Christian teaching. Among the early Apologists, specifically, 
there were some who saw the Christian revelation as the final truth for which Greek and 
Roman philosophers had been blindly groping for centuries. Men like Aristides (2nd
century A.D.), Justin Martyr (c. 100 - c. 165), and Minucius Felix (2nd or 3rd century) 
had a profound respect for Greek philosophy in general and for the philosophy of Plato 
and the Neoplatonists in particular, and the relationship between Christianity and 
Platonism became one of the central themes of Christian apologetics by the third 
century.295 Of all the great pagan thinkers, they believed that Plato had come as close to 
the truth as it was possible for man to come without the aid of divine revelation. They 
saw close parallels between Plato's teachings and some of the basic tenets of Christian 
belief. In fact, it could reasonably be argued that Plato's ideas about immortality, the 
Demiurge, and the World of Forms helped to shape Christian doctrine itself, mor many 
of the Church Fathers, who were responsible for creating Christian dogma out of the 
raw material of biblical revelation, were trained in Neoplatonic philosophy before
converting to Christianity. As D. P. Walker put it, “Christianity was born and bred in a 
Hellenistic world”.296 The intellectual landscape of that world was largely dominated by 
the thought of Plato and the Neoplatonists.
The Apologetic writings of the early Fathers were written in defense and 
promotion of Christianity. They were directed at educated pagans whom their authors 
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believed could be convinced to accept the teachings of Christianity by rational 
argument. Some of the early Apologists saw philosophy as a potential servant to 
Christianity, a handmaiden who could help them lead educated pagans to the truth of the 
Word.
Apologetic authors like Lactantius (c. 240 – c. 320) made use of sceptical 
arguments that hearkened back both to biblical and to pagan, specifically Academic, 
sources.297 He regarded the scepticism of the Academics in particular as a potentially 
useful foundation for Christian belief.298 Lactantius wrote of the “knowledge and 
science of truth which no one can attain by thinking and disputing”.299 Like Paul and the 
authors of Wisdom, Job and Ecclesiastes, Lactantius believed that truth comes only 
from God. He argued that “knowledge cannot come from ingeniousness, nor can it be 
grasped by cogitation, because it is not of man to have in himself proper knowledge, but 
it is of God”.300 Lactantius praised Socrates and the Academics who followed him for 
arguing that nothing can be known with certainty. He believed that philosophy, both 
moral and natural, was purely speculative. He said that philosophers “do not know the 
truth, since truth is knowledge of something certain; their speculation is of an 
uncertainty”.301 Lactantius rejected absolute scepticism, however. He argued that the 
philosophers possessed wisdom without truly realizing it. He maintained that those who 
thought that all things could be known were not wise, nor were those who thought that 
nothing could be known. He wrote, “the former attributed too much to man, the latter 
too little; to both and in each part measure was lacking”. He asked, “Where, therefore, is 
wisdom?”302 His answer was “that you may not think that you know all things, which is 
characteristic of God, nor that you do not know all things, which is characteristic of the 
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beasts”.303 He conceived a “middle state which belongs to man, that is, a knowledge 
joined with and tempered by ignorance”.304 Lactantius embraced a sort of nascent 
probabilism and argued essentially that God had given man sufficient wisdom to 
differentiate between more and less likely propositions. With many of the other 
Apologists, he believed that the articles of Christian belief could be assented to on 
rational grounds. He wrote, “wherefore, in that matter especially, in which the purpose 
of life is concerned, it is necessary for each one to have confidence in himself and rely
on his own judgment and personal opinions for investigating and weighing out the truth, 
rather than believe in errors of others as though utterly gullible and lacking in wisdom, 
to be deceived”.305 He said, “to all, according to their capacity as men, God gave 
wisdom in order that they might seek out things not heard of and weigh out things heard 
of”.306
Lactantius was sceptical, but he rejected absolute scepticism. He thought that 
man's capacity for knowledge was limited, but that God had endowed man with 
sufficient mental ability to grasp the truth of revelation rationally. He believed that true 
knowledge and understanding belong only to God, but he was also convinced that 
between the extremes of absolute certainty and absolute scepticism there was “a middle 
state which belongs to man, that is, a knowledge joined with and tempered by 
ignorance”. He believed in probable knowledge in matters both mundane and spiritual.
Like Lactantius, St. Augustine (354-430), perhaps the most important and 
influential Patristic author, also made use of both biblical and Academic sceptical 
arguments in his Apologetic writings. Again, like Lactantius, and others, Augustine was 
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a philosopher before he was a Christian. Even after his conversion, however, Augustine 
retained a powerful admiration for pagan philosophy, specifically for that of Plato, the 
Neoplatonists, and the Academics. 
Indeed, in his Confessions, Augustine tells us that before his ultimate conversion 
he embraced Academic scepticism, but in the same work he also relates his subsequent 
rejection of the philosophy of Academic doubt. In another important work, the Contra 
Academicos, he set out to refute that philosophy. He also criticized the Academics in the 
City of God, his most straightforwardly Apologetic work. Nonetheless, Augustine 
ultimately must be regarded as sceptical even though he is clearly not an asbolute 
sceptic, and his position vis-à-vis the tradition of Academic doubt is more complicated 
than it might at first appear. In fact, in the final analysis, Augustine's split with the 
Academics is perhaps not as complete as it might seem, despite of the title of Contra 
Academicos, for his only answer to the doubt of the Academics is faith. Like Lactantius, 
Augustine thought that man has a limited capacity for knowledge, but again like 
Lactantius he also felt that God had made man in such a way that man has the ability to 
differentiate between more and less likely opinions. Augustine believed that with the 
assitance of faith and grace man's reason is sufficient to assent to probable ideas. He 
believed that man could only attain a provisional knowledge, and a provisional faith, in 
this life. As many before him, he maintained that knowledge and understanding belong 
only to God, but that with God's help man could attain to belief and assent.307
Much has been written about Augustine's relationship with Academic 
scepticism. The general consensus among Augustinian scholars seems to me to be that 
while Augustine ultimately rejected the teachings of the Academic sceptics, his thought 
was, nonetheless, deeply influenced by his encounter with the sceptical Academy, and 
he retained a sceptical position with respect to the limits of human knowledge. He 
believed, however, that he had found a response to the sceptics in Christianity. He 
believed that man could achieve a limited understanding, a belief in the probable truth 
of likely opinions, through the mediating grace of divine illumination. He maintained 
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that man was incapable of discovering truth through the action of reason alone, but that 
through grace man could attain to faith in matters beyond his ultimate understanding. In 
short, faith was Augustine's answer to scepticism. Etienne Gilson argued that Augustine 
rejected radical scepticism but maintained that truth was only accessible to man through 
the mediation of faith.308 Robert Cushman said that for Augustine, “men are born blind 
in Adam and need Christ to awaken them”.309 Julius Weinberg argued that for 
Augustine, the approach to truth must always begin with faith but that Christ, the 
Internal Teacher, will always teach those who approach him properly.310 He also said 
that belief, rather than knowledge, is the centerpiece of Augustinian epistemology, 
which is to say that man can have genuine belief in the truth without fully apprehending 
it as such.311 Peter Brown maintained that Augustine rejected Academic scepticism but 
argued that he learned from the Academics that the search for wisdom was an on-going 
quest in which only the authority of Christ could lead to truth.312 Bruce Bubacz 
suggested that Augustine's encounter with Academic scepticism taught him both the 
possibility of knowledge and the possibility of doubt.313 He argued that for Augustine 
doubt was the beginning of the search for knowledge.314 Anthony Long said that 
although Augustine ultimately rejected the conclusions of the Academics, their 
teachings nonetheless made a strong impression on him.315 He also said that Christian 
revelation was Augustine's only answer to scepticism.316 Frederick Coppleston said the 
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same.317 Gerard O'Daly argued that although Augustine rejected radical scepticism, he 
nonetheless believed that “true philosophy” dealt with things that could not be fully 
comprehended in this life.318 Augustine Curley considered Socrates and Plato as part of 
the story of the evolution of scepticism but argued that both “held that truth did exist, 
and that it could be known at least in a vague way”.319 He further argued that in 
rejecting the New “sceptical” Academy in favor of the Old “dogmatic” one, Augustine 
was following them in this.320 Carol Harrison also put Augustine squarely in the 
Academic tradition, noting likewise his shift from the teachings of the New to those of 
the Old Academy.321 The picture that emerges from the writings of all of these scholars 
is much the same on this point. Although Augusitne initially embraced the conclusions 
of the Academic sceptics, he ultimately found a response to scepticism in Christianity. 
He, nonetheless, remained sceptical about the human ability to apprehend truth without 
divine mediation. He was sceptical, if not an absolute sceptic.
Although Augustine criticizes the Academics in several places, the picture of his 
epistemology that emerges from the City of God and some of his other writings is 
decidedly sceptical and owes much to the Academic sceptics. Though Book VIII of the 
City of God is devoted to a critique of pagan philosophy, Book IX is concerned with the 
attempt to reconcile Platonism with Christianity, and Augustine's tone with respect to 
pagan philosophy is generally sympathetic throughout the work. Augustine believed that 
Plato and the Neoplatonists in particular had come as close to the truth as it was 
possible for man to come without the benefit of divine revelation and grace. He 
maintained that all of the works of the philosophers were merely opinions, but he 
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argued that sometimes the opinions of the philosophers were correct, or nearly so, but 
that the philosophers themselves were incapable of realizing this because they lacked 
grace.322 He said that the philosophers, nonetheless, had a nascent and unrecognized 
conception of grace which they revealed when they spoke of it being “granted only a 
few to reach God by virtue of their intelligence”.323 He saw this as an “undoubted 
confession of the grace of God and the insufficiency of man”.324 He saw as a 
foreshadowing of Christian teaching the belief of Porphyry and Plato that “man cannot 
by any means reach the perfection of wisdom in this life, but that, after this life, all 
those who live the life of the intellect receive all that is needed for their fulfillment from 
the providence and grace of God”.325 Augustine argued that the “mind of man, the 
natural seat of his reason and understanding, is itself weakened by long-standing faults 
which darken it”.326 He called it “too weak to cleave to that changeless light and to 
enjoy it”, “too weak even to endure that light”.327 He argued that man's mind “must be 
renewed and healed day after day so as to become capable of such felicity”. He believed 
that the mind of man had to be “trained and purified by faith” and that its “journey 
towards the truth along the way of faith” could only be realized through the mediating 
grace of Christ.328 He believed that man's reason is weak, but he rejected the absolute 
scepticism of the Academy, calling it madness.329 Following Paul, he acknowledged that 
our knowledge is partial only, but he argued that certainty can be achieved in some 
matters, that the evidence of the senses can be trusted, that the scripture, which is 
                                                            
322 St. Augustine, City of God, Henry Bettenson tr., London, Penguin, 1972, Book XVIII, Chapter 41, pp. 
815-819.
323 St. Augustine, op. cit., Book X, Chapter 29, p. 414.
324 Idem.
325 Idem.
326 St. Augustine, op. cit., Book X, Chapter 29, p. 430.
327 Idem.
328 St. Augustine, City of God, Book XI, Chapter 3, pp. 430-431.
329 St. Augustine, City of God, Book XIX, Chapter 18, p. 879.
120
ultimately based on the testimony of “witnesses whom it would be irrational to 
distrust”, can also be trusted, and that man's faith can be sustained by God's grace.330
Augustine was sceptical of man's natural abilities, and he thought that man could 
only attain a limited understanding in this life, but he maintained that through faith and 
grace man could aspire to salvation. He believed that with their assistance, man's reason 
was sufficient to assent to the historical, miraculous evidence of the truth of revealed 
teaching. For Augustine, ignorance and doubt are part of the condition of the viator, but 
faith and grace can lead to salvation.
Even though Augustine's position has at least some similarities to that of the 
Academics, ultimately he claimed to have rejected Academic scepticism, but his critique 
of the Academics in the Contra Academicos is somewhat problematic, for even as he 
claims to reject their scepticism, he retains his admiration, and indeed seems to consider 
himself to be a legitimate successor to their school. The message of Book I of the 
Contra Academicos is that while the search for wisdom belongs to man, wisdom itself 
belongs only to God.331 The position of the Academics is laid out in full in Book II, but 
there is also some talk there of the possibility that the sceptical Academics might have 
had some secret teaching that they communicated only to the initiated among them.332
In Book III, Augustine attempted to refute Academic scepticism by arguing that 
certainty can be achieved with divine help.333 Curiously, he also speculated that the 
sceptical Academics might have secretly clung to the teachings of Plato, which they 
sought to protect against the attacks of the Stoics by hiding behind an assumed 
scepticism.334 In the end, Augustine seems to describe himself as heir to what he sees as 
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the complicated traditions of the Academy, although he claims to have more affinity 
with the Old Academy than with the New.335
Additional light can be shed on Augustine's relationship to pagan philosophy and 
the traditions of the Academy, and on the nature of his scepticism, by a glance at his 
Confessions. There he tells us quite straightforwardly that his study of philosophy, 
specifically the teachings of Plato and Cicero, is part of what led him to God.336 He said 
that during the course of his journey to God, he “began to thinking that the philosophers 
known as the Academics were wiser than the rest, because they held that everything was 
a matter of doubt and asserted that man can know nothing for certain”.337 He also said, 
echoing the conclusion of the Contra Academicos, that “this is the common belief about 
their teaching and it seemed to me that it was what they thought, but I did not yet 
understand what they really meant”.338 He later tells us that “treating everything as a 
matter of doubt, as the Academics are generally supposed to do, and hovering between 
one doctrine and another, I made up my mind at least to leave the Manichees, for while I 
was in this state of indecision I did not think it right to remain in the sect now t hat I 
found the theories of some of the philosophers preferable”.339 He also tells us, however, 
“nevertheless I utterly refused to entrust the healing of the maladies of my soul to these 
philosophers, because they ignored the saving name of Christ”.340 He chose to remain a 
“catechumen in the Catholic Church” until he “could clearly see a light” to guide his 
steps.341 Ultimately he found the answers he sought through grace and the mediation of 
Christ.342 Subsequently he said that he came to believe that the teachings of Plato 
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contained truth, but not all truth, and that they lacked the divine illumination conveyed 
by revelation through faith and grace.343 Augustine spoke of the “poverty of the human 
intellect”, of true knowledge coming through God alone,344 and of the saving power of 
faith and grace:
“What man can teach another to understand this truth? What angel can teach it 
to an angel? What angel can teach it to a man? We must ask it of you, seek it in you; we 
must knock at your door. Only then shall we receive what we ask and find what we seek; 
only then will the door be opened to us”.345
Augustine's scepticism is in part a transformation of the teachings of the 
Academy. He believed that Plato and the Academics who followed him most closely 
had come as near to truth as man could come without the assistance of God. He rejected
the scepticism of the later Academics, but he retained a healthy measure of Academic 
doubt. Like Plato before him, he labored under the shadow of the doubt of Socrates, but 
also like Socrates, Plato, and at least some of the Academics, he believed in the 
possibility of divine revelation. Unlike his Greek and Roman predecessors, however, he 
believed that at last he had found truth in theology.
The Christian scepticism of Paul, Augustine, and others has remained a powerful 
force within Christian thought. At its heart lies the idea that in this earthly existence 
man cannot comprehend fully the nature of God and his works. Man's senses are frail, 
his reason weak, and it is only through faith and grace that he can approach true 
understanding. For Augustine and others, knowledge belongs only to God, man can 
have only belief.
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In the later Middle Ages, this Christian scepticism influenced both philosophical 
and theological discussions. St. Bernard's response to Abelard and the Schoolmen was 
fundamentally that of the Christian sceptic. The thirteenth-century clashes over Aristotle 
at the University of Paris and elsewhere were essentially a struggle over the relative 
epistemological authority of reason and faith. The radical scepticism of Nicholas of 
Autrecourt in the fourteenth century was in part a resurgence of this deeply-rooted 
Christian sceptical tradition. The docta ignorantia, the doctrine of learned ignorance, of 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), perhaps the last great medieval theologian, was also an 
expression of it. Although each of these well-known cases was separated by a hundred 
years or more, and each has a complicated history of its own, they are, nonetheless, 
inseparably linked. The full history of the Christian scepticism of the Middle Ages has 
yet to be written, but taken together, these examples signal the presence of a powerful 
and vibrant tradition.346
This medieval sceptical tradition helped to shape the “sceptical crisis” of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the scepticism of Montaigne and his 
contemporaries cannot be fully understood without reference to its fundamentally 
Christian roots. Indeed for people like Erasmus, with whom Richard Popkin effectively 
begins his consideration of the “sceptical crisis”, questions of faith were central.347
Much of what can be described as sceptical in Erasmus is the result of an attraction to 
an idealized vision of Pauline simplicity and a commitment to a simple faith that rejects 
the human capacity to fully comprehend the divine truth.348 For Erasmus and other
Christian authors, faith alone can lead to truth. Montaigne and others like him were not 
merely responding to ideas encountered in ancient philosophical texts. They were 
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grappling with and age-old problem within a changing Christian context.349 The 
theological controversies of the sixteenth century played an important part in the 
development of the sceptical crisis. Indeed, the question of authority in matters 
pertaining to faith was perhaps central to it. In their explorations of human capacities, 
men like Montaigne drew not only on the philosophical traditions of Greece and Rome, 
but also on the teachings of scripture and of the Christian Fathers, and in fact, the latter 
two were widely regarded as being the more important and reliable of these sources. 
Moreover, Montaigne and his contemporaries wrestled with these questions not only 
with their reason, but also with their faith, for faith was central to the problem.
- The problem of Montaigne’s belief.
The problem of Montaigne's belief is an interesting one. Montaigne knew his 
Bible, and he was familiar with the writings of many of the Fathers. Although not 
trained in theology, as he was the first to admit, he was more than familiar with the 
basic theological controversies of his day. As a judge and a statesman, he was involved 
at the highest levels with their legal, social, and political repercussions. He wrote about 
religious issues in the Essais, and the problem of belief in particular is central to several 
of them, including the “Apology for Raymond Sebond”. He proclaimed that belief on a 
number of occasions. He was a self-professed Catholic who repeatedly avowed his 
submission to the ecclesiastical authority of Rome. Nonetheless, in the centuries since 
his death, many have questioned Montaigne's orthodoxy, indeed his belief itself. In the 
final analysis, however, there is little room for doubt as to the sincerity of Montaigne's 
belief, but the more interesting question, that of how he defended that belief, follows 
directly from the consideration of the other.
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Donald Frame, one of Montaigne's numerous biographers, has argued that the 
burden of proof lies with those who maintain that Montaigne's many professions of 
belief were insincere.350 Michael Screech has called Montaigne a Roman Catholic 
layman who recognized the authority of Rome.351 Elaine Limbrick has shown quite 
convincingly that Montaigne's belief was unquestioned by his immediate 
contemporaries, and that in fact he was regarded as a champion of Catholicism by many 
of the most powerful among them.352 Thierry Wanegfellen has argued that Montaigne 
was intellectually committed to Catholicism.353 Most Montaigne scholars, however, 
acknowledge with Claude Blum that Montaigne can be read with some legitimacy as 
sceptical, indifferent, agnostic, fideistic, a sincere Catholic, or a Catholic by custom 
only, and that the “Apology for Raymond Sebond” in particular can be read as an 
unresolved investigation of the question of faith.354 Nevertheless, Blum agrees with 
Frame, Limbrick, and the majority of Montaigne scholars, most of whom do not 
seriously question the truthfulness of Montaigne's pretensions to belief. There remains, 
nonetheless, considerable debate as to the nature of that belief. Ultimately, of course, the 
answers to these questions must be sought in the Essais themselves, but they must be 
sought with caution, for while it is impossible to agree with Terence Cave that they 
perhaps cannot be found by a close reading of the text, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that the text is a complicated one that can be read y many ways.355 Not all readings are 
equally plausible, however. As with the philosophical issues treated in the previous 
chapter of this thesis, Montaigne approaches the problem of belief through the medium 
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of the essay, assaying his judgment on the religious controversies of his day and arguing 
a particular point of view, as we shall see, with great rhetorical skill.
Montaigne read the Bible and the writings of many of the Fathers, and the Essais
abound with both scriptural and patristic references, as well as references to later 
Christian sources. One of Montaigne's bibles is still extant.356 We know that Montaigne 
knew Lactantius's works, although we cannot be certain in which edition. The same is 
true of Augustine's City of God, and passages in the Essais at least suggest that 
Montaigne knew other Augustinian works as well.357 Montaigne tells us in the Essais
that the Christian religion owes much to Augustine's writings.358 He also tells us that he 
follows St. Augustine's opinion, “that is better to lean toward doubt than toward 
assurance in things difficult to prove and dangerous to believe”.359 Montaigne knew 
some of the writings of St. Bernard and the works of Nicholas of Cusa.360 Montaigne 
was also quite familiar with the Natural Theology of Raymond Sebond, a work that he 
translated and whose author's defense served as the starting point for his Apology.361
Montaigne knew and cited many other Christian authors as well. All of this, of course, 
is proof only that Montaigne was well read, even by the standards of his day. 
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that these do not sound like the reading tastes of 
someone who rejects the Christian tradition.
Montaigne also had numerous passages from scripture, patristic authors, and 
later Christian sources inscribed on the rafters of his library. In fact, of the fifty-seven 
total inscriptions that provided him with immediate inspiration as he worked, twenty-
one are from Judeo-Christian sources. Eleven of these, the most from any single source, 
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were rightly or wrongly attributed by Montaigne to Ecclesiastes alone. Four come from 
St. Paul. Again, this does not sound like someone who has abandoned Christianity.362
Montaigne's selections from scripture, moreover, strongly indicate his 
indebtedness to Judeo-Christian sources in the formulation of his scepticism. Inscription 
2, falsely ascribed by Montaigne himself to Ecclesiastes, indicates that the desire for 
knowledge was given to man by God.363 Inscription 12, taken from the Book of 
Proverbs or Wisdom, calls attention to the foolishness of the human pretension to 
wisdom.364 Inscriptions 17 and 24-26 are all from St. Paul. Inscription 17 is an 
injunction not to be wise in our own eyes.365 Inscription 24 says that the man who 
presumes his own knowledge does not even know what it means to know. Inscription 25 
has the sense that man seduces himself when he forgets that he is nothing. Inscription 26 
warns of the danger of seeking to know more than man is capable of knowing. 
Inscription 29, taken from Ecclesiastes, says that all things are too difficult for man to 
understand. Inscription 36, from Isaiah, warns man of the misfortune that follows the 
belief in his own wisdom.366 Inscription 48, from the Book of Psalms, says that God's 
judgments are unknown to man.367 Montaigne had these sayings inscribed on the rafters 
of his library, so that every time he paused in his thoughts to raise his eyes to heaven he 
would be reminded of man's weakness and ignorance, reminded that understanding 
belongs to God alone.
Turning to the Essais themselves, we find even more powerful evidence of 
Montaigne's belief, even though some of its passages seem to call that belief into 
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question when taken in isolation. A believer in moderation in all things, Montaigne is 
mistrustful of excessive zeal. His defense of the Roman Emperor Julian the Apostate in 
the essay “Of freedom of conscience”, for example, might strike those looking for signs 
of apostasy in Montaigne as significant. Montaigne argues here that the early Christians 
went overboard in their zeal and destroyed much that was of value in classical 
civilization.368 He argues that they badly defamed Julian, who sought to preserve that 
civilization's traditions. Montaigne acknowledges Julian's persecutions, without 
defending them, but argues that Julian was not as much an enemy of Christianity as 
others both before and after. Indeed Montaigne's defense of Julian consists of nothing 
more than a catalogue of the latter's admirable qualities, most importantly his morality, 
his philosophical nature, and his general regard for justice. Montaigne expresses nothing 
but contempt, nevertheless, in the matter of Julian's religion.369 Montaigne does not 
sound particularly religious, however, when he writes, “our religion has no surer human 
foundation than contempt for life” in the essay “That to philosophize is to learn to die”, 
and essay that, despite its nature, contains no biblical or scriptural citations.370 Nor does 
he sound especially pious in the essay “Of the art of discussion” when he says of 
religion, “there are some who think that it would have escaped and melted through their 
fingers if it did not hold fast among us by a mark, title, and instrument of division and 
faction more than by itself”.371
Taken in their proper context, however, even such remarks as these suggest, 
rather than challenge, the sincerity of Montaigne's belief. In “That to philosophize is to 
learn to die”, Montaigne speaks of being ready for death when God chooses, and 
although this need not indicate any strong belief, it certainly does not immediately 
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suggest the absence of it.372 As for the line quoted from “Of the art of discussion”, 
Montaigne there is attacking some of the Protestant Reformers, for the more zealous of 
whom at least he feels little sympathy.
Indeed, Montaigne frequently proclaims his allegiance to Catholicism and his 
belief in its teachings. In the essay “It is folly to measure the true and false by our own 
capacity”, he maintains that we should accept the scriptural testimonies of miracles.373
In the same place he also argues that Catholics should not yield to Protestants in any 
doctrinal matter and that although he used to question the validity of some the Church's 
teachings, his discussions with theologians have convinced him that there are good 
reasons behind all of them. He calls the abandonment of traditional Catholic teaching an 
example of a vanity that forgets its own ignorance.374
In the beginning of the essay “Of prayers”, he says that he “proposes formless 
and unresolved ideas, as do those who publish doubtful questions to debate in the 
schools, not to establish the truth but in search of it”.375 He submits “to the judgment” of 
the theological authorities, whose task it is “to regulate not only my actions and my 
writings, but even my thoughts”.376 Their “condemnation and approval” will be “equally 
acceptable and useful” to him because he considers it “execrable if anything is found 
which was said by me, ignorantly or inadvertently, against the holy prescriptions of the 
Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church, in which I die and in which I was born”.377 At 
the end of the essay he writes, “I propose ideas that are human and my own, simply as 
human ideas considered in themselves, not as fixed and decreed by heavenly ordinance, 
incapable of being doubted or disputed; matter of opinion, not matter of faith; what I 
reason out according to me, not what I believe according to God; as children set forth 
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their essays to be instructed, not to instruct; in a lay manner, not clerical, but always 
very religious”.378 In the same essay, he recommends the Lord's prayer, saying that it is 
the one he himself uses most commonly, since it was “prescribed and dictated word for 
word by the mouth of God”.379 He also argues that before we pray, we should always 
stop to think about the legitimacy of the object of our prayers.
Although these pious sentiments bracket a discussion likely to be of interest to 
theological authorities, and it might be reasonable, therefore, to suppose that Montaigne 
is merely being cautious, it must be remembered that it was Montaigne who invited this 
learned scrutiny, even as he often did on less dangerous ground. In the essay “A custom 
of the island of Cea”, for example, he writes, “if to philosophize is to doubt, as they say, 
then to play the fool and follow my fancies, as I do, is all the more to doubt”.380 He says 
there, “it is for the apprentices to inquire and debate, and for the masters to decide” and 
that his “master is the authority of the divine will, which rules us without contradiction 
and has its place above these vain and human disputes”.381 In the essay “Of repentance”, 
speaking of his self-portrait in the Essais, he says, “I make excuses for here that which I 
often say, that I rarely repent and that my conscience is content with itself; not as the 
conscience of an angel or a horse, but as the conscience of a man; always adding this 
refrain, not ceremoniously but in sincere and real submission: that I speak as an ignorant 
inquirer, referring the decision, purely and simply, to the common and legitimate 
beliefs”.382 Montaigne speaks as a man speaking to other men.
He acknowledges the ecclesiastical authority of Rome, “not ceremoniously but 
in sincere and real submission”. Montaigne braves potentially dangerous territory in his 
Essais because he cannot be faithful in his quest for self-knowledge without doing so. 
He does not seriously fear theological censure, even in his most sensitive inquiries, 
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because he knows that he is highly thought of by Catholic leaders. He does not fear 
theological censure but rather invites it, because he is eager for the instruction of 
learned men. He sees himself as a faithful son of the Church and wants his self-portrait 
to be true.
Montaigne's piety comes out in a number of passages. In the essay “Of vanity”, 
he writes, “Oh, how beholden to God am I that it pleased him that I should receive all 
that I have directly from his grace, that he has retained all my debt particularly to 
himself”.383 Speaking of his illnesses, he says, “at the very beginning of my fevers and 
the maladies that lay me low, while still whole and in the neighborhood of health, I 
reconcile myself with God by the last Christian offices, and find myself thereby more 
free and unburdened, feeling all the more triumphant over the sickness”.384
To deny the sincerity of Montaigne's belief is to accuse him of utter hypocrisy. 
Further, it is to make him not only a heretic in the eyes of Rome, but also in the eyes of 
Delphi. It makes his quest for self-knowledge nothing more that a sham and a deceit. It 
makes the author of the Essais nothing more than a liar. Surely, Montaigne is more than 
that. The author of the Essais may be mistaken, perhaps on occasion even self-deluded, 
but surely he would never contradict the truth so completely and intentionally.
Perhaps the most powerful testimony of Montaigne's belief, however, comes to 
us directly in his own words. He tells us explicitly of his rejection of the Reformation 
and his loyalty to Rome. He seems to speak to us across the ages, scoffing at our 
hesitancy to accept that he could believe what many of us simply cannot. He comments 
scathingly on our presentism, our all-too-frequent inability to grapple with the past on 
its own terms. We do not honor Montaigne by trying to make him more like ourselves. 
We insult him, and make ourselves fools in future eyes, as he and those of his time often 
seem to be to our own limited vision. Too confident in our present state, we ignore the 
wisdom, and even the occasional honesty, of the past at our own peril:
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“How fantastic seemed to me the imagination of those who in recent years had 
the habit of reproaching each and every man in whom there gleamed some light of 
intelligence, who professed the Catholic religion, maintaining that it was hypocritical 
and, even, thinking to honor him, that whatever he said for appearance, he could not 
help having his belief within reformed according to their measure. A disagreeable 
malady, to believe yourself so wise that you persuade yourself that no one can believe 
the contrary. And even more disagreeable, to persuade yourself that one of such spirit 
would prefer I know not what disparity of present fortune to the hopes and threats of 
eternal life. They may believe me. If anything had tempted my youth, ambition for the 
risk and difficulties that followed this recent enterprise [the Reformation] would have 
played a good part in it”.385
- Montaigne’s Apology.
Montaigne had faith, but the precise nature of that faith remains as yet unclear. 
Montaigne was a sceptic, and his scepticism clearly had Christian antecedents, but the 
specific connections between his scepticism and his faith have also yet to be delineated. 
Montaigne was a Christian, a Catholic, but the foundations of his Christianity, his 
Catholicism, are uncertain. How did Montaigne defend his faith? How did his 
scepticism influence that defense? How did the defense influence his scepticism? Did 
Montaigne justify his faith by rational means, through reason? Did he claim direct 
mystical experience of revelation? Did he defend his belief through faith alone? 
Montaigne was sceptical of the power of reason and of the verisimilitude of experience; 
was he also sceptical with respect to faith? Did he seek to make a defense by some other 
means? Is it possible that, in the end, he had no real defense to give?
The three best interpretations of Montaigne's defense of Christianity to be 
offered in the last thirty years are all plausible, if not equally likely. Elaine Limbrick has 
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argued that Montaigne's vision of faith was essentially Augustinian.386 She maintains 
that Montaigne employed Augustine in his critique of human reason, his attack on 
anthropomorphism, that his fideism, his belief in the primacy of faith, was 
fundamentally Augustinian, and that Montaigne used Augustine to justify his religious 
and political conservatism.387 She says that Montaigne believed, following Augustine, 
that such knowledge that man can achieve comes through God and that for Montaigne, 
as for Augustine, knowledge of God begins with knowldege of self. Montaigne 
followed Augustine in believing in the necessity of God's grace to the fostering of 
human understanding and belief.388 Elsewhere, Limbrick argues that Montaigne, like 
Augustine, believed in the rational foundations of faith.389 For both, Montaigne and 
Augustine, reason is a pre-requisite for faith390 and is essential to its acceptance.391
Although both Montaigne and Augustine had fideistic tendencies, for both, faith on its 
own, without reason and grace, is insufficient.392
Frédéric Brahami reads Montaigne quite differently from Limbrick. He agrees 
with her that theological concerns are central to Montaigne's scepticism, that the relation 
between faith and reason is central to Montaigne's “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, and 
that the “Apology” must be viewed in relation to the Christian Apologetic tradition to be 
properly understood.393 He points out that one of the goals of the Apologetic tradition 
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was to produce rational assent. He argues that that tradition is essentially anti-fideistic, 
that it maintains that faith is founded on reason, and that faith on its own is insufficient. 
Departing significantly from Limbrick, he maintains that Sebond, whom Montaigne 
purported to defend in the “Apology”, had carried rationalism to an extreme and that 
Montaigne had gone to the other extreme, that his was fundamentally an irrational 
defense of Christianity based on faith alone.394 Looking ahead to later, seventeenth-
century developments, Brahami argues that Montaigne's alleged fideism ultimately 
became problematic in the eyes of the Church because fideism, which rejects the role of 
reason in the defense of faith, makes faith private and subjective rather than universal 
and presumably therefore subject to theological authority. Brahami describes a split 
within the fideistic tradition between the rational fideism promoted by Pomponazzi and 
the Paduan school in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and the irrational, 
radical fideism fostered by people like Pierre Daniel Huet in the seventeenth century for 
whom scripture was the only source of truth. He sees Montaigne as a precursor of this 
irrational fideistic tradition, essentially a radical fideist.395 In this, Brahami regards 
Montaigne as being fundamentally anti-Augustinian.
Claude Blum has argued that ultimately Montaigne's “Apology for Raymond 
Sebond” must be viewed as an attack on both rationalism and fideism.396 Like Limbrick, 
he seems to read Montaigne as essentially Augustinian, maintaining that for Montaigne, 
as for Augustine, faith, grace, and reason are all essential to understanding, and that 
faith and grace give form to reason.397 Blum departs from Limbrick and Brahami, 
however, in maintaining that there is much ambiguity in Montaigne, such that he may 
be read with almost equal legitimacy in a number of radically different ways.398
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To me, all three of these readings of Montaigne are ultimately flawed, however, 
although perhaps not equally. Each suffers from an ahistorical view of Montaigne's 
relationship to a fideistic tradition that had not fully emerged in his day, and although 
Montaigne may reasonably be regarded as having been significant in the evolution of 
fideism, it is quite unreasonable to read later developments back into Montaigne. Of the 
three, Brahami is particularly guilty of this, especially when he speaks of the official 
position of the Catholic Church and of the unorthodox and heretical nature of 
fideism.399 Brahami's radical fideistic reading of Montaigne in general is at least 
potentially ahistorical and at best overly conceptual. Brahami's belief in Montaigne's 
radical empiricism a la Ockham and medieval nominalism, a claim I am planning to 
consider in greater detail in the next chapter, is similarly flawed and suggests an equally 
poor understanding both of Montaigne and of Ockham and the “nominalist” tradition.400
In general, moreover, Brahami's reading of Montaigne suffers from a dangerous reliance 
on too many unexamined assumptions and on what must be regarded as at best a 
selective reading of Montaigne. Montaigne is neither a “radical empiricist” nor a 
“radical fideist”. Blum's and Limbrick's readings of Montaigne, on the other hand, are 
much more historical and much more faithful to Montaigne and to the sources on which 
he drew. Nevertheless, both are guilty of seeing Montaigne as simply adopting an 
Augustinian vision of grace, faith, and reason. Andrée Comparot's even more radical 
assertion that Montaigne should be read as a Christian Neoplatonist and an Augustinian 
theologian reacting against a stale Aristotelian scholasticism is an even more extreme 
example of such a claim.401 As Emmanuel Faye has argued, such arguments rob 
Montaigne of all originality and obscure the very real differences he has with many of 
the sources he utilizes.402 Montaigne is not a theologian, but he thinks about theological 
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problems.403 In doing so, he draws on a number of sources for guidance, but although 
they inform his judgments, they do not overrule it. The claim that Montaigne is a pure 
Augustinian ultimately will not work, for although he had nothing but admiration for 
Augustine and, indeed, followed him in many things, in the end he was far more 
sceptical than Augustine and, perhaps, less secure in his own faith than the saint had 
been. Montaigne clearly did not see himself as possessing the wisdom of the Fathers. 
He longed for it, and he had an essentially Augustinian vision of it, but he did not claim 
to have attained it.
Although they disagree as to the particulars, Blum, Limbrick, and Brahami all 
agree that the relation between grace, faith, and reason are essential to the understanding 
of Montaigne's faith and of his scepticism, and Blum and Limbrick read Montaigne has 
having a fundamentally Augustinian vision of that relationship. For Augustine, all three 
concepts are intertwined, but grace is central. God's grace, freely given and unattainable 
by human effort, is essential to the operation of reason, and faith; belief, which must be 
assented to by reason, must constantly be sustained by a continuous influx of grace. For 
Augustine, man is incapable of either real faith of true understanding without the 
continuous presence and operation of grace.
What relationship did Montaigne perceive between grace, faith, and reason? He 
had a limited belief in the power of the latter. How strong was his faith? What measure 
of grace did he believe that he possessed? How did he conceive of grace, of faith? How 
did his Christianity shape his scepticism? How did he defend the former?
Montaigne's most extended discussion of faith appears in the “Apology for 
Raymond Sebond”. Indeed, although the “Apology” starts out as a defense of the 
Natural Theology of Raymond Sebond, it essentially becomes an Apology for, or a 
defense of, Christian belief. In the beginning of the work, Montaigne relates how his 
father first became acquainted with the writings of Sebond, a fourteenth-century 
theologian who sought to prove nearly all the truths of Christianity by rational means.404
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He tells us that Sebond's book came into his father's house in a timely fashion, when the 
“innovations of Luther were beginning to gain credit and to shake our old belief in 
many places”.405 Montaigne says that his father's interest in Sebond was “very well 
advised” because he rightly foresaw “that this incipient malady would easily degenerate 
into an execrable atheism”.406 Montaigne appears to have seen the theological 
controversies of the Reformation as a threat to the very existence of Christianity, 
arguing that the belief of the “vulgar” in particular was in danger of being shaken by 
them. He tells us that he translated Sebond's book at his father's request.407
Montaigne then tells us of two charges against Sebond that he, Montaigne, will 
attempt to refute. The first objection against Sebond “is that Christians do themselves 
harm in trying to support their belief by human reasons, since it is conceived only by 
faith and by a particular inspiration of divine grace”.408 Montaigne says that “in this 
objection there seems to be a certain pious zeal, and for this reason we must try with all 
the more mildness and respect to satisfy those who advance it”.409 He tells us that he 
respects this criticism, and those who offer it, but that he does not accept it and will 
argue against it, even though he is sympathetic to those who advance it. Furthermore, he 
gently and mildly suggests here that those who make this objection to Sebond may be 
guilty of excessive zeal, which the moderate Montaigne does not admire. In response to 
their argument, Montaigne argues that “in a thing so divine and so lofty, and so far 
surpassing human intelligence, as is this truth with which it has pleased the goodness of 
God to enlighten us, it is very necessary that he still send us his help, by extraordinary 
and privileged favor, so that we may conceive it and lodge it in us”.410 He agrees in part 
with this criticism, but not completely. We cannot achieve faith without God's grace, 
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and human reason alone is incapable of discovering its truth, but faith is not conceived 
and lodged within us by the operation of grace and faith alone either. Rather, God's 
grace assists reason in the attainment of understanding. Reason is not enough on its 
own, but without it, by definition, any sort of understanding at all is impossible.
Montaigne agrees with those who say that reason alone is insufficient, but argues 
that we must “accompany our faith with all the reason that is in us”.411 He says that 
“there is no occupation or desing more worthy of a Christian man than to aim, by all his 
studies and thoughts, to embellish, extend, and amplify the truth of his belief”.412 Faith 
does not depend on reason, and the divine is ultimately beyond human understanding, 
but Montaigne argues that there is no higher use to which reason can be put.
Further, he argues that if faith comes to us through any human agency, it is not 
pure and unshakable, but it is all that we have. He is “afraid that we enjoy it only in this 
way”.413 He says, “if we held to God by the mediation of a living faith, if we held to 
God through him and not through ourselves, if we had a divine foothold and foundation, 
human accidents would not have the power to shake us that they have”.414 If we had this 
other, stronger and more complete faith we would be immune not only to the 
vicissitudes of fortune, but also to things like religious controversy which “would not 
have the power to shake and alter our belief”.415 It is perhaps tempting to suppose that 
Montaigne is proposing such a “living faith” as an anodyne, but it must be remembered 
that that one is the very objection to Sebond that he is arguing against, and what he has 
to say about the nature of faith and the service that reason owes to it makes it clear that 
he does not believe that such a faith is attainable. He maintains that “if this ray of 
divinity touched us at all, it would appear all over; not only in our words, but also our 
works would bear its light and luster” and that “everything that came from us would be 
                                                            






seen and illuminated by this noble clarity”.416 He says that “if we had a single drop of 
faith, we should move mountains from their place... our actions, which would be 
accompanied and guided by divinity, would not be simply human; they would have 
something miraculous about them like our belief”.417 He calls such a faith “miraculous” 
and more than human. It is not the lot of ordinary men to be “accompanied and guided 
by divinity”. That dignity belongs to prophets and to saints. For ordinary men, there can 
only be an imperfect faith. Montaigne argues that “some make the world believe that 
they believe what they do not believe. Others, in greater number, make themselves 
believe it, being unable to penetrate what it is to believe”.418 The Protestant Reformers 
are mistaken, but so too are those who hope to answer them with faith alone; both 
ultimately are “unable to penetrate what it is to believe”.
But where is Montaigne? What does he believe? How does he hope to defend 
that belief? Montaigne rejects the idea of this living faith and asserts an historical belief 
that is ultimately based, at least in part, on human capacities. He says “if we believed in 
him, I do not say by faith, but with a simple belief; in fact (and I say it to our great 
confusion), if we knew and believed in him as in any other history, like one of our 
companions, we would love him above all other things, for the infinite goodness and 
beauty that shines in him”.419 Here is Montaigne's answer to the Protestant Reformers 
and to the claim that belief must be based on faith alone. Montaigne believes 
historically, he believes in the testimonies of the saints and prophets as interpreted by 
the authority of the Roman Church. This belief is based on the rational acceptance of the 
testimony of what he takes to be incontrovertible witnesses. His belief is juridical. He 
has no direct knowledge, no real understanding. He is a sceptic who exercises his 
judgment as best he may.
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Montaigne has a potential problem, however: what protects the status of 
Christian revelation? What makes Christianity superior to other religions? We will 
return to this problem again, but here is Montaigne's answer in a nutshell. “Our 
religion”, according to him, comes to us by human means and in that it is no different 
from other religions.420 We are Christians by accident of place of birth and of custom 
and that if we cling to our religion it is perhaps only because of the threat of damnation 
and the authority of tradition.421 He writes, “we are Christians by the same title that we 
are Perigordians or Germans”.422 He says, “the knot that should bind our judgment and 
our will, that should clasp and join our soul to our creator, should be a knot taking its 
twists and its strength not from our considerations, our reasons and passions, but from a 
divine and supernatural clasp, having only one form, one face, and one aspect, which is 
the authority of God and his grace”.423 God's grace is all that makes belief in Christian 
revelation feasible, but grace must be combined with reason to produce faith.
Enter Sebond in particular and natural theology in general. Montaigne alludes to 
the argument from design, suggesting that if we could understand the creation, we 
would understand its creator. He argues that our reason is too weak, however, to 
accomplish such a task on its own. Nevertheless, he praises Sebond's attempt. 
Montaigne is saying, à la Augustine, that if we apply ourselves to the study of the 
divine, with the help of God's grace, faith will lead us to understanding. He writes: “our 
human reasons and arguments are like the heavy and barren matter; the grace of God is 
their form; it is thath which gives them shape and value”.424 As with the ancients who 
sought the divine on their own, like Socrates and Cato, “so it is with our ideas and 
reasonings: they have a certain body, but it is an unformed mass, without form or light, 
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if faith and the grace of God are not joined to it”.425 Montaigne says, “faith, coming to 
color and illuminate Sebond's arguments, makes them firm and solid: they are capable 
of serving as a start and a first guide to an apprentice to set him on the way of this 
knowledge; they fashion him to some extent and make him capable of the grace of God, 
by means of which our belief is afterward completed and perfected”.426
Montaigne argues that Sebond's apologetic efforts are successful. They do what 
they are supposed to do. They provide the non-believer and the beginner with an 
apprentice understanding which only faith and grace can perfect.
But does Montaigne have this understanding, or is he only an apprentice 
himself? Is moderate Montaigne likening to the saints and prophets? Montaigne follows 
the masterful guidance of Augustine, but in the end he does not claim to have been 
incepted into the guild. Montaigne wants to believe. He submits himself to the authority 
of Rome, he remains a Catholic, a Christian, but he has doubts. He is a man and claims 
only the knowledge proper to his state. Make no mistake, this is not an insult to his 
belief, but rather its ultimate defense. Montaigne is a Christian despite his doubts, and 
as he hopes for eventual understanding in other things, so too he hopes for 
understanding here. He does not ultimately have even the imperfect faith of an 
Augustine, of a saint. Instead, he has the provisional faith, the provisional understanding 
that he sees as proper to his place in the journey.
This brings us to the second objection to Sebond and Montaigne's response to it. 
Some of Sebond's detractors have said that his reasons are too weak and can be 
shattered with ease.427 Montaigne says that those who say this “must be shaken up a 
little more roughly, for they are more dangerous and malicious than the first”.428 I would 
like to note that although Montaigne calls them “more dangerous and malicious than the 
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first”, the implication, again, is that the ideas of those others, those who maintain that 
faith must be supported by faith alone, are problematic as well.429 Montaigne agrees that 
Sebond's arguments can be overcome by a merely human reason, but he will argue that 
the same is true of all human arguments, and the bulk of his defense of Sebond, his 
defense of Christian belief, is devoted to a consideration of the frailty of human reason. 
He has already admitted, however, that Sebond's arguments do not prove the truth of 
Christianity, that they merely pave the way for the operation of faith and grace on an 
ultimately all-but impotent human understanding. Nevertheless, Montaigne will set out 
to demonstrate the weakness of man's natural, innate capacities. Montaigne's response to 
the second criticism of Sebond, the idea that his arguments in defense of Christian 
teachings are insufficient, is to offer a critique of reason, in order to show that reason 
itslef is insufficient.
This then, is the beginning of the “manifesto” of Montaigne's scepticism, an 
essentially Socratic scepticism that he marshals in defense of Christianity. Montaigne is 
a Christian sceptic. As we have seen before, however, he is not an absolute sceptic. He 
does not suspend judgment. Rather, as he tells us elsewhere, he “exercises it 
throughout”. In merely human undertakings, he weighs probabilities. In divine matters, 
he does as well, bowing to an authority to which he consents because of what he sees as 
the probable nature of its claims. Montaigne's critique of ancient philosophy in the 
“Apology for Raymond Sebond” takes on a whole new light when placed in its 
Chrisitian context, as does his consideration of Academic and Pyrrhonic scepticism. Can 
anyone believe that Montaigne takes Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus as his guides in his 
exploration of Christian belief? Will he suspend judgment in this? Or, will he not rather, 
like Socrates, pursue knowledge and faith relentlessly, even if he can never be sure of 
attaining them in this life? Montaigne's scepticism and his faith are inseparably 
intertwined and cannot be understood in isolation from one another. Montaigne is a 
sceptic, but he has faith. He does not claim to possess certain knowledge or perfect 
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belief; he has only doubts and uncertainties, but he believes in the possibility of true 
understanding. Like Socrates, if he ever knew them, he has forgotten, but he hopes to 
understand some day with the help of God's grace. To suspend judgment in matters of 
faith is a legitimate choice, but it is the agnostic's choice, and Montaigne, although an 
agnostic in the sense that he does not claim to have experienced gnosis, is not an 
agnostic in the common sense. Rather he is a Catholic. He does not suspend his 
judgment; rather he submits it to what he perceives as a higher authority.
To demonstrate this more fully, we must continue our exegetical journey through 
Montaigne's Apology. We must see what else Montaigne has to say about grace, faith, 
and reason and experience. We must consider his judgment on Christianity in the Essais. 
Let us start, however, with what he has to say specifically about submission. He writes, 
“the knowledge of his duty should not be left to each man's judgment; it should be 
prescribed to him, not left to the choice of his reason”.430 He claims that “otherwise, 
judging by the imbecility and infinite variety of our reasons and opinions, we would 
finally forge for ourselves duties that would set us to eating one another, as Epicurus 
says”.431 He affirms, again, that reason is incapable of reaching truth on its own. 
Furthermore, he maintains that “the first law that God ever gave to man was a law of 
pure obedience; it was a naked and simple commandment about which man had nothing 
to know or discuss; since to obey is the principal function of a reasonable soul, 
recognizing a celestial superior and benefactor”.432 For Montaigne, obedience is the 
principal function of a reasonable sould and virtue comes from it, and sin from 
presumption. He claims that man's first temptation was the idea that knowledge and 
intelligence could belong to him on his own. The “opinion of knowldege” is the “plague 
of man”.433 Supporting this claim with reference to St. Paul, he says “that is why 
ignorance is so recommended by our religion as a quality proper to belief and 
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obedience”.434 He claims that “the participation that we have in the knowledge of truth, 
whatever it may be, has not been acquired by our own powers”.435 Our faith is the 
“present of the liberality of another”.436 He says “we have received our religion... by the 
authority and command of another”.437 According to Montaigne, “it is by the mediation
of our ignorance more than of our knowledge that we are learned with that divine 
learning”.438 Our learning proceeds not despite, but because of our ignorance. Our 
understanding is insufficient on its own, but with grace it suffices enough to receive the 
instruction of faith. Here again, Montaigne supports his claims with reference to St. 
Paul.439
Submission, then, is the key for Montaigne because reason is insufficient. He 
says that our reason “does nothing but go astray in everything, but especially when it 
meddles with divine things”.440 He argues that the current crisis of the Reformation is 
evidence of this, of how faith is lost when obedience to the Church is laid aside through 
the vanity of human reason. He claims that “man can be only wht he is, and imagine 
only within his reach”.441 Echoing Plutarch, he talks about the “presumption” of those 
who are “only men” and who yet “venture to talk and discourse” about the divine.442
Montaigne maintains that we are lost without grace. He writes, “all that we 
undertake without his assistance, all that we see without the lamp of his grace, is only 
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vanity and folly”.443 The very essence of truth is corrupted and adulterated by our 
deficiency. He claims that “whatever course man takes by himself, God permits him 
always to arrive” at the same confusion.444 In support of his arguments here, he 
marshals the specter of Nimrod, and the words of Paul and Augustine. Montaigne 
argues that we are “beholden to God alone, and to the benefit of his grace, for the truth 
of so noble a belief, since from his liberality alone we receive the fruit of immortality, 
which consists in the enjoyment of eternal beatitude”.445 The belief in our eventual, 
eternal beatitude is produced in our current, limited, temporal understanding by the free 
gift of God's grace. This belief comes to us from God alone and is known to us through 
faith alone for it is a lesson of neither faith nor reason.446 He says, “the more we give, 
and owe, and render to God, the more like Christians we act”.447 All that we are, and all 
that we hope to become, we owe to God and not to ourselves. Hope, here, is the key. 
Montaigne does not claim to possess this thing that he sees in Paul and in Augustine, 
whose beatitude he acknowledges; rather he aspires to it. He, Montaigne, cannot reach 
faith or grace, he can only use his reason, such as it is, to defend his belief in faith. With 
Plato's Timaeus and with Cicero, he cannot “declare certain and fixed things like 
Pythian Apollo” but can only “speak like a mere man with probabilities following 
conjectures”.448 He cannot speak for the divine, but he can speak of it. His limited, 
human understanding is too weak to apprehend the divine, but he can seek it 
nonetheless. He has not found it, and he believes that without grace it cannot be found, 
but he hopes that with grace it can.
Here, however, we must deal with Montaigne's curious warning to the unnamed 
princess to whom he offers his Apology. She is commonly supposed to have been 
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Margot of Valois, the sister of the Catholic Henri III, and the wife of the Protestant 
Henri of Navarre, the future Henri IV. It is tempting to speculate that Montaigne might 
have hoped to reach the understanding of the husband, who in fact eventually converted 
to Catholicism, by attempting to sustain the Catholic sensibility of the wife.449
Montaigne admonishes the princess to defend Sebond, and by implication her 
religion, by the common means, through the arguments of her reason. He tells her not to 
engage in a critique of the power of reason, as he has done, warning that “this final 
fencer's trick must be employed only as an extreme remedy”.450 It is a “desperate stroke, 
in which you must abandon your weapons to make your adversary lose his, and a secret 
trick that must be used rarely and reservadly”.451 He calls it “great temerity to ruin 
yourself in order to ruin another”.452 He says also that “here we are shaking the barriers 
and last defenses of knowledge, in which extremity is a vice, as in virtue”.453 Instead of 
taking this course, she should “hold to the common road”, since “it is not good to be so 
subtle and so fine”.454 He advises her to be moderate and temperate in all things, saying 
that “all eccentric ways irritate” him. He also tells her that she could have given this 
assignment to a better man, but that he hopes that what he offers will be sufficient for 
her needs.455 Montaigne believes that “one has reason to give the most constraining 
barriers to the human mind that one can” because it is “an empty body, with nothing by 
which it can be seized and directed; a diverse and formles body, which can neither be 
tied nor grasped”.456 He writes, “there are few souls so well regulated, so strong and 
wellborn, that one can trust their proper conduct to themselves, and that can sail with 
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moderation and without temerity in the freedom of their judgments beyond the common 
opinions. It is more expedient for them to be placed in tutelage”.457 For Montaigne, the 
mind a “dangerous blade”, even to its owner, “for anyone who does not know how to 
use it with order and discretion”.458
There are several layers of meaning in this passage, and a good deal of irony. On 
the surface, it is a straightforward enough admonition to moderation, but ultimately it is 
more complicated.459 It also echoes the opening of the “Apology”, reminding the 
princess that it is just as dangerous to place too little confidence in human 
understanding as it is to place too much in it. It is a reminder to her that both sets of 
Sebond's critics are, in Montaigne's opinion, in error. It also, frankly, advises her, 
princess though she may be, not to meddle with affairs that are more properly, in 
Montaigne's eyes, the province of (presumably male) theologians. Here, however, is 
where the irony comes in, and there are several shades of it as well. Nonetheless, he 
seems to suggest that he is equal to the task, possibly because he thinks it ultimately a 
simple one. At any rate, Montaigne apparently considers his own powers sufficient for 
this particular tutelary endeavor. On yet another level, however, he has done and said 
something a little troubling. He has just performed the very fencer's trick that he has 
advised the princess against! In attempting to defeat his opponent, he has disarmed 
himself. In destroying the sword of his foe's reason, he has cast aside his own. He has in 
fact defeated two foes, both groups of Sebond's detractors, but where does that leave 
him? Where does it leave anyone unprepared merely to applaud his mental gymnastics 
and return to the affairs of court? What are the consequences of what he has done? If 
faith cannot be defended by faith alone, and the truth of revelation cannot be 
demonstrated by reason, how can faith be supported, and what kind of faith are we left 
with?
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Montaigne's guide to the perplexed Catholic is very confusing. If neither faith 
nor reason is sufficient, what does that leave? Perhaps grace, but if full understanding is 
the ultimate prize of grace, a prize that most of us have not achieved, what sort of 
understanding is left to the ordinary viator who is neither saint nor prophet?
Perhaps the only solution is to be constant in one's opinions. Montaigne advises 
that “whatever they preach to us, whatever we learn, we should always remember that it 
is a man that gives and a man that receives; it is a mortal hand that presents it to us, a 
mortal hand that accepts it”.460 He says, “the things that come to us from heaven have 
alone the right and authority for persuasion, alone the mark of truth; which also we do 
not see with our own eyes, or receive by our own means”.461 He argues that “this great 
and holy image could not be in so ignoble a domicile, unless God prepares it for that 
purpose, unless God reforms and fortifies it by his particular and supernatural grace and 
favor”.462 Man cannot achieve even a limited understanding, a limited faith, without 
God's grace. But is Montaigne saying that constancy of opinion is all that that grace can 
produce? At first glance that would seem to be the case. God's grace, and the knowledge 
of his own “mobility” have produced in Montaigne a “constancy of opinions” that has 
preserved him in Catholicism:
“Now from the knowledge of this mobility of mine I have accidentally 
engendered in myself a certain constancy of opinions, and have scarcely altered my 
original and natural ones. For whatever allure there may be in novelty, I do not change 
easily, for fear that I will lose in the change. And since I am not capable of choosing, I 
accept other people's choice and stay in the position where God put me. Otherwise I 
would not know how to keep myself from rolling about without end. Thus I have, by the 
grace of God, conserved myself intact, without agitation or disturbance of conscience, 
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in the ancient beliefs or our religion, in the midst of the many sects and divisions that 
our century has produced”.463
If the only solution is constancy of opinion, how can the Catholic know that the 
teachings of Catholicism are superior to those of the Protestants, or indeed of anyone 
else? How are the teachings of Christianity superior to those of any other religion? What 
is to prevent a Protestant, a Jew, a Muslim, or the adherent of any other religion from 
making the same claim? Does salvation depend merely on an accident of birth?
Montaigne is aware of this dilemma. He asks, “if nature enfolds within the terms 
of her ordinary progress, like all other things, also the beliefs, judgments, and opinions 
of men; if they have their cycle, their season, their birth, their death, like cabbages; if 
heaven moves and rolls them at its will, what magisterial and permanent authority are 
we attributing to them?”464 He asks, “since a wise man can be mistaken, and a hundred 
men, and many nations, yes, and human nature according to us is mistaken for many 
centuries about this or that, what assurance have we that sometimes it stops being 
mistaken, and that in this century it is not mistaken?”465 This is a dangerous stratagem 
indeed. It can be used against the Protestants, but why can it not be used against 
Catholics as well? Montaigne asks, “O god, what obligation do we not have to the 
benignity of our sovereign creator for having freed our belief from those vagabond and 
arbitrary devotions, and having based it on the eternal foundation of his holy word?”466
A fine answer, but what prevents the Jew and the Moslem from making the same?
How are Christians to know the authority of Christian revelation? Against the 
first group of objectors to Sebond, Montaigne argues that mere faith is not enough. 
Against the second, he argues that reason cannot demonstrate its truth.467 He also argues 
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that the senses as well are insufficient, for they do not reveal being, but only passing, 
temporality rather than eternity: the creator is hidden from them and they do not reveal 
the eternal underlying truth of him that is inherent in creation.468
Montaigne's answer is that it cannot be known, only submitted to. Historical 
evidence, the revealed word of scripture supported by miracles attested to by sound 
witnesses, is sufficient in his eyes, with the help of faith and grace, to compel the 
provisional assent of understanding. God has made man in such a way that his reason is 
sufficient to embrace the truth of revelation with the help of faith and grace. It is a 
submission, however, an assent and not a true understanding. That belongs only to the 
beatified. Man cannot rise above his humanity, his own limited understanding, by his 
own means, but he can rise with God's help. His reason can achieve sufficient 
understanding with the aid of faith and grace:
“For to make the handful bigger than the hand, the armful bigger than the arm, 
and to hope to straddle more than the reach of our legs, is impossible and monstrous. 
Nor can man raise himself above himself and humanity; for he can see only with his 
own eyes, and seize only by his own grasp. He will rsie, if God miraculously gives him a 
hand; he will rise by abandoning and renouncing his own means, and letting himself be 
raised and uplifted by purely celestial means. It is for our Christian faith, not for his 
Stoic virtue, to pretend to that divine and miraculous metamorphosis”.469
Montaigne's understanding of grace, faith, and reason is fundamentally 
Augustinian, but Montaigne departs from Augustine in a number of important ways. 
Montaigne is far more sceptical than Augustine, and ultimately, he has a much more 
pessimistic conception of viatores. Moderate Montaigne does not pretend to the perfect 
belief of the saint, and although he follows the saint's lead, he cannot offer as 
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resounding a defense of his belief. He cannot supply the purely rational apology that 
Sebond attempted, nor does he have the confidence in his own abilities, his own 
knowledge, his training, or his belief to explicate the intricacies of theology as 
Augustine did. He does not pretend to that degree of wisdom. With Socrates, he claims 
only to know the limits of his own understanding and claims only the quest for 
knowledge, not its end, as his own. He believes that there are levels, degrees of 
understanding. He has suficient faith to admire rationally the simple, irrational, 
unquestioning belief of the ignorant and to accept as probable the veracity of the 
enlightened belief of the saints, but he places himself somewhere between the two and 
calls it moderation. Following Paul, he sees the pretension to wisdom as vanity,470 but 
he maintains that “these exquisite subtleties are proper only to preaching; they are 
arguments that would send us all saddled into the other world”.471 He writes, “life is a 
material and corporeal movement, an action imperfect and irregular in essence; I 
employ myself to its service according to its fashion”.472 Montaigne aspires to a higher 
understanding and a higher faith, but he rests at the level of each that has been allotted 
to him. Echoing Ecclesiastes, he says the “knowledge of causes appertains solely to 
Him who has the guidance of things, not to us who have only the sufferance of them, 
and who have the perfectly full use of them according to our nature, without penetrating 
to their origin and essence”.473 He argues that determining and knowing, like giving, 
appertain to rule and mastery; to inferiority, subjection, and apprenticeship appertains 
enjoyment and acceptance”.474 Montaigne claims apprenticeship rather than mastery. He 
seeks the instruction of the wise, he does not pretend to offer it.
Montaigne, then, does not see himselff as having the belief of a saint, but he also 
does not claim the simple belief of the ignorant. Montaigne sees several sorts of 
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viatores. There are “simple souls, less curious and less learned”, of whom are made 
good Chrisitians, who, “through reverence and obedience, believe simply and maintain 
themselves within the laws”.475 Then there are those, among them the Protestant 
Reformers, who are “in the middle range of mental vigor and capacity”, where “error in 
opinion is engendered; these follow the first apparent sense, and have some right to 
interpret our holding to the old ways, those of us who are unlearned, as simplicity and 
stupidity”.476 Montaigne himself is among those who hold to the old ways without being 
learned. He does not place himself among the simple souls, nor among those of 
intermediate mental vigor and capacity, but seemingly somewhere just below those 
“great minds”, who, “more settled and clear-sighted, make up another type of good 
believers, who, by long and religious investigation, penetrate to a deeper and more 
abstruse light on the Scriptures and sense the mysterious and divine secret of our 
ecclesiastical polity”.477 Moderate Montaigne claims to be somewhere just above the 
middle in understanding. He is not a simple and unleraned soul, and he is above the 
errors of the Protestant Reformers, but he is beneath the wisdom of the prophets, saints, 
and Catholic theologians.
Montaigne has the reason, experience, and faith proper to man, and he defends 
his belief with them as best he can. He says that “God must touch our hearts. Our 
conscience must be amended through the reinforcement of our reason, not through the 
weakening of our appetites”.478 Montaigne does not reject his reason; he seeks to perfect 
it, insofar as it is capable of being perfected. Montaigne does not despise the mingling 
of the human and the divine that is man, nor does he deny it. Montaigne accepts his 
vision of man's condition. For Montaigne, the language of the divine is not the language 
of man, but man must endeavor to translate it as best he may:
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“Is it not an error to esteem some actions less dignified because they are 
necessary? No, they will not knock it out of my head that it is a very convenient 
marriage of pleasure with necessity, with which, says an ancient, the gods always 
conspire. Why do we dismember by divorce a structure made up of such close and 
brotherly correspondence? On the contrary, let us bind it together again by mutual 
services. Let the mind arouse and quicken the heaviness of the body, and the body stop 
and fix the lightness of the mind. 'Anyone who praises the soul as the supreme good, and 
condemns the nature of the flesh as evil has a carnal desire for the soul and a carnal 
revulsion of the flesh; for this feeling is inspired by human vanity, not by divine truth'. 
There is no part unworthy of our care in this gift that God has made us; we are 
accountable for it even to a single hair. And it is not merely a formal charge to man to 
conduct himself according to his condition; it is express, simple, and essential, and the 
creator has given it to us seriously and sternly. Authority alone has power over common 
understandings, and has more weight in a foreign language”.479
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Chapter 4
Montaigne, man and society
In the two previous chapters I have attempted to demonstrate that Montaigne 
was not a sceptic in the sense that he denied the possibility of the acquisition of 
knowledge as Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonians did. Instead, he embraced the search for 
true understanding despite the inevitability of uncertainty, as Socrates and Augustine 
did. A conclusion that follows logically from the assumption of Montaigne's 
Pyrrhonism is the idea that Montaigne believed that all knowledge, and all human 
custom, is relative. In this chapter I try to show that just as Montaigne is not a pure 
sceptic, he is also not an absolute relativist; he believes in, and even has some 
tentative conclusions about, the nature of a truth that is fundamentally linked to 
morality. Montaigne not only did not deny the existence of truth; like Socrates and 
Augustine he had an idea of its shape. He could see its outline, if he could not 
perceive its features clearly.
Ann Hartle has tried to show that Montaigne incorporated a sceptical moment 
into what she called the “dialectical movement of his thought” that is, the moment of 
openness to the possible that allows the French thinker “to find the strange in the 
familiar”.480 Hartle sets out this dialectical thought as a circular movement that can be 
described as a motion from low to high to low, from familiar to strange to familiar, from 
common to rare to common: in other words, Montaigne would initiate his thought in a 
certain manner to return to his starting position after a long reflection and after 
consideration of those beginnings in a totally new way.481 To establish her ideas, Hartle 
merely uses some examples from five different essays which she considers that can be 
proofs of Montaigne’s circular movement of thought. However, I think that those five 
examples are not enough to talk about a “dialectical moment” in Montaigne’s thought. 
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Hartle draws a striking contrast between this so called Montaigne’s circular dialectic 
with the sceptical mode of thought of Sextus and even Hume.482
To fully grasp Hartle’s position it is necessary to first understand the idea behind 
the concept of “accidental philosophy”. For this British scholar, accidental philosophy 
is, on one hand, a certain type of philosophy that discovers the truth, but a kind of truth 
that was already there in a pre-philosophical or non-philosophical moment, and, on the 
other hand, is a circular dialectic. She says: “We have seen one manifestation of this in 
the discussion of Montaigne’s transformation of scepticism –that is, in his openness to 
the possible, the rare and the extraordinary, and his return to the common and familiar. 
Thought comes back to its starting point but only after having gone through a 
movement of departure and return, in this case, a dialectic of scepticism and 
credulity”.483 I do not really see that Montaigne elaborated his method from this 
dialectic purpose. Furthermore, I think that Montaigne’s method has more to do with the 
election of the essay as a philosophical genre that with anything else. Our French 
thinker decided to use the essay knowingly that this is not exhaustive and does not try to 
determine “in advance that the object in question can be fully grasped by the concepts 
which treat it; that nothing is left over that could not be anticipated by these 
concepts”.484 Even if we concede the presence of a certain dialectical tone in 
Montaigne’s Essais, this question appears marginally or almost casual. It is true that 
Hartle makes the effort to show some examples in certain essays, but if we consider the 
three books as a whole, as an entity with unity, we cannot see any dialectical method 
used systematically. Montaigne reasons in a different way. 
Montaigne's scepticism was shaped to a large extent by reflection on a set of 
philosophical and theological problems, but ultimately it was more than a mere 
response to formal epistemological concerns alone; it was also a judgment on man 
                                                            
482 Idem, pp. 104-105.
483 Idem, p. 34.
484 Adorno, T. W., “The Essay as Form”, in New German Critique, n. 32, 1984, p. 163. Quoted in Hartle, 
Accidental Philosopher, p. 34.
156
and society, and as such it was at least as much the product of Montaigne's study of 
man, the true focus of the Essais, as it was a reaction against ancient scepticism and 
Christian theology. Indeed, the story of early modern scepticism in general is about 
more than individual encounters with ancient sceptical ideas and theological debates. 
It is also a social story. At its heart it is the story of the local and personal experience 
of human society in a particular time and place; but it is also a universal story, a story 
about man's interaction with man, and as such it concerns not only the footing of 
rational discourse, but also the very foundations of human society itself. In fact, the 
flowering of scepticism in the long sixteenth century can only be described as a 
“sceptical crisis” because of its social aspect. Morality and law, the obverse and 
reverse of human society, were in the balance together with philosophy and theology. 
In short, the sceptical crisis was not merely philosophical or theological; it was also 
ethical and political. Man's understanding of man and society was as much at stake as 
man's understanding of God and the world.
For Montaigne, the proper study of man is man. He tells us this again and 
again in the Essais. Montaigne explores a wide variety of subjects in the Essais, but 
although he assays his judgment from time to time on philosophical and theological 
themes, for the most part it is the private and public life of man that intrigues him 
the most, and he is first and foremost a student of man. The bulk of the Essais is 
devoted to the relation of anecdotes, which Montaigne uses to explore and illustrate 
his inquiries, and anecdotes occupy most of the space in each of the individual 
essays and can be found in all but two of them, “Of idleness” and “Twenty-nine 
sonnets of Etienne de La Boetie”, each of which is less than 500 words in length. 
From a textual standpoint then, the Essais as a whole is essentially a lengthy 
collection of anecdotes interspersed with speculative reflections. The anecdote, 
whether personal or public, historical or contemporary, is Montaigne's favorite 
medium, but he almost always uses it either to illustrate the general with the 
particular or to move from the local to the universal. The majority of Montaigne's 
anecdotes are either personal or drawn from classical sources, but some are also 
taken from medieval and contemporary writers. Most of them are either about 
ancient or contemporary people, places, and events, but almost all are fielded in the 
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service of the exploration of a universal, usually ethical or political, theme. Many of 
them thus are directly relevant to his own day, but even the ones that are not are 
most often linked to some issue or event of current or general interest. Among the 
specific contemporary topics that Montaigne considers directly are the European 
discovery and exploitation of the New World and the upheavals attendant upon the 
Protestant Reformation and the French Wars of Religion. The general topics that 
concern him most are ethics and government, public law and private morality. 
Montaigne's study of man, his quest for self-knowledge, is ultimately a search for 
knowledge of the good.
In the final analysis, it is the study of man that, more than anything else, leads
Montaigne to scepticism, and ultimately he concludes that all human knowledge is 
relative to the culture that produces it; he does not, however, conclude that all
knowledge is relative. Montaigne's study of human society, past and present, 
European and non-European, teaches him the diversity of human customs and mores, 
but it also teaches him the unity of the human condition. He sees all human laws and 
customs as contingent, but he does not see them all as equally valid, rather as equally 
flawed. Montaigne's relativism is not an absolute relativism. For Montaigne, all 
cultures are perhaps ultimately equal, but it is an equality based on a shared, if 
variously manifested, imperfection. The conclusion of Montaigne's relativism, of his 
scepticism, is not belief in the absence of a universal standard of virtue, but rather 
belief in the universal failure to adhere to that standard absolutely.
Montaigne believes in an ideal, which even if it can never be fully attained in 
this lifetime is still, nonetheless, to be sought after. For Montaigne, human knowledge 
and human society are shaped by the nature of the human condition, by fortune, and by 
a divine providence that rules over all. Man in his temporal state is imperfect both in his 
knowledge and in his society, but for Montaigne, as for Socrates and Augustine, there is 
more to man than the accidents of his earthly condition. There is something higher to 
which man can and must aspire. For Montaigne, man may be incapable of perfection in 
this life, but he can at least strive to be less imperfect. Although Montaigne is a sceptic 
and a relativist, he nonetheless has at least an imperfect idea of the ideal, and, 
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unsurprisingly, his conception is Western, classical, and Christian; and Montaigne's 
cultural relativism is ultimately not so relativistic at all.
The investigation of Montaigne's understanding of the relative and the 
absolute requires a closer look at his study of man. The first part of what follows 
deals with Montaigne's reflections on the France of his day and on contemporary, 
non-Western cultures. The second treats his consideration of the nature of man and 
society in more general terms. The third deals with Montaigne's prescription for the 
human condition.
- The world.
Montaigne's reflections on the great affairs of his age reveal that his scepticism 
was not just a reaction to a set of abstract philosophical and theological problems; it 
was also an existential response to political turmoil and changing worldviews, of which 
the key features were grief at the contemporary state of affairs and a deeply-rooted 
pessimism about the perfectibility of human society. In this respect, the two subjects 
that seem to have had the greatest impact on Montaigne were the politics of the France 
of his day and Europe's encounter with the New World. The former showed Montaigne 
the corruption of his own civilization. The latter helped to convince him that that 
corruption was perhaps universal.
Montaigne's entire adult life was set against the backdrop of the French Wars of 
Religion, and he was well-situated to observe their effect. He was a confidant of both 
the Catholic King Henri III and the Protestant Henri of Navarre and had dealings with 
many of the elites of his day. He fought in the wars and frequently carried out 
negotiations between moderate and conservative Catholics and Protestants. He also 
participated in the legal and political life of the land, first as a judge in the Cour des 
Aides de Perigeux and later in the Parlements of Bordeaux and Paris; later still as 
Mayor of Bordeaux. All of these experiences contributed to the formation of 
Montaigne's scepticism.
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The political history of France in the sixteenth century was dominated by a 
series of struggles, first with foreign powers and later between rival, internal factions.485
The period from roughly 1480 to 1560 which encompassed the reigns of Charles VII, 
Louis XII, Francis I, and Henri II was one of relative internal stability, peace, and 
prosperity, and indeed many of Montaigne's contemporaries looked back on this period 
as a “golden age” of French culture. The Italian wars of Charles VII and his successors 
and the subsequent struggles between the French crown and the Empire all but united 
France against a common foe. After 1560, however, the situation changed, and the next 
four decades witnessed a series of bloody internal conflicts between moderate and 
conservative Catholics and Protestants. As traditionally counted, there were eight 
separate civil wars in the period between 1562 and 1598, each ending with its own 
peace accord of which the most famous is the Edict of Nantes of 1598; in reality, 
however, the latter half of the sixteenth century was consumed by an all but continuous 
series of confrontations, almost 40 years of crisis.
The French Wars of Religion grew out of the Catholic aristocracy's attempt to 
halt by force the spread of Calvinism in France.486 The period from 1552 to 1562 
witnessed the growth of French Protestantism, but the Protestant movement in France 
was relatively small at first and never attracted more than a small fraction of its 
population, partially because of the lack of royal support and partially because of the 
armed resistance of the majority of the Catholic nobility.487 The Edict of Nantes in 
1598, the traditional end of the Wars of Religion, signaled a political truce only, 
however, and ultimately Protestants remained in the minority and were barely 
tolerated by the predominantly Catholic elite of French society.488 Traditionally, 
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modern scholars have tended to regard the period from around 1500 to 1700 as one in 
which religious tolerance was steadily on the rise. Recent scholarship, however, has 
suggested that the reality was far more complicated.489 Indeed, it is possible that 
tolerance was on the decline in the period. Many early modern thinkers seem to have 
regarded the idea of tolerance not, as has been argued by some, as a means of 
preserving the public peace, but rather as a potential threat to the common good.
Furthermore, religious tolerance seems to have been advocated more often by 
minority than by majority groups.490 Generally, where policies of religious toleration 
appeared, they seem to have been intended more as a short-term concession than as 
the expression of a higher ideal.491
Another facet of the Catholic response to the Protestant Reformation of course 
was the “Counter Reformation”, or “Catholic” or “Tridentine Reformation” as some 
have preferred to call it. Like the Protestant Reformation and the Wars of Religion, the 
Catholic Reformation was a gradual and evolving process, characterized by different 
attitudes and sentiments in different times and places. Some historians divide the 
Catholic Reformation into three main phases.492 One of the common features of the 
Christian Humanism of the North of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries 
which in part gave rise to both the Protestant and Catholic Reformations was a 
hearkening back to the early days of Christianity which were seen by many as the 
golden age of the Church, and Catholic and later Protestant Reformers alike welcomed 
discussion and debate and were united in many of their criticisms of the Church, each 
desiring a return to the spiritual values of the early Church. By the middle of the 
                                                            
489 Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner, ed., Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. i.
490 Grell, introduction to Grell and Scribner, ed. Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation,
pp. 1-7.
491 Grell, Grell and Scribner, ed. Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation, pp. 6-10.
492 Elisabeth G. Gleason, “Catholic Reformation, Counter-reformation and Papal Reform in the Sixteenth 
Century”, in Thomas A. Brady, Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy eds., Handbook of European 
History 1400-1600, v. 2.
161
sixteenth century, however, things had changed, and both Catholics and newly 
emerging Protestants, each finding themselves involved in political as well as 
theological battles, became less tolerant of debate, and both groups began to develop 
and deploy various mechanisms in the attempt to assure uniformity of belief. After the 
Council of Trent the foci of the Catholic Church became organization, education, and 
missionary activity.
The Protestant and Catholic Reformations also sparked a European-wide legal 
and constitutional crisis.493 One of the most important concepts in the political thought 
of the day was that of the state, and this is the period in which most historians 
traditionally place the birth of the modern state. The emergence of international 
Calvinism contributed to the development of theories of armed resistance to that state. 
In Lutheran Germany, the Protestant Reformation led to a redefinition of secular and 
clerical authority and a reworking of traditional German law along the lines of old 
Roman civil law. Within the Catholic Church, the Reformation saw the emergence of a 
new constitutionalism which all-but put to rest traditional struggles between 
conciliarists and papal absolutists. The legal and constitutional traditions of Spain, 
England, France, and various Italian states also evolved during this period, although the 
role of Reformation and Counter-Reformation is more complicated in these cases. All 
of this, however, contributed to the confusion and chaos of the period.
Montaigne was a witness to all of these events and a participant in many of 
them. They shaped his thought and conditioned his outlook. They contributed to his 
scepticism. His basic reaction to all of this was shock and dismay, and he was appalled 
at what he perceived as the corruption of the age. Even in his grief he saw some signs 
of light, however, and his very indignation signals a belief in the possibility of the 
existence of something better than what he saw around him.
Montaigne's political response to the Protestant Reformation was similar to his 
spiritual response, and as he rejected at least some of the ideas of the Protestant 
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Reformers on theological grounds, so too he rejected the turmoil that he perceived their 
politics to have created. In Montaigne's eyes, the Protestant Reformers had created a 
political and a social conflict out of theological debates, and the net result of the 
Protestant Reformation was the chaos of the Wars of Religion. This rejection of the 
Protestant Reformation on both theological and political grounds is nicely encapsulated 
by his claim that “Luther has left us as many divisions and altercations on the doubt of 
his opinions, and more, as he raised about the Holy Scriptures”.494 For Montaigne, 
Luther's uncertainties had provoked violence, but Montaigne did not entirely reject 
violent opposition to the spread of Protestant doctrine. He saw the Protestant 
Reformation as an “effect of Providence” which allowed “its holy Church to be 
agitated, as we see it, by so many troubles and storms, to awaken pious souls by this 
contrast and bring them back from the idleness and sleepiness wherein such long 
tranquillity had plunged them”.495 For Montaigne, the Protestant Reformation and the 
Wars of Religion were a test of faith, a divinely ordained means of awakening “pious 
souls”, and if they were attended by much that was undesirable, they, nonetheless, 
produced some good. Indeed, in the end, he was half-convinced that the Church had 
profited by them. In his eyes the Protestant Reformation produced turmoil and 
confusion, but it also provided a useful challenge to the faithful.
Montaigne's allegiance to the Catholic cause is also expressed by his admiration 
for two of its leaders, François, Duke of Guise, and his brother, Charles de Guise, 
Cardinal of Lorraine. In one place, he praises the Duke, seeing in his confrontation with 
a would-be assassin the dignity and clemency of a true Christian prince.496 In this 
anecdote, Montaigne relates how the Duke, having been warned of a potential assassin, 
confronts the man and, discovering that the assassin's cause is politically and 
religiously motivated, sends him on his way as a lesson of the moral superiority of the
Catholic Church. Ultimately, Montaigne uses this anecdote in support of the Stoic ideal 
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of tranquillity in the face of adversity.497 Elsewhere, he compares the Cardinal to 
Seneca.498 In another place, he praises the Cardinal's Stoicism in his grief at the news of 
the deaths of his brothers, a story that Montaigne ultimately uses, however, to show the 
limits of Stoicism, arguing that it is not proof against the tribulations of the human 
spirit.499 In Montaigne's eyes, the troubles of his day produced at least a few men like 
these, whose actions here embodied for him some of humanity's best qualities. This is a 
glimpse of part of what Montaigne idealizes in man, whom he sees as being capable of 
nobility as well as savagery.
Montaigne is not oblivious to the excesses of his party, however, and in general 
he finds men like the Duke of Guise and his brother the Cardinal of Lorraine to be 
unrepresentative of the France of his time. Montaigne had a profound sense of the 
darkness of his age. In his eyes, all are responsible: “the corruption of the age is made 
by the particular contribution of each of us: some contribute treason, others injustice, 
irreligion, tyranny, avarice, cruelty, according to their greater power, the weaker ones, 
including myself, bring stupidity, vanity, and idleness”.500 Elsewhere he writes, “we are 
so formed for agitation and ostentation that goodness, moderation, equability, 
constancy, and such quiet and obscure qualities are no longer felt”.501 Note, however, 
that the picture is not entirely dark, for even if they are not to be found in the current 
situation, Montaigne still believes in such things as "goodness, moderation, equability, 
and constancy”. Nonetheless, these “quiet and obscure qualities” are not in the 
ascendant for Montaigne. Instead, he feels he lives “in a season in which we abound in 
incredible examples of [heinous violence], through the licenses of our civil wars; and 
nothing is seen in the ancient histories more extreme than that which we experience 
every day”.502 He says that he is unreconciled to this, however, and he “could hardly be 
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persuaded, until I saw it, that there were souls so monstrous that they would commit 
murder for the mere pleasure of it; hack and cut off the limbs of another; free their 
spirits to invent unknown torments and new deaths, without enmity, without profit, and 
for the sole end of enjoying the pleasing spectacle of the pitiful gestures and 
movements, the lamentable groans and cries, of a man dying in anguish”.503 For 
Montaigne, this is “the extreme point that cruelty can attain”.504  Montaigne is disgusted 
and appalled by what he sees around him, but his very abhorrence is sure sign of his 
belief in an absolute ideal of good and evil, and if the age in which he lives is one in 
which evil reigns, it nonetheless offers opportunity for goodness to shine forth: 
“And there was never time and place where there was more certain and greater 
compensation offered to princes for goodness and justice. The first who councils 
himself to push into favor and credit by that path, I am much deceived if, like in a good 
tale, he will not outstrip his companions. Force, violence, can do something, but not 
always everything.”505
As a jurist and a mayor, Montaigne himself had the opportunity to participate in 
and experience at first hand the trials of government in an age of political unrest, and 
these experiences also shaped his scepticism, leaving him with a profound sense of the 
uncertainty and instability of human law and government and the interactions that they 
seek to regulate. Indeed, Andre Tournon has argued that Montaigne's “systematic 
doubt” arose primarily out of his juridical experience.506 Tournon maintains that like the 
legal literature of Montaigne's day, the Essais abound in “paradoxes”, “contrasts”, 
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“discussions without limit”, and a spirit of “perpetual research” that hearkens back to 
Socrates. With others, Tournon claims that Montaigne's scepticism was not the result of 
a temporary crisis, but rather an essential and enduring feature of his thought.507 He 
argues that the legal literature of Montaigne's day fostered a belief in the contingency of 
thought, and developed a virtual “logic of incertitude”.508 He points out that the legal 
decisions presented in contemporary legal writings were presented as opinions that 
were based on interpretation and open to dispute.
He argues that the whole thrust of sixteenth-century legal writing was to 
challenge received authority, making everything subject to debate and reassessment509
and maintains that the idea of incertitude was central to Humanist jurisprudence. 
Finally, he considers Montaigne's juridical experience, describing how Montaigne's task 
as a judge consisted primarily in examining documents presented as evidence, 
determining their pertinence, validity, and force, and preparing written arguments for 
both sides of the case before ultimately issuing an opinion on the matter at hand.510
Toumon argues that Montaigne's experience of the courts and seats of 
government shaped his thought and influenced the structure of the Essais. He calls 
Montaigne's understanding of the human condition juridical rather than metaphysical, 
maintaining that Montaigne focused on man's place in the cosmos and the things that 
prescribe his existence.511 For Tournon, Montaigne was a Pyrrhonist who was not 
always faithful to his Pyrrhonism,512 and Tournon sees Montaigne examining opinions 
and making judgments everywhere.513 Nonetheless, he sees the Essais as a whole as a 
process of exploration that is by its very nature inconclusive and unconcluded. For 
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Tournon, the process of the Essais mirrors the juridical process of Montaigne's day, and 
he sees Montaigne as presenting a series of reflections, testimonies, and researches in 
his quest for self-knowledge. In his eyes, Montaigne's quest for self-knowledge was a 
search for ethical foundations, in Platonic terms for knowledge of the good. Tournon 
sees this as the meaning behind the Delphic injunction to self-knowledge and argues 
that ultimately Montaigne found it an impossible one to fulfill.514
Tournon's reading of Montaigne has much to recommend it, and in general it 
offers valuable insight into the nature of Montaigne's thought; there are, however, at 
least two significant potential problems with it. The first is that Tournon perhaps places 
too much emphasis on Montaigne's experience of and indebtedness to the literary 
tradition of contemporary French law. The discursive approach that Tournon sees as 
the hallmark of that tradition is far older than the tradition itself and has its roots in 
medieval scholasticism, Christian theology, Roman law, Greek philosophy, western
historical writing, and western literary traditions more generally. Montaigne's 
experience of the legal writings of his day may or may not have been extensive, but his 
broad reading tastes certainly afforded him ample opportunity to encounter literary 
models of balanced disputation. Then too, the style of the Essais themselves does not 
mirror the particular details of the legal literary style that Tournon describes to any 
great extent, a fact that detracts significantly from a wholehearted acceptance of his 
thesis. Nonetheless, the idea that Montaigne's scepticism was perhaps reinforced by his 
juridical experience, if not created by it, remains extremely attractive. A more serious 
objection to Tournon's reading of Montaigne is his apparent failure to understand that 
while Montaigne himself maintained the inconclusiveness of his quest for self-
knowledge, he nonetheless had a probabilistic conception of what for him, as for 
Socrates, Plato, and Augustine, was the highest form of knowledge, the knowledge of 
the good. Montaigne himself had little to say about his immediate juridical or mayoral 
experiences, but his stance on law, morality, and government, detailed below, makes 
this final point clear, as we shall see.
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Montaigne's study of man and society was not confined to the France of his day, 
however, for he was also a student of western history and was curious about the
traditions and customs of non-western cultures as well; his remarks on the latter in 
particular offer important insight into his thought. Montaigne sought to understand the 
unity that he believed was hidden behind the diversity of custom.515 In his reflections 
on non-western cultures he frequently juxtaposed images of these other cultures with 
ones from his own. Montaigne's attitude towards other cultures has often been 
described as relativistic. The truth of the matter, however, is that more often than not he 
is making comparisons in a continuous search for some abstract human ideal, and his 
comments almost always include a judgment, whether explicit or implied, and are 
almost never “value-free”. He firmly believes that culture is contingent on the 
circumstances of its origin, but he maintains that all human society is fundamentally 
flawed, and he is always seeking after the ideal. He examines other cultures as he 
examines his own, and he pronounces moral judgments on both. Montaigne is aware 
that “not only each country but each city has its particular forms of civility”, but he 
does not conclude from this that all customs, all visions of morality, are equally 
acceptable.516 In his judgments, Montaigne sometimes rules in favor of his 
countrymen. This is not always the case, however, and part of his purpose in these 
juxtapositions is to comment on the flaws he sees in his own society. In this regard, as 
in most others, Montaigne is a moderate; he sees good and bad in all things.
An example of Montaigne's ambivalence towards other cultures can be seen in 
his treatment of the Moslem world. Some of his comments, like his reference to 
Turkish table manners517 and his remarks on the Turkish use of feigned retreats as a 
battle tactic,518 are indeed essentially value-free, but some are not. His reflections on 
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Turkish horsemanship, for example, show open admiration.519 So too do his thoughts 
on the courage of the Janissaries, the elite soldiery of the Ottoman Empire.520 He also 
in one place contrasts what he sees as the commendable conduct of Turkish soldiers in 
conquered cities with that of French soldiers.521 In another place, he cites the Ottomans 
and “Muley Moloch, King of Fez”, as positive examples against “do-nothingness”.522
Elsewhere, however, he uses the seraglio of the Grand Turk as an example of excess,523
and in another place he speaks unfavorably of the lechery of Mohammed II, the 
conqueror of Constantinople.524 Moreover, his opinion of Muslims in general seems on 
the whole to be less than favorable. He calls the Ottomans in particular, “a race not 
overly careful about observing promises and pacts”.525 He also has little sympathy for
Islam, rejecting what he sees as its fatalism526 and vilifying what he calls the “monkey 
tricks of Apollonius and Mohammed”, likening both to the Protestant Reformers and 
other false prophets who lead men astray from the true faith.527
Montaigne's remarks on the Far East are more ambiguous, however, and on the 
whole less explicitly judgmental; nevertheless, it is hard not to read an at least slightly 
pejorative tone into his comments on eastern examples of suicide, self-mutilation, and 
sexual mores. His attitude, nonetheless, is unclear here. On the one hand, he speaks 
with admiration of the military and diplomatic practices of the Indonesian Kingdom of 
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Temate, comparing them favorably to those of the ancient Florentines.528 On the other 
hand, his apparent rejection of the moral validity of suicide would seem to suggest a 
negative view of it in other traditions as well as in his own.529 His feelings about the 
sexual practices of India are uncertain.530 All in all, Montaigne seems to have had 
either little knowledge of or little interest in the Far East, and in any event he made 
scant use of anecdotal material on this subject; the few examples that are to be found in 
the Essais offer little insight into the attitudes of either him or his contemporaries 
towards the east or into Montaigne's thoughts on man in general.
The bulk of Montaigne's reflections on contemporary non-western cultures are 
devoted to New World societies. Like many Europeans of his day he was fascinated 
with the new lands and peoples beyond the sea, and he exercised that fascination in a 
number of places in the Essais. In his considerations of Mezoamerican and South 
American Indians, Montaigne grapples with the values and traditions that he examines 
in a way that he does not when speaking of those of either the Near or the Far East, in 
part perhaps because the peoples of the New World were so new to the European 
imagination and, because of that newness, so alien. As we shall see, however, 
Montaigne's attitude towards New World cultures was complicated, and ultimately his 
thoughts on them have more to say about himself and the Europe of his day than they 
do about the cultures themselves. Like many of his contemporaries, Montaigne found 
in the New World a minor in which to examine himself and his own society. Some of 
the things he saw there he liked; some he did not. Montaigne was attracted by what he 
perceived as the “innocence” of the New World and appalled at its destruction by the 
Spanish, but even though he saw much that he admired across the sea, he did not 
embrace what he found there as an acceptable, alternative mode of living. Instead, he 
read a moral lesson for contemporary European society; a lesson taught by a more 
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“primitive” society. Ultimately, Montaigne maintained what must be regarded as an 
unexamined and incompletely articulated linear conception of cultural evolution, and 
for him the peoples of the new world remained younger and less mature than their 
European counterparts. Montaigne did not necessarily equate age with wisdom, 
however, and he found good and bad in both worlds. He did not barbarize the New 
World, but he did not idealize it either.
This tension in Montaigne's discussion of transatlantic cultures is a common 
feature of contemporary European treatments of the New World. The discovery of new, 
previously unknown and unimagined lands and peoples across the sea challenged the 
European conception of the world not only intellectually, but also emotionally and 
spiritually. The New World posed a challenge to Europe's idea of itself and its place in 
the world.531 Its very conception as a “New World” made it alien and otherworldly, and 
for many Europeans it had visionary associations. For some a journey to the New 
World was a journey out of the world, a supernatural journey leading to revelation. It 
was a journey that could ennoble or destroy those who undertook it.532 The New World 
was seen as a place where anything was possible. It was also seen, in contrast with 
“civilized” Europe, as a place of “barbarism”, however. Ultimately, the New World was 
both a European “discovery” but also a European “invention”, and Europe's encounter 
with it led to its eventual assimilation and transformation.533 Europe's literary 
exploration of the New World was largely anecdotal.534 The stories that travelers told of 
the New World were pathways for the imaginations of those who stayed at home, 
pathways along which they too could make this mystical and dangerous journey; they 
served as mediators between the two worlds, between the local and the universal. They 
were a tool both of exploration and of cultural conquest. Travelers from different 
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nations with different social and religious backgrounds told different stories, but 
despite their differences almost all of these travelers shared a sense of the superiority of 
European culture. The New World remained a place of wonder,535 but it also became a 
world to be dominated. Ultimately, the “shock of discovery” left Europe's notions of 
history and civilization intact.536 With all of this in mind, it is no surprise that 
Montaigne and others would look to the experience of the New World for moral and 
spiritual instruction.
Montaigne's two most extended discussions of the New World appear in the 
essays “Of cannibals” and “Of coaches”. Of the two essays, the former has received by 
far the most scholarly attention, especially outside of literary circles where it is one of 
the best known of the Essais. This is perhaps understandable because in general it is a 
more complicated and interesting piece than the other, but it is also one of the most 
difficult of the Essais to approach on its own. Read in isolation it seems at times a 
panegyric on New World societies, at others a diatribe against the evils of 
contemporary European nations, and in other moments a dispassionate and relativistic 
comparison that concludes the incommensurability of culture. Methodologically, it 
could conceivably be regarded as a defense of either empiricism or rationalism, or as 
an example of Montaigne's scepticism. In a sense it is all of this, but, from my point of 
view, it is also something more, and ultimately, something else. When read in 
conjunction with the rest of the Essais, it becomes part of Montaigne's continuous 
exploration of the nature of man and of human society, an investigation that, here as 
elsewhere, makes use of both reason and experience and ultimately reveals 
Montaigne's fundamentally sceptical outlook. Montaigne juxtaposes images of the Old 
and the New and puts both Worlds in the balance of his judgment. His conclusion is the 
near-equality of their imperfection, an imperfection that is both implicitly and 
explicitly compared with the ideal that he seeks. The essay “Of cannibals” is one of 
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Montaigne's masterpieces, but its full flavor cannot be appreciated without the contrast 
of other morsels, and certain passages in “Of coaches” in particular enhance its 
experience. “Of cannibals” has often been read incompletely. Many have seen 
Montaigne's “relativism” and have made much of it.537 Some have gone so far as to see 
in Montaigne a precursor of modern anthropological attitudes.538 More subtle readers 
have spoken of his apparent relative lack of cultural prejudice.539 Others have 
maintained that Montaigne's treatment of the Brazilian cannibals is not an example of 
either relativism or tolerance, arguing that he idealizes what he sees as the “noble”
aspects of their culture and “exorcises” what he considers execrable.540
Methodologically some have seen “Of cannibals” as a straightforward defense of 
empiricism.541 Others have implied the inseparability of reason and judgment and have 
understood Montaigne as relying on both reason and experience,542 but have failed to 
take his deeply-rooted scepticism into account.543 Others have seen both reason, 
experience, and scepticism in “Of cannibals” and have regarded Montaigne as 
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searching for truth, while not necessarily finding it.544 Montaigne does indeed play 
with many of these ideas in I, 31, the essay “Of cannibals”, but the conclusions he 
presents are, ultimately, more consistent than this survey might imply.
In “Of cannibals” Montaigne exercises his judgment on the culture of the 
Brazilian Indians as described for him in other contemporary accounts and compares 
what he sees there with what he sees at home, concluding that custom is relative to the 
culture that produces it, but finding, ultimately, that both societies fall short of an 
unrealized, and probably unrealizable, ideal.545 He says, “that there is nothing 
barbarous and savage in that nation, from what I have been told, except that each man 
calls barbarism that which is not his custom, as in truth it seems we have no other 
criterion of truth and reason than the example and idea of the opinions and customs” of 
our country.546 He claims further that the “perfect religion, the perfect government, the 
perfect and accomplished customs in all things” is always to be found at home.547 He 
also says, “these nations, then, seem to me barbarous in this way; for having received 
very little human imprint, and being still very close to their original naturalness”.548 He 
finds their world younger than his own, claiming that the “laws of nature still rule 
them, very little corrupted by ours; but they live in such purity that I am sometimes 
displeased that they were unknown earlier, in a time when there were men able to judge 
them better than we”.549 He finds them uncorrupted by the ways of his own world, but 
not as entirely innocent as we shall see. He also desires to pass judgment on them, but 
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fears that the men of his day are insufficient to the task. Even here, and in the 
description of their society that follows, however, he is in fact making judgments. If he 
admires their world, it is not so much for its own sake, but for a quality of innocence 
that he fears his own has lost. He also posits a higher cultural level than either his own 
or theirs, a greater perspective from which both can at least potentially be evaluated. 
Further on, he makes more explicit and direct judgments as when he writes, “I am not 
sorry that we notice the barbarous horror of such acts [as they commit], but I am truly 
sorry that, judging their faults rightly, we should be so blind to our own”.550 Here is the 
heart of the matter. Montaigne argues that “we may well call these people barbarians 
then, in regard to the rules of reason, but not in regard to ourselves, who surpass them 
in every sort of barbarity”.551 Montaigne passes sentence on both them and his 
countrymen, concluding that each falls short of an ideal that he does not articulate here.
At the end of the essay “Of coaches”, Montaigne presents a less literary and 
more openly reflective consideration of the Old and New Worlds. There he treats the 
Spanish conquests of Mexico and South America, portraying the Spaniards as 
monstrous villains in this encounter between worlds and the Indians as heroes, but even 
here he has a complicated agenda, for he is not only glorifying the Brazilians, Aztecs, 
and Incas and vilifying the Spanish, traditional enemies of the French; he is also again 
comparing Old and New, both with one another and with a higher ideal. Again he starts 
with a description of the youth of this New World, saying “our world comes from 
finding another (and who will guarantee us that it is not the last of its brothers, since 
the Daemons, the Sibyls, and we ourselves have up to now been ignorant of this one?) 
no less great, full, and well-limbed than itself, yet so new and so infantile that it is still 
being taught its A B C; not fifty years ago it knew neither letters, nor weights and 
measures, nor clothes, nor wheat nor vines”.552 He says that “it was still quite naked at 
the breast, and lived only by means of its nursing mother”, and he sees it as perhaps the 
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successor to his own world, even as he seems to have seen his as the heir of antiquity. 
He also sees it as the victim of his world, saying “I very much fear that we will have 
very greatly hastened its decline and its ruin by our contagion, and that we will have 
sold it our opinions and our arts very dear”.553 He sees little virtue in the conquest, 
however, saying that “it was an infant world; yet we have not whipped it and submitted 
it to our discipline by the advantage of our natural valor and strength, nor seduced it 
with our justice and goodness, nor subjugated it by our magnanimity”; if the world has 
been overthrown it was not defeated by a greater virtue, nobility, or merit. Montaigne 
goes on to praise the beauty of the cities of this new land and the “devoutness, 
observance of the laws, goodness, liberality, loyalty, and frankness” of its people—fine 
sentiments all, but still the projections of a conqueror who knows the conquered from 
the comfort of his library. He praises them lavishly, saying “as for boldness and 
courage, as for firmness, constancy, resoluteness against pains and hunger and death, I 
would not fear to oppose the examples that I could find among them to the most 
famous ancient examples that we have in the memories of our world on this side of the 
ocean”.554 His conception is admiring, but it is still a vision of the exotic, the alien, and 
even as he seeks to glorify this other world by comparing it to what he sees as the best 
his has to offer, he is still exploiting it and making it into something to serve his 
purpose rather than its own. He is partly day-dreaming here of a land of heroes. 
Heroes, however, need villains to provide a proper contrast.
The Spanish are the antagonists of Montaigne's story, and in his treatment of 
them he is at his most human. Here too, his description is a caricature, but it is a 
poignant and a telling one. He describes how, “coasting the sea in quest of their mines, 
certain Spanish made land in a fertile, pleasant, well-populated country, and made their 
accustomed admonitions to its people: that they were peaceful men, coming from 
distant voyages, sent on the part of the king of Castile, the greatest prince of the 
habitable world, to whom the Pope, representing God on earth, had given the 
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principality of all the Indies; that if these people would be tributaries to him, they 
would be treated most benignly; they demanded of them food for their nourishment and 
gold needed for a certain medicine; admonished them, all of this notwithstanding, in 
the belief in a single God and the truth of our religion, which they advised them to 
accept, adding a few threats”.555 Montaigne drips with scornful irony here, as becomes 
clear with the response he puts into the mouth of the Brazilians: “the response was this: 
as for being peaceable, they did carry themselves like it, if they were; as for their king, 
since he was begging, he must be indigent and needy; and he who had given him this 
claim must be a man of dissension, to go and give another something that was not his, 
setting him in conflict with its ancient possessors”.556 Montaigne goes on to describe 
the atrocities committed by the Spanish in Mexico and Peru and much of the final part 
of the essay is devoted to further eulogies to the glories of the now lost New World 
civilizations.
Montaigne's rage at the Spaniards is multi-faceted, however. First and foremost, 
he is outraged at the barbarism of the conquest of the Americas and clearly sees it as an 
example of the worst that man has to offer. He also feels for the fall of an ancient, and 
in his mind, noble people. He also sees this as a moral lesson on the good and bad in 
man. Among the things that he is lamenting here, however, is the fact that in his mind 
the Spaniards have both failed a sort of test and squandered an opportunity. They have 
destroyed what they could not understand, and their actions are seen not only as 
signifying a shortcoming in themselves but also as an indictment of European society 
as a whole, but they have also failed, in Montaigne's eyes, in their parental duty to lead 
these noble, childish savages gently and truly into the fold of European Christendom. 
They have destroyed this new world and exposed the ugliness of their own because 
they have forgotten the classical and Christian values which for Montaigne are his 
world's only claim to superiority. Confronted with an opportunity to ennoble 
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themselves, they have not only been destroyed; they have contributed to the demise of 
two worlds and failed in their service to God:
“We have these narratives from themselves, for they not only admit them, they 
boast of them and preach them. Would it be for testimony of their justice or their zeal 
for religion? Truly, those are ways too contrary and hostile for so holy an end. If they 
had proposed to extend our faith, they would have considered that it is not in the 
possession of land that it is amplified, but in the possession of men, and they would 
have been more than content with the murders brought about by the necessity of war, 
without adding to these an indiscriminate butchery, as of wild beasts, as universal as 
fire and sword could make it, after purposely sparing only as many as they wanted to 
make into miserable slaves for the working and service of their mines: with the result 
that many of the leaders were punished with death by order of the kings of Castile, who 
were justly shocked by the horror of their conduct; and almost all were disesteemed 
and hated. God justly permitted this great plunder to be absorbed by the sea in its 
transport, or by the intestine wars in which they devoured one another; and most of 
them were buried on the spot without any fruit of their victory”.557
- Man and society.
Montaigne's thought was shaped by the great affairs of his age, but the precise 
nature of their impact has yet to be made clear. Montaigne's study of man made him 
sceptical of man's ability to understand himself and to order his affairs, but his ultimate 
assessment of the human condition was neither entirely pessimistic nor wholly 
relativistic. Although he believed that human knowledge and custom were influenced 
by Fortune and were therefore at least partially contingent, he also believed in the 
guiding power of Providence and maintained the existence of truth and moral 
absolutes, even if he regarded their full apprehension as impossible in this life; and 
although he did not believe in the perfectibility of earthly society, he did in fact believe 
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in the possibility of its improvement. To get at this more fully, it is necessary to look at 
some of his more general reflections on the nature of man and society.
Some scholars have argued that Montaigne ultimately conceives man only in the 
particular and not in general. Frédéric Brahami's “nominalistic” reading of Montaigne 
perhaps suggests that he could not have done otherwise.558 Andre Tournon claims that 
Montaigne regarded the idea of man in general as a philosophical fantasy and dealt only 
with particular men.559 Michael Screech, on the other hand, maintains that Montaigne 
essentially has a “realist” rather than a “nominalist” conception of man, arguing that, 
following Aristotle, Montaigne extrapolated the general from the particular.560 While it 
is unfortunate that this issue has been clouded by a dangerous reliance on extremely 
problematic conceptions of “realism” and “nominalism”, which become even more 
ambiguous in discussions of post-medieval philosophy than they are in discussions of 
medieval philosophy, the issue itself remains. Without entering the quagmire of a 
discussion of “post- medieval nominalism”, because this is not the place to try it, let us 
see if we can come to grips with the question at hand. Stripping it of at least potentially 
flawed conceptual labels, as some of the scholars cited might have done, it comes down 
to the question of whether or not Montaigne believes it is possible to speak of man as 
having a collective nature that is irrespective of the unique personal and cultural details 
that define individual men. In the essay, “Of repentance”, Montaigne tells us, “Others 
form man; I tell of him and represent a particular one, most ill-formed, whom if I had to 
make over I should really make very different from what he is”, and he tells us further 
that the effort to do so is an attempt only, an apprenticeship, because his subject is 
unstable and constantly changing.561 In the essay “Of books”, he says that he seeks 
knowledge of man in general, whom he finds presented in all of his diversity in the 
writings of historians, and this might be his main opinion on the topic: 
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“The historians are my obverse. They are pleasant and easy; and at the same 
time, man in general, the knowledge of whom I seek, appears in them more alive and 
entire than in any other place -the diversity and truth of his inner conditions in mass 
and in detail, the variety of the means of his assembly, and the accidents that menace 
him.”562
It would seem from this that Montaigne, who follows the middle way in all 
things, is capable of conceiving man both in particular and in general. He seeks 
knowledge of man in general. He may ultimately be sceptical of his ability to discover 
this knowledge, but he is not sceptic enough to deny the possibility of it.
Geralde Nakam has argued that Montaigne's study of the past and of other 
societies convinced him of the contingent nature of moral values; that his experience of 
the events of the France of his day made him pessimistic about the ultimate fate of 
human society; and, finally, that his personal experience of government taught him 
compassion and tolerance.563 In general, Nakam's analysis of the circumstances that 
shaped the Essais is masterful, probably the most useful and detailed of such studies. 
Nonetheless, there are one or two issues of concern with respect to her reading of 
Montaigne. First, there is Nakam's assertion that Montaigne rejected the absolute 
primacy of any particular set of religious teachings and embraced Catholicism as a 
matter of custom only, a reading of the Essais that fails to take Montaigne's repeated 
claims of allegiance to Catholicism seriously enough. Generally, moreover, this ties in 
with Nakam's conviction of Montaigne's all but absolute cultural relativism, an 
interpretation of Montaigne that must be ultimately regarded as both inaccurate and 
ahistorical.564 Then too, Nakam's belief in Montaigne's tolerant liberalism, which she 
sees as deriving from his relativism, flies in the face of Montaigne's obvious 
appearance of conservatism.565 Further, Nakam's conclusion that for Montaigne human 
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action is entirely constrained by historical circumstance, the very foundation of her 
entire reading of Montaigne and the ultimate principle from which her other claims 
derive, is fundamentally flawed.566 Finally, her analysis of Montaigne's epistemology is 
incomplete; for although she asserts the probabilistic nature of Montaigne's scepticism, 
she never really grapples with Montaigne's conception of probable knowledge or 
explores the relative roles of reason, faith, and experience in his thought.567
As I have said repeatedly, Montaigne is relativistic but not an absolute relativist; 
he is pessimistic about man's power to perfect himself but not completely cynical in 
this regard; he is sceptical but he nevertheless has a conception of truth. A believer in 
moderation in all things, he detests extremes and almost always follows the middle 
way. He seeks knowledge of this way in the understanding of self and society. The
Essais are the product of that search, but they are also a defense of the path he has 
chosen to walk.
Perhaps the two most important of the Essais for an understanding of 
Montaigne's conception of custom are the “Apology for Raymond Sebond” and “Of 
custom, and not easily changing an accepted law”. In the former, Montaigne considers 
man and his beliefs in general terms. In the latter, he focuses more narrowly on the idea 
of custom. In both he reflects on the ways in which Fortune shapes human affairs, but 
he also touches on Providence in his continuous search for absolutes. In the final 
analysis, Montaigne believes that man and society are shaped not only by 
circumstance, but also by human action, and ultimately he believes that everything is 
guided by the hand of a providential deity. He believes in Fortune, but he does not 
believe in Fate. He believes in the freedom of the will, but he also believes in 
Providence. To make his ultimate conception of man's place in the cosmos clear, 
however, we must first spend a little time with Montaigne's thoughts on custom.
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In the “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, Montaigne argues that man's only claim 
to greatness is the benevolence that his creator has shown to him, and part of his 
defense of Christianity is devoted to contrasting merely human custom with divine 
ordinance. Early on, he makes an extended comparison between man and the animals, 
speaking of man's presumption and inflated self- image,568 concluding that without 
God man is nothing. In a number of places he contrasts the “error of paganism” and its 
“ignorance of our sacred truth” with the true revelation of Christianity.569 It is in this 
regard that he speaks of the Moslem paradise as a seductive lie,570 comments on the 
“farce of ancient deifications”,571 and paints a satirical picture of non-Christian religion 
in general.572 Elsewhere, he considers human society, pointing out that “there is 
nothing in which the world is so varied as in customs and laws” and that “a thing is 
abominable here, which brings comendation elsewhere”.573 He does not, however, find 
all customs equally acceptable in the ideal. He says, “the confusion of worldly customs 
has gained this from me, that conduct and fancies different from mine do not so much 
displease me as instruct me, do not so much swell my pride as humble me when I 
compare them; and any choice other than that which comes expressly from the hand of 
God seems to me a choice of little advantage”, but he also says “I leave aside 
monstrous and unnatural ways of life”.574 Montaigne also explicitly addresses the 
question of the ultimate contingency of values:
“Moreover, if it is from ourselves that we derive the ruling of our conduct, into 
what confusion do we cast ourselves! For the most plausible advice that our reason 
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gives us in the matter is generally for each to obey the laws of his country, which is the 
advice of Socrates, inspired, he says, by divine counsel. And why should reason say 
that, unless that our duty has no other rule than a fortuitous one? Truth must have a 
universal and like face. If man knew any rectitude and justice that had body and real 
existence, he would not attach it to the condition of the customs of this country or that. 
It would not be from the fancy of the Persians or the Indians that virtue would take its 
form”.575
Montaigne directly considers the question of moral relativism and rejects it. He 
writes, “how could that ancient god more clearly accuse human knowledge of 
ignorance of the divine being, and teach men that religion was only a thing of their own 
invention, suitable to bind their society together, than by declaring, as he did, to those 
who sought instruction of his tripod, that the true cult for each was that which he found 
observed according to the practice of the place he was in?”576 When Montaigne speaks 
of “ignorance of the divine being”, of religion as a thing of man's invention, and of the 
contingency of custom, he is speaking largely of non-Christian society. He says, “O 
God, what an obligation do we not have to the benignity of our sovereign creator for 
having freed our belief from these vagabond and arbitrary devotions, and having based 
it on the eternal foundation of his holy word?”577 In Montaigne's eyes, the customs that 
man creates on his own are accidental and contingent; the ordinances of heaven, in 
contrast, are absolute. This is not to say, however, that Montaigne believes that 
Christian ideals have been actualized in western society, nor that all of his world's 
practices are divinely ordained. On the contrary, in the “Apology” and elsewhere, he 
maintains that his society has much in it that is arbitrary and clearly perceives that it has 
fallen short of the Christian ideal in a number of ways.
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Montaigne tries to strike a certain level of balance between relativism and 
objectivity. It might be interesting to briefly consider his influence on one of the most 
complex French thinkers, Blaise Pascal. Pascal admitted that he had carefully read 
Montaigne’s Essais. We can even point out some similarities between his observations 
and Montaigne’s. That may be one of the reasons why Pascal wrote in his Pensées: “It is 
not in Montaigne, but in myself, that I find all that I see in him”.578 Even though Pascal 
was not his follower, it is clear that the author of the Pensées read the Essais, as more 
than one scholar has proven.579 Montaigne’s writings provided him the most varied 
observations and Pascal strongly recommended reading the Apology for Raymond 
Sebond. That is one of the reasons we should not be surprised that Pascal devoted so 
many pages to talk about Montaigne in his Conversation of Pascal with M. de Saci on 
Epictetus and Montaigne.580 We can distinguish two different passages about Montaigne 
in this book, interrupted by Saci’s opinion. In this book, the Conversation with M. de 
Saci, the separation between praise and criticism of Montaigne is not as well established 
as in the case of Epictetus, and the quotations are much freer.581 Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy Pascal’s effort to order and structure issues addressed by Montaigne by his 
proverbial dispersion.
Pascal is initially interested in two aspects of Montaigne’s thought: his 
scepticism and his fideism. At the start, Pascal mentioned Montaigne’s profession of 
Catholicism. According to Pascal, without the light of faith, reason leads to scepticism, 
hence the interest in recovering all the observations of Montaigne intended to demolish 
the building of our certainties, moral principles, the truths of science, justice of laws and 
many other things. This is what Pascal values the most about Montaigne: his critique of 
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the arrogance and the ambitions of human reason, which is precisely why Pascal 
reproached Epictetus. Therefore, Pascal stops to describe the theoretical and practical 
implications of the sceptical attitude of putting everything into question and refrain 
from any claim.
Pascal notes that the doubt that Montaigne applies to everything also applies to 
himself, so that, finally, there is no certainty whatsoever, only questions. This leads to 
the suspension of judgment, a position that characterizes the Pyrrhonians. For this 
reason, Montaigne expressed himself through the use of questions and makes the 
expression “Que sais je?” his motto. With this attitude, he makes fun of all certainties, 
such as the justice of laws, a subject especially dear to Pascal and present in his 
Pensées. This shows the vanity of opinions and of human actions.
Moreover, Montaigne translates into his form of expression the very bottom of 
this thought. That is, his style is characterized not by the use of evidences or rational 
demonstrations, but by demonstrating the variety of opinions and “the contradictions of 
one mind” with one’s own example. His analysis of the common convictions of men 
leads to the conclusion that everything is debatable and uncertain. There is no law or 
custom that is observed by all human beings. 
The author of the Essais mocks the apparent safety of those who trust in the 
laws, when in fact the number of laws multiply and complicate the processes. In 
examining the different perspectives that can be taken on any question, Montaigne 
wants to show that we do not know where the truth lies.
Although at first we may think that this scepticism can lead to religious 
indifference, according to Pascal, Montaigne is able to fight the heretics of his time and 
those who dare to say that God does not exist. This is because Montaigne challenges the 
authority of those, heretics and atheists, who speak of the Sovereign and Infinite Being, 
those who, ultimately, are nothing but finite beings. He remember the difficulties of 
knowing if the soul knows itself, and if it is possible to join the body, what body and 
spirit mean and, in another vein, what is the space or extension, or movement. 
Moreover, Montaigne addresses specific issues of human existence, such as illness, life, 
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death and evil. This is all to show that truth and God are inseparable. Consequently, man 
cannot judge about divine things, since he himself is unable to find the truth in the 
domain of nature.
Montaigne also extends the same uncertainty that undermines human existence 
with insurmountable obstacles to the various sciences, as shown by the examples he 
cites: the axioms and terms that geometry cannot define. He also refers to physics, 
medicine, history, politics, law and morality. Thus, Montaigne attacks the reason that is 
devoid of faith. He forces reason to descend from the heights where is artificially 
installed, and even compared the alleged human intelligence to the wisdom that guides 
animals. In short, according to Pascal, the usefulness of reading Montaigne is to make 
reason get off the high “degree of superiority that it has been attributed to it” and he 
recognizes his joy at seeing “so invincibly battered the conceited reason with its own 
weapons”. This confuses the pride of those who boast of true justice outside the faith.
In spite of this reading of Montaigne, initially so positive, Pascal also noted 
some disadvantages of the philosophy of the author of the Essais.
Pascal recognizes that Montaigne, in fact, acts as a pagan, slipping on the issues 
and considering truth and good in their first appearance. For this reason, Montaigne 
follows the common directions and views, given the effort required to disprove them. In 
practice, in the moral framework, he acts like everyone else and follow the customs of 
the country. Therefore, the rule that applies in his actions is to ensure the comfort and 
tranquillity.
That is, according to Pascal, on the one hand Pyrrhonism is useful in 
undermining human pride and the kind of reason that intends to be God-like, on the 
other hand it is the moral attitude which takes Montaigne.582 Theoretically, one can 
remain in indecision and suspend judgment, but in life, in practice, forces actions 
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rendering it impossible to abstain. Sceptics follow the customs of their country because 
they find it comfortable; for example, they are faithful to their partner not by virtue, but 
to avoid the discomfort that infidelity would cause, following the law of least effort at 
all costs. Therefore, according to Pascal, there is a manifest contradiction in Montaigne, 
for although at first he declares his Catholicism, in fact he does not behave morally as 
such.
In conclusion, reading Montaigne is harmful to those who have a tendency to 
impiety and vices; Montaigne’s Pyrrhonism leads, in practice, to Epicureanism. It must 
be given to Pascal that, indeed, Montaigne, even showing the vanity, weakness and 
inconstancy of the human condition, also recognizes a certain fullness, which is 
incompatible with the religious position of the author of the Pensées, with his tragic 
thought procedure that always poses all available options in terms of “all or nothing”. 
There is no happy medium or traces of Epicureanism in the case of Pascal. Clearly, he 
places himself away from the defence of the ephemeral conducted by Montaigne and 
from his quiet installation and collusion with finitude.583
By experiencing the radical insufficiency of the mundane and human things, 
Pascal will have no choice but to recognize that the output is to seek God, as he states at 
the end of his Conversation with M. de Saci. The deep gap between the finite and the 
infinite can only be saved in accepting Christianity. As for Saint Augustine, a suffering 
and fighting spirit as Pascal, the access to the very essence of God will be in feeling the 
dependence on God in the depths of our being.584 No wonder, therefore, that in his 
Conversation with M. de Saci, Pascal, after having spoken of Epictetus and Montaigne, 
immediately goes to Saint Augustine, centre of Saci’s intervention.
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Going back to the question of moral relativism, in the essay “Of custom, and not 
easily changing an accepted law”, Montaigne considers some of these issues more 
fully and also reflects on the dangers attendant on the effort to improve society. There 
he argues that we are ruled by custom. After a series of anecdotes about different 
customs from around the world, he calls custom more powerful than philosophy,585
saying, “in short, in my opinion, there is nothing that custom will not or cannot do; and 
with reason Pindar calls her, so I have been told, the queen and empress of the 
world”.586 He says, the “principal effect of its power is to seize and ensnare us in such 
a way that it is hardly in us to get ourselves back out of its grip and return ourselves to 
reflect and reason about its ordinances”.587 He also says that when most of us 
encounter a true and absolute moral precept we pay it lip-service only and make no 
real effort to modify our behavior according to its teaching. After speaking of certain 
“barbarous” customs, he nonetheless maintains that it is good, at least to a degree, to 
obey the customs and laws of one's own culture, blaming much of the troubles of his 
own day on innovation, departure from tradition. He considers the Protestants in 
particular to be guilty of this dangerous innovation, but also criticizes some of their 
more fanatical opponents. He speaks of both as switching the places of virtue and vice 
in their efforts to reform society.588 He considers such innovation an example of vanity, 
saying that “it seems to me, to speak frankly, that it takes a lot of self-love and 
presumption to have such esteem for one's own opinions that to establish them one 
must overthrow the public peace and introduce so many inevitable evils, and such a 
horrible corruption of morals, as civil wars and political changes bring with them in a 
matter of such weight—and introduce them into one's own country”.589 He sees the 
Christian injunction of obedience to secular authority as one of the hallmarks of its 
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“justice and utility”. He maintains that “there is a great difference between the cause of 
one who follows the forms and laws of his country and that of the one who undertakes 
to control and change them”.590 He finds the former position admirable in what he calls 
its moderacy. He writes, “whoever meddles with choosing and changing usurps the 
authority to judge, and he must be very sure that he sees the weakness of what he is 
casting out and the goodness of what he is introducing”. He maintains that “private 
fancy” has a “private jurisdiction” only, and that the desire to change public 
institutions, to innovate, is a dangerous one. He claims that it is not in man's power to 
reshape society, only God's, but that Fortune “sometimes presents us with a necessity 
so urgent that it is needful for the laws to make a place for it”.591
Montaigne has at least some sort of idea of an absolute virtue and conceives 
human society as flawed. However, a seemingly conservative champion of tradition, 
he largely rejects innovation; in truth he is a moderate, who believes in reform from 
within. He believes that human society is fundamentally and inevitably maired by the 
human condition, but he also believes that it can be improved, at least to an extent. 
Before we can see how this works, however, we must first turn our attention to his 
thoughts on government and virtue.
Although he does not articulate an elaborate political theory, Montaigne 
nonetheless has a concept of good government, the central notion of which is the idea 
of justice based on public and private virtue. He also believes that there is a sort of 
contractual obligation to maintain that virtue between ruler and ruled.592 Unfortunately, 
his study of man has taught him that virtue, and therefore good government, is not a 
hallmark of human society, an idea which is in keeping with his essentially Augustinian 
theological views. In short, man's condition since the Fall prevents him from creating a 
truly just society, and his affairs are largely constrained by the Fortune that God's 
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Providence has ordained to be his lot. Nevertheless, although Montaigne believes that 
man is influenced by Fortune, by chance and circumstance, he also believes that man 
can adapt to his situation, at least to a certain extent.593 Human society cannot be 
perfected, but it can be improved. The question of how that improvement is to be 
sought, however, is problematic, for Montaigne, as we have seen, rejects innovation 
except in the face of extreme necessity.
Montaigne's reflections on government are scattered throughout the Essais. The 
first thing that should be noted is that Montaigne is not an advocate of any particular 
type of government, but rather maintains that “the best and most excellent government 
for each nation is the one under which it has been maintained”, and he explicitly rejects 
the notion that either monarchy, democracy, or indeed any type of government is 
intrinsically preferable. He also rejects philosophical discussions of the ideal 
government, calling “artificial descriptions” of government “ridiculous and unfit to put 
into practice”.594 He rejects innovation, calling it a “plague”,595 a “deadly drug,”596 and 
maintains that in the end, even when it is well-intentioned, it often leads to “injustice 
and tyranny”.597 He also, however, says that he hates “every sort of tyranny, both in 
words and in acts”.598 He also sees virtue as the key to justice and maintains that our 
rulers should be exemplars of it, saying that for those “who rule and command us, who 
hold the world in their hands, it is not enough to have a common understanding, to be 
able to do what we are able to do; they are far below us if they are not far above us”.599
One of the cornerstones of virtue, for Montaigne, in both ruler and ruled, is 
truthfulness. In the case of the ruler in particular he maintains that keeping his word is 
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essential.600 Referring to some of the followers of Machiavelli, he writes, “those, who 
in our time, in establishing the duties of a prince, have considered only the good of his 
affairs, and have preferred that to caring for his faith and conscience, would have 
something to say to a prince whose affairs Fortune had so arranged that he could 
establish them once and for all by a single breach and betrayal of his word”.601 He 
claims, however, that this is not the way it happens, and that further breaches of faith 
inevitably follow the first.602 For Montaigne, virtue, in both ruler and ruled, is essential 
to justice.
Montaigne's thoughts on virtue itself are also to be found in a number of places. 
His conception of it is ultimately both classical and Christian, and truth is at its core. 
Among the inscriptions on the rafters of his library was the phrase “”,
the “good is admirable”, taken from Plato.603 In the essay “Of Cato the Younger”, he 
says that although he does not consider himself exceptionally virtuous, he believes 
himself capable of recognizing, and admiring, virtue in others, saying that “crawling in 
the slime of the earth, I do not fail to observe, even in the clouds, the inimitable 
loftiness of certain heroic souls”.604 Paraphrasing Socrates, he also says, “the things that 
I know to be bad, like wrongdoing our neighbor and disobeying our superior, whether
God or man, I carefully avoid”, and “those which I do not know to be either good or 
bad, I cannot fear”.605 He does not fully comprehend what virtue is and considers it an 
unattainable ideal, but he nonetheless believes in its existence and has something of an 
idea of what it consists of. He claims “that virtue is something other and nobler than the 
inclinations toward goodness that are born in us”606 and that “self-regulated and 
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wellborn souls follow the same path, and show the same countenance in their actions, as 
virtuous ones”.607 He also writes, however, that “virtue means something greater and 
more active than letting oneself, by a happy disposition, be led gently and peacefully in 
the footsteps of reason”.608 He argues that truth, or perhaps would it be better to say 
truthfulness, is the “first and fundamental part of virtue”.609 Indeed, Montaigne hates 
deception so much that he does not even approve of judges who trick criminals into 
confessing.610 He calls lying an “accursed vice”, saying that “we are men, and hold 
together, only by our word”,611 and that “if we recognized the horror and gravity [of 
lying], we would persecute it with fire more justly than other crimes”. He maintains that 
“people ordinarily fool around chastising harmless faults in children very 
inappropriately, and torment them for thoughtless actions that leave neither imprint nor 
consequences”.612 He argues that “only lying, and a little below it obstinacy, seem to be 
the actions whose birth and progress one should combat insistently”.613 Like many 
before him, he links truth with the good:
“If falsehood, like truth, had only one face, we would be in better shape. 
For we would take as certain the opposite of what the liar said. But the reverse of 
truth has a hundred thousand shapes and a limitless field. The Pythagoreans make 
out the good to be certain and finite, evil infinite and uncertain. A thousand paths 
miss the goal, one goes there”.614
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Montaigne also admires valor and despises cruelty. Of the latter he says that “all 
that is beyond simple death seems to me pure cruelty”,615 and “the horror I feel for 
cruelty throws me back more deeply into clemency than any model of clemency could 
attract me to it”.616 With respect to the former, he conceives a valor that is “true, perfect, 
and philosophical”, a valor “much greater than ours and fuller, which is a strength and 
assurance of the soul, equally despising all sorts of adverse accidents, equable, uniform, 
and constant, of which ours is only a very feeble ray”.617 He fears that this perfect and 
very Stoic seeming valor may be unattainable in this life.618
In all things, however, Montaigne believes in moderation. Of valor he writes that 
it “has its limits like the other virtues, which transgressing we find ourselves in the train 
of vice; so that we may pass through valor to temerity, obstinacy, and madness, unless 
we know its limits well—and they are truly hard to discern near the borderlines”.619 He 
also says that he likes “temperate and moderate natures” and that “immoderation, even 
in the direction of the good, if it does not offend me, astonishes me and gives me 
trouble to name it”.620 He claims that “the archer who overshoots the target misses as 
much as the one who does not reach it”.621
Montaigne believes in virtue, justice, and moderation. He does not, however, 
embrace innovation and feels that Fortune limits our ability to live together in harmony. 
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What remedy, then, if any, does he see for our situation? If our condition cannot be 
perfected in this lifetime, can it be improved, and if so, how?
- Know thyself.
The vagaries of Fortune and our inability to comprehend truth fully not 
withstanding, Montaigne believes that we have the power to improve ourselves and our 
society through the pursuit of virtue. He does not believe that Fortune is all-powerful; 
he is not a determinist, but rather believes in the freedom, if limited efficacy, of the 
human will. He believes that through education and the pursuit of philosophy, which for 
him is at its best as a guide to conduct, we can approach if not reach the good. The key 
to all of this, in Montaigne's eyes, is self-knowledge, and the text of the Essais is 
ultimately the record of his search for self-knowledge and knowledge of the good.
Montaigne's conception of Fortune is both classical and Christian. He regards it 
as the power which, under the guidance of Providence, rules and shapes the events of 
the world. He does not, however, believe that Fortune is all-powerful, and he rejects 
determinism. He believes in chance, not in destiny, and he believes that man has the 
ability to shape his life, at least in part. It is in Montaigne's attitude towards Fortune that 
we see what is often described as his “Stoicism”. Ultimately, however, this attribution 
of Stoicism to Montaigne indicates a misunderstanding both of Stoicism and of 
Montaigne, and although Montaigne may legitimately be called stoical, he should not 
be regarded as a Stoic, even in part. Part of the confusion lies in the fact that there was 
considerable overlap between so-called “schools of thought” in Hellenistic and Roman 
times, and none of them was as rigidly demarcated as is often supposed. The Stoic 
response to circumstance, which Montaigne like Augustine admired but did not accept 
fully, was not characteristic of Stoicism alone, but rather was a fairly commonplace idea 
in classical thought. As a philosophical conception it flowered in the Hellenistic period, 
but it had Hellenic roots, and it largely derives from the Greek conception of man's 
situation vis-à-vis Fate and the Gods. Most of the surviving philosophical discussions of 
it, however, come from Roman times, and in the time of Cicero and after it is largely 
194
part of the stock-in-trade of ethical discussions and as such appears in the writings of 
authors from several different “schools”. Cicero considered himself an Academic 
sceptic, but although he rejected most of the teachings of Stoicism, he clearly admired 
the Stoic cultivation of equanimity. Lucretius the “Epicurean” also embraced it as, 
essentially, did the Pyrrhonian sceptic Sextus Empiricus. Indeed, in Diogenes Laertius, 
we find it to be one of the things that is to be admired about Pyrrho, the “founder” of 
the Pyrrhonic tradition, and about a number of other philosophers as well. This Stoicism 
was essentially a Greek and Roman virtue. It also had Judeo-Christian precursors, 
however, and even though it was ultimately rejected by Augustine and other early 
Christian writers, it exercised a significant influence on the development of Christian 
thought. In other words, Montaigne knew this Stoicism through a number of sources. 
He not only found it in “Stoics” like Horace and Seneca, but also in “Academics” like 
Cicero, “Epicureans” like Lucretius, historians like Diogenes Laertius, and in Christian 
writings as well. More importantly, he imbibed it as a cultural ideal. Montaigne has a 
certain Stoicism then, but he is never a Stoic, for there is little if any evidence to suggest 
that he ever seriously entertained other aspects of Stoic thought; rather he admired the 
Stoicism that he found in the Stoics, but also in others. He did not embrace the fatalistic 
tendencies of Stoicism, however.
Montaigne believed that circumstances affect our lives, and he cultivated a Stoic 
attitude, but he did not believe that our actions are pre-determined. In the essay “Of 
constancy”, he writes, “the law of resolution and constancy does not signify that we 
must not protect ourselves as much as is in our power from the evils and troubles that 
menace us; nor consequently that we should not fear being taken by surprise”.622 He 
goes on to say that “On the contrary, all honest means of safeguarding ourselves from 
evils are not only permitted but laudable”, and “constancy's part is played principally in 
bearing troubles patiently where there is no remedy”.623 Circumstances threaten us, but 
we are not entirely powerless in the face of them. In another place he says, “Fortune 
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does us neither good nor harm; she only offers us the material and the seed of them, 
which our soul, more powerful than she, turns and applies as it pleases, sole cause and 
mistress of its happy or unhappy condition”.624 Elsewhere, he says, “let us offer our 
offerings and vows to ourselves, not to Fortune: she has no power over our character, on 
the contrary, it drags her in its frain and molds her in its own form”.625 In still another 
place he argues that the wise man “disdains [human accidents] and tramples them 
underfoot, having a strong and solid soul, against which the arrows of Fortune, when 
they come to strike, must necessarily bounce off and be blunted, meeting a body on 
which they can make no impression”.626 Elsewhere he even more explicitly rejects the 
idea of fate, saying of fatum that “what we see happen, happens, but it could have 
happened otherwise, and God, in the register of the causes of events which he has in his 
foreknowledge, has also those which are called fortuitous, and the voluntary ones, 
which depend on the freedom he has given to our will; and he knows that we shall err, 
because we shall have willed to err”.627
Montaigne believes that we can contend with Fortune and that we can make the 
best of our earthly situation through the study of ourselves and of the good; that we can 
improve society by improving ourselves, partly through education, the principal 
function of which in his eyes is the cultivation by the young of the desire to know and 
achieve the good. In his essay “Of presumption”, he criticizes the state of education in 
his day, calling it inept, and saying that “its goal has been to make us not good or wise, 
but learned”, arguing that it teaches “the definitions, divisions, and partitions of virtue, 
like the surnames and branches of a genealogy, without any further concern to form 
between us and virtue any familiar relationship and intimate acquaintance”.628 He says 
                                                            
624 Montaigne, Essais, I: 14, "That the taste of good and evil depends in large part on the opinion we have 
of them," p. 67.
625 Montaigne, Essais, I: 50," Of Democritus and Heraclitus," pp. 302-323.
626 Montaigne, Essais, I: 54, "Of vain subtleties," p. 312.
627 Montaigne, Essais, II, 29, "Of virtue," pp. 708-709.
628 Montaigne, Essais. II, 17, "Of presumption," p. 660.
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that a “good education changes your judgment, and conduct, as happened to Polemon, 
that dissipated young Greek, who, having gone by chance to hear a lecture by 
Xenocrates, did not notice merely the eloquence and mastery of the teacher, or bring 
back to his house merely the knowledge of some fine matter, but reaped a more 
perceptible and solid fruit, which was the sudden change and amendment of his former 
life”.629 In the essay “Of the education of children”, he writes, “the gain from our study 
is to have become better and wise by it”.630 There he maintains that the tutor should 
teach the student to let “conscience” and “virtue” “shine forth in his speech”.631 He 
further argues that through the study of man and philosophy the student will learn 
virtually everything that he needs to know.632
Montaigne believes that our troubles ultimately all derive from a failure to 
understand and pursue virtue, and he maintains that we can improve ourselves and our 
society through philosophy, theology, and the study of man. He says, “the sciences 
which regulate men's morals, like theology and philosophy, enter in everywhere”, and 
that “there is no action so private and secret that it escapes their cognizance and 
jurisdiction”.633 He believes that the teachings of philosophy and theology should 
govern our conduct, saying that “philosophy does not think it has badly employed its 
means when it has given to reason the sovereign mastery of our soul and the authority 
to hold our appetites in check”.634 He relates that Socrates maintained “that the principal 
function of wisdom was to distinguish the good from the bad”.635 Montaigne directs us 
to look to past ages for exemplars of virtue and wisdom, citing the valor of the Scipios 
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632 Montaigne, Essais, 1, 26, "Of the education of children," p. 158-159.
633 Montaigne, Essais, I: 30, "Of moderation," p. 198.
634 Montaigne, Essais, II: 33, "The story of Spurina," p. 728.
635 Montaigne, Essais, II: 2, "Of drunkenness," p. 340.
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and the wisdom of Socrates. Following the precept of the Oracle at Delphi and the 
example of Socrates, he urges us to know ourselves and our limitations.636
For Montaigne, self-knowledge is ultimately the key and the whole of 
philosophy and wisdom. He says, “this great precept is often cited in Plato: 'Do thy job 
and know thyself”, and that “each of its parts generally includes our whole duty, and 
likewise includes its companion”.637 He argues that he “who would do his job would see 
that his first lesson is to know what he is and what is proper to him, and he who loves 
himself no longer takes another's business for his own: he loves and cultivates himself 
before anything else; he refuses superfluous occupations and useless thoughts and 
designs”.638 For Montaigne, wisdom consists in knowing ourselves and knowing our 
limitations; knowing our place in the cosmos and pursuing the good insofar as we are 
able, even if we can never fully comprehend its nature in this life:
“It was a paradoxical commandment which that God at Delphi made of old: 
Look into yourself, know yourself, keep to yourself; bring back your mind and your will, 
which are spending themselves elsewhere, into themselves; you are running out, you are 
scattering yourself; concentrate yourself, resist yourself; you are being betrayed,
dispersed, and stolen away from yourself. Do you not see that this world keeps its sight 
all concentrated inward and its eyes open to contemplate itself? It is always vanity for 
you, within and without; but it is less vanity when it is less extensive. Save for you, O 
man, said that god, each thing studies itself first, and, according to its needs, has limits 
to its labors and desires. There is not a single thing as empty and needy as you, who 
embrace the universe: you are the investigator without knowledge, the magistrate 
without jurisdiction, and all in all, the fool of the farce”.639
                                                            
636 Montaigne, Essais, II: 6, "Of practice," p. 380.
637 Montaigne, Essais, I: 3, "Our feelings reach out beyond us," p. 15.
638 Montaigne, Essais, I: 3, "Our feelings reach out beyond us," p. 15.
639 Montaigne, Essais, III: 9, "Of vanity," p. 1001.
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Man is the “fool of the farce”, the “magistrate without jurisdiction”, and the 
“investigator without knowledge”, but he must nonetheless strive to know himself and 
understand his place. Montaigne claims that “the principal charge of each of us is his 
own conduct; and that is what we are here for”, to be the best that we can be.640 He says 
that “just as anyone who should forget to live a good and saintly life, and think he was 
quit of his duty by guiding and training others, would be a fool; even so he who 
abandons healthy and gay living of his own to serve others thereby, takes, to my taste, a 
bad and unnatural course”.641 For Montaigne, our goal and our purpose is to be happy, 
happiness is to be found in virtue, and self-knowledge is the path to virtue.
*****
Montaigne does not claim certainty, but in the Essais he assays his judgment on 
man and society, allowing his reason, his faith, and his experience to guide him in the 
quest for a probabilistic knowledge of the good. He writes, “I guarantee no certainty, 
unless it be to make known to what point, at this time, extends the knowledge of 
myself”.642 He says, “I speak my mind freely on all things, even on those which 
perhaps exceed my capacity and which I by no means hold to be within my jurisdiction, 
and so the opinion I give of them is to declare the measure of my sight, not the measure 
of things”.643 Like Plato's Timaeus, he speaks as a man speaking to other men, of 
opinions and ideas, not of certain and fixed things. In the essay “Of experience”, the 
last of the Essais, he claims with an Aristotelian taste that “there is no desire more 
natural than the desire for knowledge”, and that “we try all the ways that can lead to it”,
                                                            
640 Montaigne, Essais, III: 10, "Of husbanding your will," p. 1007.
641 Montaigne, Essais, III: 10, "Of husbanding your will," p. 1007.
642 Montaigne, Essais, II: 10, "Of books," p. 408.
643 Montaigne, Essais, II: 10, "Of books," p. 410.
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saying that “when reason fails us, we use experience—which is a weaker and less 
dignified means”.644 He acknowledges that “each nation has many customs and usages 
that are not only unknown, but savage and miraculous, to some other nation”,645 but 
nonetheless maintains the belief in a higher law.646 As he tells us elsewhere, he seeks 
the cultivation of the rule of that law in society through education and study, urging an 
inward reform over outward innovation, saying that experience has taught him “that we 
ruin ourselves by impatience”.647 He argues that “must learn to endure what we cannot 
avoid”648 and, by implication, that we must strive where we can:
“It is an absolute perfection and almost divine to know how to enjoy our 
being rightfully. We seek other conditions because we do not understand the use of 
our own, and go outside of ourselves because we do not know what it is like there. 
Yet there is no use our mounting on stilts, for on stilts we must still walk on our 
own legs. And on the most elevated throne in the world we are still sitting only on 
our own ass”.649
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Chapter 5
Montaigne and the sceptical tradition
In the preceding chapters I have considered the extent of Montaigne's debt to 
ancient sceptical sources, the nature of his Christianity and his commitment to the 
primacy of faith over reason, and the relationship between his scepticism and his 
investigation of man and society. All that remains is to tie the conclusions of this study 
together, and to discuss some of its implications. Montaigne is widely regarded as the 
most significant of the sixteenth-century sceptics, and yet as we have seen, in the final 
analysis he turns out to be sceptical, like Socrates and Augustine, rather than an 
absolute sceptic, like Sextus Empiricus; in ancient sceptical terms, an Academic rather 
than a Pyrrhonian; a student of man who believes in the possibility of truth, even if he 
despairs of its attainment in this life. This reading of Montaigne has important 
consequences for our understanding both of the author of the Essais and of the sceptical 
tradition itself. In what follows, I try to deal briefly with each of these issues.
- Montaigne’s scepticism.
Michel de Montaigne was a sceptic who believed in the existence of truth. He 
sought that truth through the medium of the essay, and the Essais of Montaigne are both 
the fruit and the record of that search. The Essais are complex and must be read with 
subtlety. Montaigne's thought is complicated, but his vision is ultimately consistent and 
harmonious. In his search for truth, Montaigne considered the ideas of many of those 
who had gone before him. Sometimes he followed in their footsteps, and sometimes he 
did not. He also looked for truth in the study of man, ultimately finding unity in 
diversity. A student of paradox, Montaigne is a study in paradox, but ultimately there is 
meaning in the paradox of Montaigne; and if Montaigne speaks of probabilities rather 
than certainties, he nonetheless does so with assurance.
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Montaigne may be read from many different perspectives. The Essais can be 
approached philosophically, rhetorically, historically. There is, however, no golden road 
into their heart. A student of perspective, Montaigne plays with perspective itself, and 
the search for his own perspective is one that must encompass a wide territory indeed, 
for Montaigne claims the world as his own. To read passages of the Essais in isolation, 
even to read individual essays without thinking of how they fit into the whole, is to read 
them incompletely. Montaigne deals in anecdotes, but to read him anecdotally is to 
misread him. The unity of the Essais can only be found in their totality. Montaigne 
wears many masks. We must look behind each of them if we are to catch a glimpse of 
his true face. In his search for the truth, Montaigne juxtaposes multiple perspectives, 
balancing them in the scales of his device as he asks, “Que sçais je?” In reading 
Montaigne we must persevere long enough to see not only the question but also the 
answer, even if ultimately our conclusions must remain no less tentative than his own.
Montaigne sought truth in the study of the ancients, in the pursuit of faith, and in 
the study of man. He walked the paths of the Academy with Socrates, Plato, and Cicero. 
He knelt in the temples of Job, Paul, and Augustine. He wandered the world, Old and 
New, with Plutarch and the historians. He listened, but although he heard, he spoke with 
his own voice, even if sometimes his words echoed some of those that came before. 
Like many before him, he spoke not of truth, but of the search for it. Montaigne was a 
sceptic and a Christian. Heir to a complicated tradition that defies simplistic labels like 
“Stoic”, “Sceptic”, and “Epicurean”, he embodied his inheritance in a way that also 
precludes facile characterization. He was not a “Stoic”, a “Sceptic”, or an “Epicurean”, 
either successively or all at once, but a seeker after truth searching in many places. In 
search of him, we must seek with him. We must look at Montaigne and the things he 
looked at, but we must not look for easy answers.
This study has dealt with Montaigne's potential debt to ancient sceptical sources, 
aspects of the Christian tradition, and elements of his study of man. In it I have tried to 
show that the scepticism of Montaigne has more affinity with the doubt of Socrates and 
Augustine than with the absolute scepticism of Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonians. 
By considering Montaigne's judgment of man, faith, and reason, his straightforward 
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and repeated rejection of the suspension of judgment advocated by the Pyrrhonians, I 
have tried to reveal the limits of his scepticism. I have not, however, attempted to deal 
with other aspects of his thought in any significant way. This study has dealt only with 
a cross-section of Montaigne's complicated intersection with the literary traditions to 
which he was heir. Nonetheless, it may suggest new ways of looking at other aspects of 
his thought. Montaigne read and borrowed from many more authors than have been 
considered here. Among the ancients, Horace, Lucretius, and Seneca are particularly 
important in this regard. Then too, Montaigne's considerable debt to Plutarch, whose
Moralia perhaps provided the principal model for his Essais, has only been suggested 
here. There are also many Christian and other non-Christian authors, ancient, medieval, 
and early modern, whose texts have not been considered. Moreover, the conclusions of 
this study suggest that there may still be more to be learned from Montaigne's 
encounters with the ideas of those whose writings have been considered. Montaigne's 
potential debt to Plato in particular, a subject that has received relatively little attention 
among Montaigne scholars, may ultimately prove to be of singular importance. Much 
remains to be done, and if this study accomplishes nothing else, hopefully it will 
suggest new avenues of exploration to those more qualified to undertake them.
Among the broader issues that have been raised but largely unexplored here are 
many questions about the nature of the sceptical tradition to which Montaigne was both 
heir and contributor. This reconsideration of Montaigne's scepticism suggests the need 
for a reevaluation of our understanding of the tradition itself. By way of conclusion, I 
would like briefly to address this subject.
- Montaigne and the sceptical tradition.
The “sceptical crisis” of the early modern period played an important part in the 
methodological discussions of the time, and a proper understanding of its nature is 
crucial to our overall understanding of the historical development of early modern
thought in general. The “sceptical crisis” has often been characterized as a revival of 
ancient scepticism caused by the rediscovery of ancient sources, particularly the 
203
writings of Sextus Empiricus. Although some consideration has been given to the 
impact of the Protestant Reformation on its development, in general the role of other 
ancient and medieval sources, contemporary debates on theological and other subjects, 
and cultural and personal circumstances have received relatively little scholarly 
attention. Moreover, the scepticism of the early modern period has all-too often been 
portrayed in too-simplistic a fashion, as a radical, Pyrrhonian, or absolute scepticism 
that early modern thinkers individually either embraced or rejected totally, or found 
some way to accommodate. The reality was far more complicated, and the study of 
Montaigne's scepticism points to a number of areas where the standard account falls 
short. The reconsideration of Montaigne's scepticism suggests the necessity of a 
reevaluation of the nature of the ancient, medieval, and early-modern aspects of a 
sceptical tradition, which in all probability must ultimately be regarded as having been 
continuous throughout the pre-modern period.
Montaigne's principal sources for ancient sceptical ideas were the writings of 
Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius, and Montaigne's most 
important ancient sceptical model was the doubt of Socrates. Our understanding of 
ancient scepticism cannot be complete without a thorough grasp of the relevance of 
these figures to its evolution, and yet to date the contributions of Cicero and Diogenes 
Laertius only have been closely scrutinized. Sextus Empiricus and others, who, like 
Cicero, have been studied carefully in this context, were important as well, but the full 
story of ancient scepticism has yet to be told. Arcesilas and the Academic sceptics 
claimed Plato, Socrates, and a number of the Presocratics as their predecessors. Cicero 
accepted this claim. Sextus Empiricus did not. Modern scholars should not be too hasty 
to follow the latter, but instead should suspend judgment, at least until the claim has 
been more thoroughly explored.
The impact of the Judeo-Christian tradition on Montaigne's thought in general, 
and on his scepticism in particular, cannot be overstated, and yet all-too often the 
Judeo-Christian sceptical tradition is left more or less out of the picture. Montaigne's 
scepticism was shaped in part by his encounters with the Old Testament scepticism of
Wisdom, Job, and Ecclesiastes, and also with the writings of St. Paul, Lactantius, and 
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St. Augustine, but relatively little attention has been paid to the relationship between 
ancient scepticism and the sceptical ideas contained in these works. During the Middle 
Ages, powerful currents of scepticism permeated the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
traditions, and yet, although their existence has long been acknowledged, their potential 
debt to Greco-Roman antiquity and relevance to the subsequent development of early 
modern scepticism have been dismissed without serious investigation, despite the all-
too obvious similarities between the various traditions.
Montaigne and his contemporaries had access to a wide variety of sceptical 
models, but although their study of these models shaped the development of their 
thought, their ideas were also influenced by contemporary reality. Montaigne at least 
was familiar with the distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism, 
between a scepticism that symbolized the state of the quest for truth and a scepticism 
that denied its existence. Like him, his contemporaries also had the possibility of 
articulating a diverse spectrum of opinions. The complexity of the “sceptical crisis” 
requires further analysis before the nature of early modern scepticism, and the impact of 
ancient sceptical ideas, theological concerns, and cultural circumstances on its 
development, can be fully understood.
Our understanding of the “sceptical crisis” needs to be reexamined. Its precise 
nature and the question of its continuity or discontinuity with earlier developments 
needs to be more thoroughly investigated. Only then can we begin to understand its full 
place in the story of early modern thought. The study of Montaigne's scepticism perhaps 
offers some suggestions as to how we might proceed. Looking at Montaigne in a new 
light, we need to be prepared to look at his contemporaries differently as well.
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